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[The joint defense privilege] permits coconspirators to continue to
conspire at a common defense, now with the privileged assistance of
teams of lawyers.1
INTRODUCTION
You are the chief executive officer of a company under investiga-
tion by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to fix prices. Several of
your own employees, as well as those of your largest competitor, have
been questioned by FBI agents and some, you gather, have appeared
before the grand jury. The prosecutor has offered you a deal-plead
to a felony, pay a substantial fine, give full and truthful testimony (i.e.,
snitch), and receive no jail time-and you agonize over it. Whether
the deal is a good one depends on what others are saying and, more
to the point, what others plan to do-that is, do they plan to snitch
first? But how can you find out? You can ask them, of course, but
there are no guarantees you will receive honest answers. And if some-
one is already cooperating with the government, any overtures from
you may later be interpreted as obstruction of justice. Prosecutors
have threatened that their "generous" deal is not open indefinitely,
and if the CEO of the other company takes it first, then the offer is
withdrawn. What do you do?
Now imagine the same scenario playing itself in this manner:
your able counsel-and for what you're paying him, he'd better be
able-originally represented all of the employees at your company.
When informed by prosecutors of a conflict of interest, your counsel
1 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.4.9 (1986).
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kindly arranges for representation for all of the employees. Their law-
yers are all members of smaller firms, many of which spun off from
the battleship firm representing you. The general counsel of your
company, with the approval of the board of directors, has agreed to
reimburse the legal fees for all of the company's employees. Your law-
yer speaks daily with his colleagues and learns what their clients are
telling prosecutors, and what prosecutors are telling them. You are
relieved to learn that your chief financial officer has told a story sprin-
kled with just enough of the truth to be believable, and you have
shaped your own story accordingly. Best of all, the CEO at your com-
petitor is represented by your own attorney's law school roommate
and close friend. The two have brokered a deal: hang tough, nobody
cooperates. Dozens of subpoenas are outstanding, and the army of
defense lawyers marshaled in the case is fighting each and every one.
"Delay, delay, delay," your attorney tells you-which is easy for him to
say, you grimly note, since the meter is running, but you know it is in
your interest as well. Then, a break: the lead Department of Justice
prosecutor departs for the greener pastures of private practice, leav-
ing her underling, who never seemed to grasp the case, in charge.
And finally, your lawyer gets a call from the prosecutor and hears the
word you've all been waiting for: misdemeanor. Plead to a misde-
meanor, pay a small fine, and the nightmare goes away. And it does.
It is often in the interest of persons under investigation by a fed-
eral grand jury to share information. One practical difficulty with
such sharing is that it may remove the cloak of privilege that otherwise
shields certain information from prying eyes. When one party reveals
information protected by the attorney-client privilege to another, the
disclosure ordinarily effects a waiver of the privilege. Parties that per-
ceive themselves in common interest are free to share information,
but the price of such sharing may be the loss of the privilege.
The joint defense privilege emerged to address and, in part, dis-
solve this difficulty. It allows parties to share information with others
in common legal interest, without waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege. Although the joint defense privilege is of relatively recent ori-
gins,2 it has already given rise to litigation in many of the highest
profile criminal investigations and prosecutions in recent memory.3
2 The first federal case to recognize the joint defense privilege was Continental
Oil v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Gir. 1964).
3 The joint defense privilege and joint defense agreements have also given rise
to controversy in civil cases, most recently tobacco litigation involving the Ligget
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These include: the largest prosecutions of Defense Department fraud
in American history ("Operation Uncover"4 and "Operation III
Wind"5), the investigation into the collapse of the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International financial empire, 6 the investigation into ille-
gal campaign contributions during the 1996 presidential election, 7
the prosecutions of Congressman Joseph McDade, 8 Governor Edwin
Edwards, 9 and the World Trade Center bombers, 10 and perhaps most
famously, the independent counsel's investigation of President Bill
Clinton. am During the Monica Lewinsky investigation, joint defense
agreements proved to be fodder for discussion in newspapers and
popular journals and, more heatedly, on television shows devoted to
legal and political issues.' 2
And these high-profile cases are only the tip of the iceberg. Prac-
titioners' guides to white-collar crime now regularly include entire
chapters devoted to the drafting of agreements (known as joint de-
fense agreements) that formalize the sharing of privileged informa-
Group. See Alex M. Friedman, Another Break in Tobacco Industry's Ranks, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 9, 1997, at B1. The focus of this Article, however, is criminal investigations.
4 See Kiely v. Raytheon Co., 914 F. Supp. 708 (D. Mass. 1996); Aaron Zitner, Guilt
by Disassociation: Ex-Manager Says Raytheon Left Him Holding the Bag, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 28, 1995, at 65.
5 See ANDY PASZTOR, WHEN THE PENTAGON WAS FOR SALE 283, 287 (1995).
6 See Linda Himelstein, Top Lawyers Are Subpoenaed in BCCI Probe, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 27, 1992, at 1.
7 See United States v. Hsia, 81 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2000); Carrie Johnson, De-
fense in Hsia Case Cries Foul, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1999, at A3.
8 See United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (E.D. Pa.
July 30, 1992).
9 See United States v. Edwards, 39 F. Supp. 2d 716 (M.D. La. 1999).
10 See Mary B.W. Tabor, Lawyer-Client Issue Rises in Bomb Conspiracy Case, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 1994, at B3.
11 Litigation over the application of the joint defense privilege arose in the
Whitewater investigation, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910
(8th Cir. 1997), and in the Lewinsky investigation, see In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100
(D.C. Cir. 1998). The Clinton White House also claimed the joint defense privilege
in the context of congressional investigations. See S. REP. No. 104-191, at 39 (1995);
see also Susan Schmidt, Panel Votes Whitewater Subpoena; White House Assets Attorney-Client
Shield for Meeting in 1993, WASH. PosT, Dec. 9, 1995, at Al.
12 See Burden of Proof (CNN television broadcast, May 1, 2000), LEXIS, News Li-
brary, CNN file (quoting a lawyer noting that "prosecutors absolutely hate these joint
defense agreements"); Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Aug. 28, 1998), LEXIS,
News Library, CNBC file (quoting a former prosecutor describing a joint defense
agreement as a "perjury map").
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tion among witnesses in a grand jury investigation. 1 3 As one former
prosecutor noted before Congress, "The reality in the District of Co-
lumbia, as I've come to know it, is that there are joint defense agree-
ments, and these joint defense agreements are as thick as closing
binders. They're probably two, three inches thick."'14
The academic and practitioners' literature is filled with praise of
the joint defense privilege. Joint defense agreements are said to be
beneficial for a number of reasons: they facilitate a flow of informa-
tion among subjects of an investigation, which is assumed to be a good
thing,15 as well as promote efficiency (by permitting parties to divide
up tasks)16 and fairness (by permitting parties to coordinate strategies
and overcome informational advantages ordinarily wielded by the
prosecutor).' 7 The occasional note of dissent is sounded,' 8 but the
literature is overwhelmingly devoted to arcane and often intractable
questions involving the contours of the privilege.' 9 Concerns about
13 See, e.g., 2 OTTo G. OBERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
BusINEss AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 17 (2000); Jed R. Rakoff, The Drafting of Joint
Defense Agreements, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 9, 1995, at 3.
14 Appointing Independent Counsel To Investigate Campaign Irregularities in the '96 Pres-
idential Campaigns, Hearing Before the House Gov't Reform and Oversight Comm., 105th
Cong. (1998), at 1998 WL 442759, pt. 3 [hereinafter Independent Counsel Hearing] (tes-
timony of Charles LaBella).
15 See, e.g., Susan K. Rushing, Note, Separating the Joint-Defense Doctrine from the At-
torney-Client Privilege, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (1990) ("The joint-defense privilege
fulfills the social goal of encouraging interparty communications by preserving their
confidentiality.").
16 See, e.g., 2 OBERMAIER & MORVILLO, supra note 13, § 17-4 ("[A] joint defense
agreement may result in more efficient and more effective case management. By di-
viding up tasks, counsel can avoid duplication of efforts, thereby reducing costs.").
17 See, e.g., ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., RECOMMENDATION THAT STATE
CIVIL COURTS ADOPT THE COMMON INTREsr PRVLEGE (Jan. 28, 1998), http://
www.abcny.org/interest.htm [hereinafter NEW YoRx BAR RECOMMENDATION] (arguing
that the joint defense privilege is "rooted in common sense, efficiency and fairness");
Deborah Stavile Bartel, Reconceptualizing the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65 FoRDHAM L. REV.
871, 873 (1996) (-A trial becomes a lopsided contest when multiple co-defendants are
discouraged from coordinating their defense and present unnecessarily inconsistent
defenses. Relegating defendants to uncoordinated and inconsistent defenses bestows
an unfair tactical advantage on the prosecution because inconsistent defenses impair
the credibility of the defense as a whole.").
18 See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 6.4.9; Paul L. Seave, Conflicts and Confidences-
Does Conflict of Interest Kill the Joint Defense Privilege? The Prosecution Viewpoint, CRIM.
JusT., Spring 1992, at 7.
19 See Michael G. Scheininger & Ray A. Aragon, Joint Defense Agreements, LTIG.,
Spring 1994, at 11, 12 ("The boundaries of the joint defense/common interest privi-
lege is murkier than those of the Milky Way.").
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joint defense agreements20 are trotted out only to be mocked in a
throwaway footnote or dismissive paragraph. 21 Prosecutors in particu-
lar are chided for their ignorance of the mechanics of joint defense
agreements, and for their failure to appreciate the societal benefits of
the privilege in the context of criminal investigations. 22
This Article questions the prevailing wisdom and argues that the
joint defense privilege, especially in the context of criminal investiga-
tions, is of doubtful social utility. The Article first questions the doc-
trinal underpinnings of the recently minted privilege. Courts and
commentators have tended to view the joint defense privilege as a log-
ical corollary of the attorney-client privilege. Although beguiling, this
approach is flawed. The purposes behind the attorney-client privilege
are not consistent with the joint defense privilege. The attorney-client
privilege exists to afford adequate legal representation to lay persons
by allowing them to make a full disclosure of factual information to a
person with expertise in the law. Although the attorney-client privi-
lege may often shelter the guilty, this cost is considered worth paying
to encourage complete divulgence both by the person whose cause is
partially just and by the person who mistakenly regards some of his or
her actions as legally culpable. Once disclosure is made to a client's
attorney (and the attorney's agents), the policy behind the privilege is
satisfied. The logic of the attorney-client privilege lends no support
to the extension of the privilege to communications among lawyers
and clients who happen to have interests in common.
The Article also questions the policy arguments raised on behalf
of the joint defense privilege and attempts to tentatively develop a
new justification for it. Many of the claimed benefits of the joint de-
fense privilege in fostering a flow of information are, from society's
perspective, largely specious; and many of the costs of the privilege,
which are often unrecognized, are grave indeed. Focusing on the use
of thejoint defense privilege and joint defense agreements in criminal
20 For example, the head of the Department ofJustice's Criminal Division in the
final years of the Clinton administration noted thatjoint defense agreements have the
"potential for mischief" for they "allow targets to circle the wagons and make it diffi-
cult for prosecutors successfully to complete an investigation or prosecution." Irvin B.
Nathan, Interview: Asst. Attorney General James Robinson Speaks to White Collar Criminal
Issues, 6 Bus. Crimes L. Rep. (N.Y. Law Publ'g) No. 12, at 3 (Jan. 2000).
21 See, e.g., Paul L. Perito et al., Joint Defense Agreements: Protecting the Privilege, Pro-
tecting the Future, CruM. JusT., Winter 1990, at 40.
22 See Robert Morvillo, ModernizingJoint Defense Agreements, N.Y. LJ., June 1, 1999,
at 3 ("Joint defense agreements have become a staple in multi-defendant cases, a phe-
nomena frowned upon by prosecutors who do not appear to understand their pur-
pose and mechanics.").
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investigations and prosecutions, I argue that courts and legislatures
should re-think this novel privilege and cabin its application.
The bestjustification for the joint defense privilege -is that it helps
to protect innocent persons swept up in a criminal investigation.
Such persons might be pressured by a prosecutor into falsely incrimi-
nating themselves or others. They may be bolstered in their resolve to
resist the prosecutor and tell the truth, if they can meaningfully com-
municate with other witnesses. From this justification for the privi-
lege, however, certain consequences follow for its scope. In the
criminal context, only actual defendants (parties who have already
been indicted) or targets of investigation (parties with a reasonable
expectation of indictment) should be able to avail themselves of the
privilege. This limits the use of the privilege to those most under pres-
sure from prosecutors and prevents peripheral witnesses in an investi-
gation (whose interests are often far different from the targets) from
being swept in with the more culpable parties.
Part I of the Article depicts the difficulties that conspirators face
in coordinating a response to a criminal investigation. The game the-
oretic model of the prisoner's dilemma helps illuminate the difficul-
ties that may be alleviated when criminal defense lawyers enter the
scene. As repeat players in the justice system, lawyers are capable of
making meaningful promises not to betray one another and are there-
fore better positioned than their clients, acting alone, to defeat the
prisoner's dilemma. However, without the joint defense privilege,
lawyers and clients would still face significant disincentives to share
information. Pledges of secrecy made among lawyers and clients with
common interests would not be enforceable against prosecutors.
Part II exposes the flawed doctrinal underpinnings of the joint
defense privilege. The attorney- client privilege, which encourages cli-
ents to make full factual disclosures to their attorneys, does not sup-
port the creation of a privilege that shields communications among all
those who claim to have interests in common. Indeed, the attorney-
client privilege was traditionally circumscribed by a "confidentiality re-
quirement"; this required lawyers and clients, on penalty of waiver of
the privilege, to preserve the confidentiality of any disclosures vis-a-vis
the rest of the world. A misunderstanding of the purposes of the at-
torney-client privilege, and the utility of the confidentiality require-
ment in limiting the costs of the attorney-client privilege, have
propelled the development of the joint defense privilege. This Part
concludes with an archaeological exploration of the joint defense
privilege, from its obscure origins to its recent, explosive growth. As is
apparent, doctrinal confusion has encouraged lawyers to press for in-
discriminate expansion of the new privilege.
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Part III then examines the current state of the joint defense privi-
lege. The contours and scope of the privilege are, in fundamental
respects, uncertain, and these uncertainties have generated a growing
number of litigated cases. Courts have wrestled with both government
motions to disqualify counsel on conflict of interest grounds (when
one member of ajoint defense agreement defects and becomes a gov-
ernment witness) and defense motions to dismiss indictments (when
the government secures information from individuals who have de-
fected from joint defense agreements). Inconclusive answers have re-
sulted, especially since courts have failed to clarify the ethical duties
owed an attorney in a joint defense agreement to clients other than
her own.
Part IV evaluates the proposed policy rationales for the joint de-
fense privilege, drawing from judicial opinions and scholarly commen-
tary. The benefits of the joint defense privilege in fostering a flow of
information among those with common interests are often overstated.
Much information, such as legal memoranda and notes of interviews
with third party witnesses, would be shared even without the joint de-
fense privilege. Proponents of the joint defense privilege argue that
society benefits when witnesses in a criminal investigation and their
attorneys can directly collaborate. Such collaboration, it is said, aids
in the discovery of the truth by encouraging a more vigorous and fair
adversary process. It is also argued that collaboration enhances the
efficiency of the criminal justice system by allowing lawyers to share
the burdens of representation. These claims are scrutinized and
found to be not wholly convincing. The search for truth, and the ex-
peditious sorting of the innocent and guilty, is, in many cases, frus-
trated when witnesses collaborate with one another. This Part also
notes thatjoint defense agreements may vastly multiply the quantity of
work a lawyer is able to perform on his client's behalf, rendering ques-
tionable claims that the joint defense privilege reduces legal fees.
Part V offers a better rationale for the joint defense privilege, fo-
cusing on the plight of an innocent person swept into a criminal inves-
tigation. Such an individual may, in some circumstances, be
pressured by a prosecutor to falsely incriminate herself. The implica-
tions of this rationale are a more narrowly focused privilege, ex-
tending only to those who are either defendants or facing the
reasonable prospect of indictment. I argue that an overbroad joint
defense privilege that permits all those questioned in a criminal inves-
tigation to enter into information-sharing pacts often endangers the
witnesses with little or no criminal exposure. I also explore the possi-
bility that joint defense arrangements will impel prosecutors to apply
ever more invasive tactics in their quest for information.
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I. THE PRISONER's DILEMMA
The hypothetical price-fixing investigation that introduced this
Article depicts the difficulties conspirators face in continuing their
conspiracy and meaningfully cooperating once a criminal investiga-
tion has begun. Simply put, how can conspirators trust each other in
the shadow of a grand jury investigation? This inability to trust each
other and meaningfully cooperate is famously depicted in the game
theoretic model known as the "prisoner's dilemma."
In Part II.A, I explore how conspiracies may unravel as prosecu-
tors offer rewards for incriminating testimony. The prisoner's di-
lemma is socially beneficial in frustrating continued cooperation
among the guilty and creating incentives for defection. However, the
prisoner's dilemma "works" on the innocent as well as the guilty.
There is the risk that an innocent or only marginally culpable party
will find himself in a prisoner's dilemma, pressured to come forward
with falsely incriminating evidence or suffer steeper penalties. Part
II.B considers the role of defense lawyers in coordinating a response
to a criminal investigation and defeating a prisoner's dilemma. Al-
though the conspirators themselves often cannot meaningfully coop-
erate, their lawyers, acting as intermediaries, can. Because attorneys
are involved in repeat business relationships with each other, they
have an incentive to abide by their reciprocal promises. Part II.C ar-
gues that an evidentiary privilege is, in addition, an essential precondi-
tion for such cooperation. In the absence of ajoint defense privilege,
lawyers and clients would be reluctant to share confidences because of
the risk that prosecutors could discover their communications.
A. Conspiracy and Cooperation
In the early 1500s, Niccolo Machiavelli cautioned rulers that the
gravest threats to civil order come not from one man acting but from
conspiracies of men joined together in a criminal venture.2 3 Several
centuries later, Justice Robert Jackson tersely captured the Machiavel-
lian insight: "[T] o unite, back of a criminal purpose, the strength, op-
portunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and
more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer. ' 2 4
Society has developed a variety of strategies to combat criminal
conspiracies. Criminal laws have traditionally assessed penalties for
23 See NiccoLo MACHIAVELLI, DIscouRsEs ON Lrvy 218-35 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Nathan Tarvoc trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1996) (1512).
24 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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conspiracies far in excess of what is accorded similar offenses commit-
ted by a solitary criminal. 25 A conspirator can be held responsible,
and punished, for criminal acts in which he did not participate and of
which he lacked actual knowledge.2 6 Moreover, in conspiracy cases
the criminal law relaxes the prosecutor's evidentiary burdens at trial,
allowing her to introduce, for example, hearsay evidence that would
otherwise be excluded in a trial of an individual defendant.27
Through the enhanced likelihood of conviction and the prospect of
steeper penalties, the criminal law effectively increases the ex ante
costs of conspiracy: for those embarking on such a venture, the ex-
pected payouts-both positive and negative-exceed those of solitary
endeavors.
Furthermore, and most relevant for our purposes here, the crimi-
nal law exploits the increased risks of detection that are inherent in
the conspiratorial venture itself. In this manner, too, the law height-
ens the risks for those who would, in a conspiracy, seek most gravely to
jeopardize the social order. As Machiavelli points out, the detection
risks of conspiracy-prior to its implementation, during its operation,
and in its aftermath-are straightforward: as the number of people in
the know increases, so too does the risk that one member will, inad-
vertently or intentionally, betray his co-conspirators. 28
Of course, betrayal ordinarily entails an element of self-accusa-
tion, and this in turn ordinarily entails penalties for the would-be
defector. As a consequence, a "conspiracy of silence" may be pre-
served insofar as it benefits all involved. But the common law long
recognized that authorities are permitted to reward those who defect
from a conspiracy, and especially those who defect first.29 Indeed,
once the authorities have caught wind of a criminal conspiracy, the
bonds that once cemented a conspiracy of silence may disintegrate,
and a race to betray may begin. This possibility of reciprocal betrayal
is famously captured in the so-called prisoner's dilemma, as described
by William Poundstone:
25 See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961).
26 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946).
27 See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2) (E); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218
(1974).
28 See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 23, at 218-24. The Supreme Court has noted,
"Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his com-
panions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness,
the association will very probably end or never materialize." United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)
(holding that defendant's "misplaced confidence" in a co-conspirator turned police
informer is not entitled to constitutional protection).
29 See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 85 (1995).
1458 [VOL- 77:5
2002] A NEW APPROACH TO JOINT DEFENSE AGREEMENTS
Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned.
Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of speaking
to or exchanging messages with the other. The police admit they
don't have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal
charge. They plan to sentence both to a year in prison on a lesser
charge. Simultaneously, the police offer each prisoner a Faustian
bargain. If he testifies against his partner, he will go free while the
partner will get three years in prison on the main charge.... If both
prisoners testify against each other, both will be sentenced to two
years in jail.30
In this classic form of the prisoner's dilemma, each player is bet-
ter off betraying the other player regardless of what his counterpart
does, and, as a consequence, defection will constitute the dominant
strategy of each. What this means, however, is that both prisoners are
worse off than they would have been had they somehow entered into a
binding agreement not to betray the other. Society, on the other
hand, benefits through the application of the prisoner's dilemma.3 1
Confessions in hand from both criminals, the prosecutor and police
need not invest time in further investigation, nor consume judicial
resources at a trial. The prisoner's dilemma is not a dilemma at all, at
least from the prosecutor's perspective; it is, rather, the "optimal
solution."32
But it is, it must immediately be added, an imperfect solution.
The prisoner's dilemma creates incentives for testimony, but there are
no independent guarantees that the testimony obtained by the prose-
cutor will be reliable. The "prisoner" is rewarded for testimony of a
specific kind-that is, testimony that the prosecutor wants to hear.
3 3
If the prosecutor signals his suspicion that a certain person is guilty,
the "prisoner" may be apt to confirm this belief, regardless of whether
such testimony accurately corresponds to the prisoner's recollections.
There is, moreover, the risk that an innocent person will be pres-
sured to falsely incriminate himself. When considering the prisoner's
dilemma, it is easy to assume that the police and prosecutors have
30 WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PIsoNER's DILEMMA 118 (1992); see also ROBERT AXEL-
ROD, THE EvoLUTION OF COOPERATION 8-9 (1984).
31 See Gordon Tullock, The Prisoner's Dilemma and Mutual Trust, 77 ETHICS 229,
229 (1967) ("By deliberately putting the criminals in the dilemma, the prosecutor is
acting rationally; and if they follow their individual rationality, society as a whole will
be better off .... ).
32 See Pamela Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing
Vision of the Right to Counse4 105 HARv. L. REV. 670, 693 (1992).
33 For an insightful exploration of the problem, see generally Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68
FoRHaM L. Rav. 917 (1999).
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captured the guilty parties. In a criminal investigation, however, a
prosecutor might become convinced that an innocent or only margin-
ally culpable party is guiltier than is really the case. Such a party
might be enticed to provide falsely incriminating evidence, against
himself and others, or face steep penalties. Prosecutorial discretion in
charging3 4 and immunity35 decisions, as well as in sentencing reduc-
tion motions,36 is vast and essentially unreviewable. Especially against
the backdrop of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a prosecutor can
ratchet up the threats on the one hand and the rewards on the
other.3 7 Or, in the vocabulary of the prisoner's dilemma, a prosecutor
can increase the "'temptation differentials"' 38 to the point that even
an innocent party may be unable to resist.39
Although the model of the prisoner's dilemma has been applied
far and wide, from international trade disputes40 to principles of stare
decisis, 41 it might, at first blush, seem to have little application to the
hypothetical grand jury investigation that introduced this Article. Re-
call the two targets of the grand jury investigation-CEO No. 1 of
Company A and CEO No. 2 of Company B, both under investigation
for price-fixing. Unlike the petty criminals of the prisoner's dilemma,
the CEOs are emphatically not in "solitary confinement," as Pound-
stone proposes, and indeed they may have ample "means of speaking
to or exchanging messages with [one] another." They may ride the
same commuter train home each evening; they may golf at the same
country club. Moreover, the choices confronting them are far more
varied than those confronting the prisoners of the famed dilemma.
For our white-collar criminals, the issue is likely not whether to coop-
34 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987).
35 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1994).
36 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5K1.1 (1998) (authorizing down-
ward departure from sentencing guidelines where defendant offers "substantial
assistance").
37 The literature on this point is vast. See, e.g., Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1471, 1475-76 (1993).
38 See CHARLESJ. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS 16-17 (1984).
39 SeeJulie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax
Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 551 (2001) ("The prisoner's dilemma can lead to the
imposition of five-year sentences on innocent individuals as well as guilty ones be-
cause the incentive to plead guilty falsely is as cogent as the incentive to truthfully
plead guilty."). But see infra note 327 and accompanying text (arguing that innocent
witnesses may be less vulnerable to the prisoner's dilemma than guilty ones).
40 See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of
International Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L LJ. 501, 503-04 (1985).
41 See Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic
Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 736 (1993).
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erate with the prosecutor, but how much to cooperate. Indeed, the
real difficulty-not nearly so bipolar as to merit the word "di-
lemma"-is not whether to testify, but what to testify to.
Nonetheless, the model of the prisoner's dilemma illuminates
something central to the problem confronted by the up-scale conspir-
ators. The nub of the problem faced by the "prisoners" is not that
they cannot communicate but that they cannot trust each other, and
they therefore cannot meaningfully agree to cooperate with one an-
other. It is not a failure of communication that marks the prisoner's
dilemma but an inability to meaningfully cooperate in pursuit of a
common goal. Put the prisoners in the same room, rather than sepa-
rate rooms, and their "dilemma" is as acute as ever. The prisoners
may exchange blood oaths they will never squeal, but when they are
escorted into separate rooms for questioning, neither can rely on the
antecedent promises and neither can be certain that the other will
resist the prosecutor's threats and entreaties.
Now consider the CEOs. Even as they ride the same commuter
train each night, consider the obstacles they face to meaningful coop-
eration. One CEO contemplates approaching the other and plotting
to stonewall the prosecutors or to craft a false alibi. But then he
thinks twice: the other CEO may have already begun to cooperate
With prosecutors or may plan to do so in the future. The risk that the
other might defect, or has already defected, chills any effort to coordi-
nate a defensive strategy. One CEO muses, "If I suggest that we lie,
then price-fixing may be the least of my troubles. Then they'll be
threatening me With obstruction of justice as well."
It is important to recognize that preventing cooperation is desira-
ble in the above scenario where the parties are in fact guilty and
where the results of any collaboration would obstruct the expeditious
sorting of the guilty and innocent. But it is not immediately apparent
that society benefits when innocent parties are frustrated from collabo-
rating with other innocent parties under investigation. Such collabo-
ration may bolster the resolve of the innocent witness to resist the
prosecutor's threats to provide falsely incriminating testimony. And it
might also reveal that many of the prosecutor's threats are little more
than puffery, for other witnesses are not, as perhaps claimed by the
prosecutor, on the verge of testifying against the innocent witness.
The innocent witness, like the guilty one, might seek to obtain mean-
ingful assurances from others under investigation that they do not in-
tend to testify against him. But how are such meaningful assurances
possible in the shadow of a criminal investigation?
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B. The Role of Lawyers in Enforcing Promises To Cooperate
Enter the defense lawyers: how will that affect the problem faced
by the CEOs? One suggestion is that the prisoner's dilemma then
"may simply be played out at a different level. Each attorney will ad-
vise her client to cooperate with the prosecutor, because none can be
sure that the other defendants' lawyers are not agreeing to stonewall
while secretly planning to claim the prosecutor's offer for their cli-
ents. '42 But this suggestion fails to appreciate the significance of the
change effected by the introduction of lawyers. Most fundamentally,
lawyers, unlike their clients, are repeat players in the criminal justice
system, and this allows defense lawyers to make meaningful
promises-meaningful in the sense that a penalty may attach to a fail-
ure to abide by them. If one CEO promises the other that he will not
cooperate in a criminal inquiry, the promise may be largely meaning-
less, for the two do not anticipate being in the same predicament
again. To be precise, the promise is largely meaningless because no
penalty, at least in the form of legal sanction, can attach to its breach.
There may, of course, be reputational harms incurred to the extent
one becomes widely known as a "false friend."43 But in many circles
the fact that one is a convicted felon is doubtless more damaging than
whispered chatter that one ratted out a friend. Country clubs may
exclude those convicted of felonies, but they risk depopulation if they
exclude those who have betrayed their friends.
By contrast, a criminal defense lawyer who reneges on an agree-
ment not to cooperate with a prosecutor may incur meaningful
reputational harms in the professional circles in which he travels. 44
Criminal inquiries are, of course, the business, and the increasingly
lucrative business, of criminal defense attorneys. Although the wealth
and prestige of the defense bar has grown considerably over the past
quarter century,45 the problem for the aspiring white-collar defense
42 Karlan, supra note 32, at 694.
43 See Richman, supra note 29, at 80-86 (collecting sources from a variety of cul-
tures stigmatizing "snitches" and "informers").
44 See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 2.1 ("The most widely effective form of regula-
tion of lawyers... [is] the network of informal sanctions that are brought to bear
against lawyers who offend accepted norms of professional behavior.").
45 Until recently, the criminal defense bar was composed mostly of solo or small-
firm practitioners. It was, because of low levels of government funding for representa-
tion of indigent defendants, rather poorly compensated compared with the rest of the
profession. The expansion of substantive criminal liability and aggressive prosecution
of white-collar defendants beginning in the 1970s has created a market for skilled
legal services. As the nature of criminal defendants, especially in the federal system,
has changed, the nature of their lawyers has changed as well. More corporations and
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lawyer is that there is generally little possibility of repeat clients. A
partner in a large firm whose specialty is securities regulation, by con-
trast, has an easier time of it. If he is fortunate enough to develop a
good working relationship with a general counsel at a large company,
he can expect repeat business year in and year out, addressing the
company's regulatory issues, overseeing its bond offerings, etc. With
such a portable "book of business," he may hop from one firm to an-
other, demanding raises and other perks, because he will have a
demonstrated ability to generate business. The white-collar defense
lawyer has it much harder, for as one defense lawyer succinctly put it,
"I have cases, not clients. '46 If the bad news for white-collar criminal
defense lawyers is that there may be little repeat business from a single
client, the good news is that even one federal investigation can gener-
ate a great deal of work-more work than even one defense attorney
can handle. This is not necessarily because the resources of a large
firm would be overly taxed, but because conflict of interest rules usu-
ally foreclose one firm from representing all persons ensnared in the
investigation.47
Take our hypothetical price-fixing investigation. Several dozen
officers and employees of each company receive grand jury subpoenas
or visits from federal agents. Although a law firm may originally re-
present all the employees at a company, as well as the company itself,
the prosecutor will often advise that, in light of potential conflicts,
separate representations should be pursued. The attorney represent-
ing the company may continue the representation of the CEO, but he
will refer the rest of the employees to other attorneys-in all likeli-
hood, to trusted attorneys with whom he has worked before and antic-
ipates working again. As one white-collar attorney acknowledged,
when referring a person who may have had information damaging to
his client to another lawyer, "he wanted a friend in the case who
would not turn this guy against his client."48 Examples abound of re-
ferrals to attorneys who are dependent upon future work and who are
business executives are investigated for, and charged with, criminal activity, and, as a
consequence, the profile of criminal defendants now includes persons with sufficient
wealth, as well as access to the media, to defend themselves vigorously. See KENNETH
MANN, DEFENDING WHrrE-CoLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ArroRNYmS AT WORK 21-26
(1985); William J. Genego, The New Adversaiy, BROOK- L. REv. 781, 795-98 (1988).
46 MANN, supra note 45, at 23.
47 See Debra Lyn Bassett, Three's a Crowd: A Proposal To Abolish Joint Representation,
32 RUTGERS L.J. 387, 422-25 (2001) (discussing ethical issues involved in joint repre-
sentations in criminal cases).
48 MANN, supra note 45, at 91.
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disinclined to antagonize the referring attorney.49 Attorneys can
make themselves attractive to those in a position to refer work by culti-
vating a reputation for intransigent opposition to the prosecution.50
On the other hand, an attorney who acquires a reputation as a "lone
wolf" may find himself shut out of future work.51
In coordinating their response to a grand jury investigation, wit-
nesses acting on their own may face insuperable obstacles. Lawyers as
intermediaries resolve, at least in part, the strategic problems of coor-
dination that characterize a true prisoner's dilemma. When two law-
yers agree that it is in their client's mutual interest not to cooperate,
the lawyers, unlike their clients, can make meaningful promises to re-
ject the prosecutor's entreaties. In the iterated prisoner's dilemma,
there is a penalty exacted for failure to abide by that promise. 52 With
49 As Professor Richman notes, the career of Edward Bennett Williams alone is
filled with examples. See Richman, supra note 29, at 111-25.
A basic Williams rule is to get as many witnesses as possible under the de-
fense tent. Usually, this is accomplished by paying their lawyers (perfectly
legal), or at least arranging for their representation. In this case, Williams
got his old buddy William Hundley... [who was] renting space in Williams's
building and taking many of his cases as referrals from his landlord. Hun-
dley was as accommodating as ever. He told [his client] to keep his mouth
shut.
EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN To SEE: EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMs 318 (1991) (footnote
omitted). When Williams represented a corporation in a criminal investigation, he
often arranged for an employees to have a lawyer who was
a friend of Williams's and dependent on Williams for referrals in the future.
He felt both personal and marketplace pressures to do exactly what Williams
told him to do. "The way it works is that the corporation comes to Ed, and
he hands out the business," said a former federal prosecutor in Baltimore
who now specializes in white-collar defense. "The unwritten rule is that if
you cut and run on Ed, you're off the list."
Id. at 408. Thomas described Williams's speech to potential witnesses in the Drexel
Burnham investigation: "'If you go down the road together, you look like a solid
wall .... But if you start to crumble, you'll become like a Greek tragedy.'" Id. at
489-90.
50 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 564 (1994)
(discussing a "lawyer's investment in reputation").
51 See Kathryn W. Tate, Lawyer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the Employee Owed
More Protection than the Model Rules Provide?, 23 IND. L. REv. 1, 54 (1990) ("The tempta-
tion [for a corporate employee's separate counsel] to respond to corporate counsel
with inappropriate cooperation concerning separate counsel's representation of the
employee might be great because it is unlikely separate counsel will remain on the
corporation's referral list if she was perceived as obstreperous.").
52 See AXELROD, supra note 30, at 125-26.
As long as the interaction is not iterated, cooperation is very difficult. This is
why an important way to promote cooperation is to arrange that two individ-
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lawyers involved in the process, then, it is not simply the prisoner's
dilemma played out on at a different level; it is another game
altogether.
C. Coordinating Stories: The Need for the Joint Defense Privilege
A potential problem arises, however, when defense lawyers swap
client confidences. Assume that defense lawyers promise each other
that they will not breach a confidence entrusted in them by the other,
and further assume that that promise is "meaningful" insofar as penal-
ties attach to its breach. The question nonetheless arises: why should
third parties, and especially prosecutors, respect such confidentiality
agreements? Why don't prosecutors subpoena the attorney and client
and require them to disclose what they discussed with other clients
and attorneys? A prosecutor cannot, of course, ask a lawyer what he
learned from his own client, nor can he ask the client what he told his
own attorney, because such a client-attorney communication is ordina-
rily privileged. But if CEO 2 speaks with CEO l's attorney, nothing
appears to foreclose a prosecutor from questioning CEO 2 and, possi-
bly even the attorney, about that communication- even ifa promise was
made to preserve the confidentiality of the communication. What privilege
shields communications between attorneys and clients not bound to-
gether in an attorney-client relationship?
This brings us to thejoint defense privilege. The process of shar-
ing information among attorneys whose clients have interests in com-
mon will often be, at least under the modem understanding,
protected by a privilege-the so-called joint defense privilege. Thus,
attorneys for the CEOs in our hypothetical can strategize together,
and even reveal client confidences, without fear of required disclosure
to the prosecutor. Indeed, if they have entered into a 'joint defense
agreement," the first CEO can speak directly to the attorney for the
second CEO, and the entire communication will be deemed privi-
leged and not discoverable. Even more remarkably, under the joint
defense privilege as it has evolved, the CEOs can meet in person and,
provided that one of their attorneys happens to be present, the CEOs
can directly collaborate on a story to tell prosecutors. Even if one of
uals will meet each other again, be able to recognize each other from the
past, and to recall how the other has behaved until now .... Mutual cooper-
ation can be stable if the future is sufficiently important relative to the pre-
sent. This is because the players can each use an implicit threat of
retaliation against the other's defection-if the interaction will last long
enough to make the threat effective.
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the CEOs eventually cooperates with the prosecutor, he and his attor-
ney will be foreclosed from revealing what they learned from the
other CEO. Such an attorney-orchestrated swapping of confidences
likely benefits the most culpable person under investigation, for he
learns what other witnesses have told prosecutors and can shape his
own story accordingly. 53 By contrast, a witness with no criminal expo-
sure would seem to benefit little from such an arrangement; indeed,
his interests might be best served by disassociating himself from the
other, more guilty parties. 54
During the Independent Counsel's investigation of President
Clinton, the workings of such a joint defense arrangement were
brought to public attention. It was widely reported that President
Clinton's lawyers had orchestrated a joint defense arrangement. 55
Several observers speculated that President Clinton benefited from
the fact that many of the witnesses in the investigation into the Presi-
dent's statements and actions in connection with the Jones v. Clinton56
civil case had retained lawyers recommended to them by the Presi-
dent's own lawyers or close friends. 57 Some contended that the de-
53 One defense attorney told Kenneth Mann:
Take a case in the Southern District [of New York] which was a major mail
fraud case .... Some of the witnesses in the case came from the company-
worked for the company-which I represented together with its president.
And some of the employees were subpoenaed and I got them lawyers whom
I knew well and trusted, good men. They got them immunity, but at the
same time they felt enough-and their clients did, too-enough obligation
to want to speak forth and tell us what they were testifying to. And that
helped me because I didn't have to worry about what they were going to say.
I didn't have to shoot craps. Very helpful.
MANN, supra note 45, at 89.
54 See infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text. If the innocent witness declines
to enter a joint defense agreement, there is perhaps the risk that he will be
scapegoated by others. So the decision is, concededly, a difficult one.
55 See, e.g., Judy Keen & Kevin Johnson, Clinton's Lawyer Lays Groundwork Via De-
fense Pacts, USA TODAY MAG., Aug. 14, 1998, at 1A.
David Kendall, the president's personal lawyer, has woven a network of "joint
defense agreements" with the lawyers for other key Witnesses. Through that
network, Kendall has learned some of the most sensitive information
amassed by independent counsel Ken Starr .... Kendall is the gatekeeper
for multiple joint defense agreements with witnesses' lawyers, but no one will
say how many, or which lawyers are cooperating with the president's legal
team.
Id.; see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Independent Counsel and the Charges of Leaking: A Brief
Case Study, 68 FoRDrv1 L. REV. 869, 879 (1999).
56 858 F. Supp. 902, 903 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
57 For example, Monica Lewinsky originally retained a lawyer recommended to
her by the President's close friend, Vernon Jordan. See THE STARR REPORT: THE FIND-
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fense lawyers reflected a politically motivated conspiracy,58 although
others argued that business and personal relationships, rather than
political ideology, explained the close-knit alliance of lawyers.59
Through what one defense lawyer dubbed "'the vast legal con-
spiracy," 60 the President may have learned what other key witnesses
had told, or planned to tell, prosecutors, and he may thereby have
been able to craft his own story accordingly. The pros and cons of a
joint defense arrangement were hotly debated on the television shows
that thrived during the investigation. Defense attorneys argued that
information sharing was a commonplace feature in white-collar inves-
tigations and therefore acceptable. 61 Former prosecutors, however,
expressed the concern that information shared through a joint de-
fense agreement could provide a "perjury map" to witnesses inclined
to alter their testimony. As one former prosecutor suggested, a wit-
ness whose lawyer had entered into ajoint defense agreement might
say to himself, 'Well, I know what [the other witness] said, OK, now I
INGS OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL KENNETH W. STARR ON PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE
LEWINS Y AFFAIR 121 (Public Affairs 1998).
58 See, e.g., Matthew Rees, All the President's Lawyers, WKLY. STD., Mar. 2, 1998, at 15
("If one doubts that the fix is in to protect Clinton, one need only consider the'attor-
neys representing figures who have been ensnared in the Lewinsky drama. They are a
group disinclined to allow any harm to come Clinton's way, even at the expense of a
client's interest.").
59 Hanna Rosin, Mining Monica, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 30, 1998, at 11.
The joint defense strategy, which allows different lawyers to share informa-
tion about their clients and still preserve the attorney-client privilege, has
been presented as a nefarious Democratic plot to protect Clinton (although
it's quite common in white-collar criminal cases). But, if there is a plot, it's
driven less by party loyalty than by ancient tribal links. Lawrence Wechsler,
Currie's attorney, knows Bennett from the U.S. attorney's office for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, where they were part of a tight clique back in the '70s.
When Bennett worked on the Pentagon fraud and abuse cases during the
Reagan era, he doled out some of the business to those in the clique, includ-
ing Gerard Treanor, Nancy Hernreich's attorney, who shared a firm with
Cacheris for many years. Both have worked with William Hundley, Vernon
Jordan's attorney.
Id.
60 Carl M. Cannon, Attorney Network Keeps White House Right Behind Star: Informa-
tion Is Shared Routinely and Legally Through Clinton Lawyers, BALT. SUN, Feb. 16, 1998, at
1A (quoting a defense lawyer).
61 As one defense lawyer reported, "A good lawyer will ... send out an investiga-
tor to talk to the lawyer for the witness and say, 'You know, we understand your wit-
ness testified yesterday before the grandjury. My client's the target. Would you mind
telling me what your client was asked and what your client said?'" Rivera Live, supra
note 12.
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know what I can say so we don't contradict each other."62 At least in
this view, the joint defense privilege diminishes the risks involved in
collaborative efforts to conceal criminal activity, and it thereby under-
mines one of society's principal strategies to combat criminal conspir-
acies. In the words of Charles Wolfram, the joint defense privilege
"permits coconspirators to continue to conspire at a common defense,
now with the privileged assistance of teams of lawyers." 63
II. THE RISE OF THE JOINT DEFENSE PRIVILEGE: MISTAKEN RELIANCE
ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
As the previous Part described, in coordinating a response to a
criminal investigation, lawyers, as repeat players in the justice system,
introduce the possibility of enforceable promises. Without the joint
defense privilege, however, defense attorneys would still be reluctant
to share information. .Regardless of any reciprocal promises to pre-
serve the secrecy of shared client confidences, lawyers (and their cli-
ents) could still be subpoenaed by the grand jury and required to
testify.
Whatever else the joint defense privilege is or does, then, most
simply put, it enables a client and his attorney to share confidences
with another client or attorney without loss of the attorney-client privi-
lege. But central to all definitions of the attorney-client privilege is
the requirement that a communication from a client to an attorney is
privileged only if it was intended to be, and in fact remains, confiden-
tial. 64 A communication from a client to an attorney in the presence
of a third person,65 or with the intent that the communication be re-
vealed to a third person, 66 is not privileged ab initio; and if an origi-
nally privileged communication is subsequently revealed to a third
62 Id. (statement of O.J. Simpson prosecutor Marcia Clark).
63 See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 6.4.9.
64 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59
(D. Mass. 1950) ("The privilege applies only if... the communication relates to a fact
of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of stran-
gers .. .and the privilege has been ... not waived by the client."); 8 JOHN H. WiC-
MORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (noting that the
privilege applies to communications "made in confidence... except the protection
be waived") (emphasis omitted).
65 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 406 F. Supp. 381, 386
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[C]ommunications between a client and his counsel in the pres-
ence of a 'third party,' i.e., one who stands in a neutral or adverse position vis-A-vis the
subject of the communication, bespeaks the absence of such confidentiality and thus
belies any subsequent claim to the privilege.").
66 See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 390 (D.D.C. 1978)
("[W] here a business proposal is sent to counsel for legal advice, with an accompany-
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party, the privilege is said to be waived. 67 This "confidentiality re-
quirement"68 has the following consequence: when a client makes a
disclosure to an attorney and that disclosure is then revealed to a third
person, the privilege would seem to have been waived, regardless of
whether that third person happens to share interests with the client or
happens to be an attorney for a person with common interests.
The implications of the confidentiality requirement are captured
in an exchange in the book A Civil Action between a curmudgeonly
judge and a young lawyer. Counsel for defendant W.R. Grace Com-
pany resisted discovery of a confidence entrusted in him by counsel
for co-defendant Beatrice Foods, provoking the judge's incredulity:
The judge looked at Cheeseman. "Where's the privilege supposed
to be?"
Cheeseman stood to explain. "There was a communication from Be-
atrice Foods' client to their attorney, which was then communicated
to me."
"Well, then," said the judge, "the confidentiality of that is destroyed,
isn't it?"
"I think not," said Cheeseman.
"Why not?"
"Because we're engaged jointly in the defense of an action."69
ing expressed intent to disclose the proposal to a third party, the communication will
not be deemed to be made in confidence and thus will not be privileged.").
67 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[Iff a client
wishes to pi-eserve the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client
communications like jewels-if not crown jewels."); see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 64,
§ 2325.
All involuntary disclosures, in particular, through the loss or theft of docu-
ments from the attorney's possession, are not protected by the privilege, on
the principle that, since the law has granted secrecy so far as its own process
goes, it leaves to the client and attorney to take the measures of caution
sufficient to prevent being overheard by third persons. The risk of insuffi-
cient precautions is upon the client.
Id. (internal cross-reference omitted).
68 The phrase "confidentiality requirement" is sometimes used in a legal ethics
context to refer to the professional requirement undertaken by an attorney to pre-
serve the confidentiality of any client disclosures. See MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 1.6 (1983). This is not the sense in which I use the phrase. Throughout the
Article, "confidentiality requirement" refers to the requirement imposed on both cli-
ent and attorney to preserve the confidentiality of any communications vis-A-vis the
rest of the world in order to preserve the attorney-client privilege.
69 JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 112-13 (1995), quoted in Howard M. Erich-
son, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Coun-
sel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DuKcu L.J. 381, 421 n.167 (2000).
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Although the judge would eventually assent to Cheeseman's argu-
ment, the joint defense privilege would nonetheless seem, at least at
first glance, to be inconsistent with both the confidentiality require-
ment and the attorney-client privilege, at least as traditionally
understood.
In justifying the joint defense privilege, many commentators
nonetheless argue that it flows naturally from the attorney- client privi-
lege. But this is incorrect. As this Part demonstrates, the purposes of
the attorney-client privilege (together with its confidentiality require-
ment) are incompatible with the joint defense privilege.
Part II.A sketches the purposes and costs of the attorney-client
privilege. The attorney-client privilege is said to promote full and
frank disclosures to a lawyer, which is (supposedly) socially desirable
insofar as competent legal advice encourages compliance with the law
and enables laypersons to explore their legal rights. Critics of the at-
torney-client privilege, however, have emphasized the costs of the
privilege in depriving the factfinder of relevant evidence. Part II.B
then turns to the confidentiality requirement, which circumscribes
the client disclosures that are protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege and thereby limits the costs of the attorney-client privilege. Al-
though courts have carved out exceptions to the confidentiality
requirement in certain contexts, I argue in Part II.C that the logic of
those contexts does not extend to 'joint defense" situations-that is,
situations in which parties with common interests seek to share infor-
mation without waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Part II.D turns
to the first American cases to abandon the confidentiality require-
ment in the 'joint defense" context. In so doing, and in adopting the
joint defense privilege, I argue that courts have neglected the social
utility of the rigorous application of the confidentiality requirement.
A. The Purposes and Costs of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Before entering the thicket of the joint defense privilege, we
need to get a good grasp of the purposes of the attorney-client privi-
lege itself. Although this section may appear to be a digression, it is
essential in revealing the flaw in the oft-repeated claim (or implicit
assumption) that the joint defense privilege flows naturally from the
attorney- client privilege itself. This section will also quickly sketch the
costs of the attorney-client privilege, which are often neglected by ad-
vocates of the joint defense privilege.
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The modem rationale 70 for the attorney-client privilege is that it
allows persons to make a full and frank disclosure of factual informa-
tion to their attorneys. This, in turn, is said to be socially desirable
because it facilitates clients' ability to obtain effective legal services. A
lawyer's advice, it is argued, allows individuals to determine whether
their conduct would or did violate legal rules (and to what extent), as
well as how to respond to the legal process.71
Virtually since its inception, the modern rationale has attracted
criticism. Critics of the privilege emphasize the substantial costs it im-
poses on the judicial system. Most directly, the privilege denies an
adversary and the factfinder of highly probative evidence-to wit, the
testimony of the client's attorney. And indirectly the costs may be far
greater, as an attorney who is entrusted with information can assist his
client in filtering the evidence that reaches the factfinder.7 2
70 The attorney-client privilege seems to have arisen in Elizabethan times as part
of the code of the gentleman that prevented attorneys, as well as other gentlemen,
from violating a confidence. See, e.g., Dennis v. Codrington, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (Ch.
1580). See generallyJACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 503.03[1], at 503-11 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorne-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REv.
1061 (1978) (discussing the scope of the attorney-client privilege); Max Radin, The
Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL. L. REv. 487
(1928) (discussing the historical policy of the attorney-client privilege). By the late
eighteenth century, the "code of a gentleman" rationale had been discarded as "the
need of the ascertainment of truth for the ends of justice loomed larger than the
pledge of secrecy." CHARLES T. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (John
William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
71 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
[The] purpose [of the attorney-client privilege] is to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby pro-
mote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's
being fully informed about the client.
Id. at 398; accord Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998); United
States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403
(1976).
72 See Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorny-Client Privilege and the
Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 363 (1991) ("Costs may increase because
the lawyer may give the client guidance in how to respond honestly but craftily to an
interrogatory, thus making the adversary's task of obtaining complete information
more difficult."). Allen's article nonetheless concludes that the costs of the attorney-
client privilege are outweighed by its benefits. See id. at 382-83.
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Jeremy Bentham was the earliest and, in many respects, still most
compelling critic of the attorney-client privilege.73 In his Rationale of
Judicial Evidence, he argued that it was not necessarily socially benefi-
cial to foster candid communications between the client and attor-
ney.7 4 To be sure, society wants the "honest" client-the client with
nothing to hide-to receive competent legal advice but such a client
would make a full disclosure to his attorney regardless of whether the
communication was privileged. Thus, the honest client does not ben-
efit from the attorney-client privilege, and indeed would benefit from
rules that made attorney-client communications freely discoverable-
for his testimony at trial could then be buttressed by his own attor-
ney's testimony. In contrast, Bentham argued, disclosure of client
confidences would hurt clients who sought, either through silence or
misleading testimony, to conceal relevant evidence from the
factfinder. To guard against damaging disclosures, such clients would
be forced, absent the attorney-client privilege, to filter what they told
their own attorneys, with the likely result that they not receive fully
effective legal counsel. And surely, Bentham argued, society benefits
when "guilty" clients (his shorthand term for clients with something to
hide) receive less than fully effective legal counsel.75
In response to Bentham's criticism, scholars have developed in-
creasingly sophisticated utilitarian (or instrumental) justifications for
the attorney-client privilege. In his 1905 treatise on evidence, Wig-
more argued that Bentham's division of clients into the guilty and the
innocent was insufficiently nuanced. 76 Often, Wigmore argued, a cli-
ent with a valid legal claim would be deterred from seeking legal ad-
vice, absent the attorney-client privilege, because of a fear of revealing
embarrassing or potentially damaging facts. 7 7
73 See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (London, Hunt &
Clark 1827).
74 See 5 id. at 302.
75 See 5 id. at 304, 310.
What, then, will be the consequence [of abandoning the privilege]? That a
guilty person will not in general be able to derive quite so much assistance
from his law advisor, in the way of concerting a false defence, as he may do at
the present .... So much the better. To what object is the whole system of
penal law directed, if it be not that no man shall have it in his power to
flatter himself with the hope of safety, in event of his engaging in the com-
mission of an act which the law, on account of its supposed mischievousness,
has thought fit to prohibit?
5 id. at 310.
76 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2291.
77 8 id. Wigmore argued that Bentham's focus on criminal cases hindered his
analysis, for it obscured the reality that, in the civil context, there is often "no hard and
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Dissatisfaction with Wigmore's defense of the privilege 78 has led
scholars to seek to place the attorney-client privilege on a surer foot-
ing. One influential article, A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege and the Work Product Doctrine,79 working within a utilitarian
framework supplemented by the insights of law and economics, has
argued that the attorney- client privilege is designed to foster client
communications when favorable and unfavorable information is
mixed, and clients may therefore have "contingent claims" of which
they are unaware.80 Other scholars have abandoned the effort to de-
fend the privilege on a utilitarian basis altogether, arguing that the
privilege is justified, regardless of its costs, because it protects the pri-
vacy of a socially valued relationship 81 or because it would be "im-
fast line between guilt and innocence, which will justify us as stigmatizing one or the other
party and banning him from our sympathy." 8 id. As the line between criminal and
civil offenses is increasingly blurred, this criticism of Bentham gains added force.
78 Striking, given its fame and influence, are the logical gaps that pervade Wig-
more's defense of the attorney-client privilege. To have seriously engaged Bentham's
criticism would have required a demonstration that the attorney-client privilege bene-
fits the "innocent" client more than the "guilty." Even accepting Wigmore's point
that all clients have something to hide and are thereby in some respects "guilty," the
relevant question would still be whether clients with less to hide fare relatively better in
a world in which communications with attorneys are cloaked in secrecy. To be sure,
all clients receive better legal advice when they have made full and complete disclo-
sure to an attorney, but the advantage secured by the client with more to hide likely
exceeds the advantage secured by the client with less to hide. If so, even in the civil
context, clients with little to hide might be better off in a world without the attorney-
client privilege, even if the legal advice they receive is not as capable as that they
would receive in a world with the attorney-client privilege.
79 See Allen et al., supra note 72.
80 See generally id. at 362-83. For example, a person accused of breach of contract
may be unaware that lack of consideration is a defense, and he may therefore think it
necessary to perjure himself and deny that he ever made a promise to bestow a gift.
81 See David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Fed-
eral Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 110-11 (1956).
Whatever handicapping of the adjudicatory process is caused by recognition
of the privilege[s] is not too great a price to pay for secrecy in certain com-
municative relations-husband-wife, client-attorney, and penitent-clergy-
man .... Therefore, to conceive of the privileges merely as exclusionary
rules, is to start out on the wrong road .... Primarily they are a right to be
let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed
relationships ....
Id. (emphasis added). The patent difficulty with Louisell's argument is that privacy is
not, in fact, regarded as intrinsically valuable in our judicial system. See Allen et al.,
supra note 72, at 373 ("The legal system has routinely sacrificed the privacy of litigants
to the interests of justice. A litigant can be required to reveal the most sordid and
intimate details of his marriage or even to pull his pants down in front of ajury."). In
any event, the relationship between a parent and child is more socially valued than
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moral for society to constrain anyone from discovering what the limits
of [the law's] power over him are. '8 2
But many scholars have continued to sound notes of skepticism as
to the social benefits of the attorney-client privilege, belittling argu-
ments that the attorney- client privilege is necessary to foster client dis-
closures to an attorney8 3 and that the privilege promotes compliance
with the law. 84 As one distinguished commentator has concluded, af-
that between an attorney and client, and yet our judicial system does not recognize
the privacy of the former: there is no parent-child privilege in the federal system. See
In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1146 (3d Cir. 1997).
82 Charles Fried, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J. 584, 586 (1977).
83 Several empirical studies have concluded that a substantial majority of layper-
sons would continue to confide in lawyers even if secrecy was limited. See, e.g., Vin-
cent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of Participants, 63 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 191, 414 (1989).
The circumstances in which the privilege plays a major role in influencing
candor seem to be relatively rare. In day-to-day corporate counseling, the
findings suggest that a manager's need to cope with a heavily regulated busi-
ness environment and his sense of trust in counsel are probably sufficient to
produce open communications.
Id.; Fred Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989) (presenting
an analytical framework for considering exceptions to confidentiality rules); Note,
Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privi-
leged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1232 (1962); see also Swidler & Berlin
v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 n.4 (1998) (summarizing literature on this point).
84 Judge Frank Easterbrook likened the attorney-client privilege, and the corol-
lary work product doctrine, to a property rights regime for lawyers, which protects
attorney-generated information and thereby encourages its creation. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, Insider Trading Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of
Information, 1981 Sop. CT. REV. 309, 353-64. But Easterbrook remained dubitante on
the social benefits of the information thereby created. Id. at 361 ("To say, as the
Court did [in Upjohn Co. v. United States], that a restriction of the scope of the attor-
ney-client and work product privileges would reduce the investment in information
may be to praise that result, not to condemn it."). As Easterbrook notes with respect
to the IRS's investigation of illegal payments by Upjohn Co., which culminated in the
landmark decision, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), "the firm used its
privilege to defeat a claim of access by the IRS, which presumably would have used the
information to enforce the laws more accurately." Id at 358. Daniel Fischel has re-
cently intensified this criticism of the Upjohn decision. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers
and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 28-32 (1998). The Supreme Court in Upjohn
based its decision on the claim that the attorney-client privilege allows persons to
know what the law is and therefore encourages persons (e.g., those confronted with a
blizzard of regulations) to take greater steps to comply with the law. Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). Fischel argues that the Court got it exactly
backwards: by upholding the claim of privilege, "the Court allowed the company to
reduce the expected penalty for its violations. Reducing expected sanctions, however,
will increase the number of violations by lowering the cost of noncompliance." Fis-
chel, supra, at 31. A slightly more optimistic view of the privilege is reflected in a 1989
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ter a sweeping survey of the costs and benefits of the privilege, deter-
mining its relative effects on the truth-seeking process is a "stupefying,
complex task."'8 5
B. The Confidentiality Requirement: Limiting the Costs of the Attorney-
Client Privilege
We turn now to the confidentiality requirement of the attorney-
client privilege. Because the joint defense privilege would seem to
substantially abridge the confidentiality requirement, we need to iden-
tify the purposes of the confidentiality requirement and whether
those purposes are consistent with the joint defense privilege.
Client-attorney communications are not indiscriminately privi-
leged. As the attorney-client privilege came over time to be justified
on a utilitarian basis, the common law circumscribed the privilege's
scope to a discrete set of client-attorney communications that society
deems, on balance, worthy of protection. That set was limited to fac-
tual disclosures made by a client to an attorney for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice. 86 And it is limited still further by the confiden-
tiality requirement: the attorney-client privilege does not extend to
communications made in the presence of third persons, Wigmore ar-
gued, because "[t]he presence of a third person . .. is obviously un-
necessary for communications to the attorney as such .... ,"87 The
confidentiality requirement ensures that client disclosures made ei-
ther in the presence of a third party or with the expectation that the
article by Louis Kaplow and Stephen Shavell. See Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell,
Legal Advice About Information To Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability,
102 Hgv. L. REv. 565 (1989) (studying not the favorability of the privilege but,
rather, the social value of the lawyers' role in selecting information for their clients'
presentation to the tribunal). Although, like Fischel, they emphasize the "diluting
effect of legal advice" on expected sanctions for criminal offenses, id. at 614, they are
more receptive to the argument that privileged advice rendered ex ante (that is, prior
to litigation and prior to parties having engaged in a course of action) can enhance
compliance with law. Id. at 597 ("The socially desirable character of legal advice of-
fered ex ante stands in sharp contrast to the questionable social value of advice of-
fered during litigation.").
85 Easterbrook, supra note 84, at 361. In this Article, I do not take a stand one
way or the other on the desirability of the attorney-client privilege. My narrower pur-
pose is, after a reminder of the costs of the privilege, to question its extension to
shared communications among clients and lawyers with common interests.
86 See United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 (5th Cir. 1981) ("An attorney
who acts as his client's business advisor . .. is not acting in a legal capacity, and
records of such transactions are not privileged.").
87 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2311.
1475
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
disclosures will be relayed to a third party are not protected by the
attorney-client privilege.
The confidentiality requirement has recently sparked a lively aca-
demic debate. Professor Paul R. Rice, a leading commentator, 8 has
advocated the wholesale abandonment of the confidentiality require-
ment.8 9 Surveying the origins of the attorney-client privilege, Rice
contends that it is "not clear" how the requirement arose in the first
place,!' but whatever its origins, it serves no purpose today other than
to spawn costly litigation.9 1 In tacit acknowledgment of the irrational-
ity of the confidentiality requirement, Rice argues, courts have aban-
doned its stringent application, 92 and one result of this abandonment
is the doctrine of the joint defense privilege. 93
In rising to the defense of the confidentiality requirement, Pro-
fessor Melanie Leslie refutes many of Rice's arguments. 94 As Leslie
shows, Rice's error is in assuming that the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege is the same as the purpose of the confidentiality re-
quirement; in fact, the confidentiality requirement "acts in opposition
to the privilege by serving an important limiting function. '95 The
privilege may exist to induce frank communications from client to at-
torney, but the limitation imposed by the confidentiality requirement
88 Professor Paul R. Rice is the author of an influential treatise on the attorney-
client privilege. PAUL R. RICE, ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVqLEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1993).
89 See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality
Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE LJ. 853 (1998) [hereinafter Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege].
Rice argues that "confidentiality is not a logical imperative of the attorney-client privi-
lege." Id. at 860. He reasons that the attorney-client privilege exists to induce clients
to be forthcoming with their attorneys; the confidentiality requirement, however,
does not advance those purposes one whit. Imagine a client who is "only willing to
speak [to an attorney] in a context of secrecy." For such a client, Rice maintains, the
confidentiality requirement is unnecessary: the client would preserve the confidential-
ity of the communication regardless of whether the law attached a penalty to a disclo-
sure to a third party. Now imagine a client who is unconcerned about the secrecy of
his communication with an attorney: such a client would make a full disclosure to an
attorney with or Without a confidentiality requirement. Either way, Rice concludes,
the confidentiality requirement is pointless. Id. at 853-61; see also Paul R. Rice, A Bad
Idea Dying Hard: A Reply to Professor Leslie's Defense of the Indefensible, 2001 Wis. L. REv.
187, 187 (" [T] he element of confidentiality is a costly and unnecessary diversion from
the policies furthered by the attorney-client privilege.").
90 Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 89, at 870.
91 Id. at 888-98.
92 Id. at 872-80.
93 Id. at 878.
94 See generally Melanie Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege,
2000 Wis. L. REv. 31.
95 Id. at 36.
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is a recognition of the costs of the privilege in depriving the factfinder
of highly relevant evidence. The confidentiality requirement is in-
tended to restrict the scope of communications shielded by the attor-
ney-client privilege to those that would not have occurred but for the
existence of the privilege. If a client is willing to communicate in the
presence of a third party who may be questioned in a legal proceed-
ing, then he cannot be said to have relied upon the privilege in com-
municating with an attorney; and if the client, after the fact, discloses
the substance of the communication to a third party, this "constitutes
good evidence that the privilege was unnecessary to induce the com-
munications to the attorney. '9 6
Professor Leslie is, however, less convincing when she defends
the joint defense privilege as consistent with the cost-limiting rationale
of the confidentiality requirement.9 7 The following section shows that
the joint defense privilege, unlike other exceptions to the confidenti-
ality requirement, is not consistent with the rationale of limiting costs
or of candid disclosure to one's lawyer.
C. Exceptions to the Confidentiality Requirement
The confidentiality requirement is not absolute; under certain
circumstances, courts have long recognized that client-attorney com-
munications can be shared with third persons without waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. The traditional exceptions are consistent
with the purposes of the attorney-client privilege and do not measura-
bly increase the costs of the privilege to society.
96 Id. at 54. A related justification for the confidentiality requirement, not ex-
plored by Professor Leslie, is that it works as a protection against the use of the attor-
ney-client privilege as both a sword and shield. As courts have often noted, the
"[s]elective disclosure [of privileged information] for tactical purposes waives the
privilege." United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982). Selective dis-
closure can occur in two ways: first, a disclosure to selected persons; and second, a
disclosure of selected materials. The confidentiality requirement to the attorney-cli-
ent privilege is designed to prevent both. Thus, a party cannot disclose privileged
documents to certain individuals and then turn around and claim the privilege
against other individuals. See In reJohn Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982).
Nor can a party reveal certain privileged documents with respect to a subject matter
but then refuse to produce other documents pertaining to the same subject matter.
See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 163 (3d ed. 1997).
97 Leslie, supra note 94, at 65-66 ("The extension of the joint defense doctrine to
co-defendants, or to parties who anticipate becoming co-defendants, in a civil suit
does not undermine the confidentiality requirement because clients would not dis-
close privileged information absent the doctrine.").
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The first context in which sharing is permitted is when more than
one person retains the same lawyer. Business partners A and B are
under investigation for tax fraud; they jointly consult a lawyer after
receiving grand jury subpoenas. A makes admissions that are damag-
ing to herself, but which may tend to exculpate B. A and B are later
indicted. Can B testify as to the disclosures A made to theirjoint attor-
ney in B's presence? The modern answer is no.98 The logic is that A
and B are jointly regarded as the client: B is not a "third person" for
purposes of determining whether the communication was confiden-
tial to begin with, and therefore the privilege cloaks the initial consul-
tation. Although the proposition is debatable, and indeed was once
debated, 99 it is at least broadly consonant with the rationale of the
attorney-client privilege: the privilege exists to allow a client to com-
municate frankly with an attorney, and when there is more than one
client, the "client unit" should be able to communicate with an attor-
ney without a member of the client unit fearing that any disclosures
will later be used against her.
A second situation: what if the client speaks a foreign language?
Wigmore allowed that in such a circumstance the attorney and the
client could have a translator present when they met, or the client
could be interviewed by a translator employed by the attorney, who
could translate the client's story for the attorney. 100 For purposes of
determining whether the attorney-client privilege existed to begin
with or was waived, the translator is not regarded as a "third person."
Again, the rule accords with the asserted purposes of the attorney-
client privilege-to facilitate communications from client to attorney.
Without the assistance of the translator, no meaningful communica-
tion, or attorney-client relationship, is possible.
The rule for translators was famously extended to accountants by
Judge Henry Friendly in United States v. Kovel 10 l In Kovel, a tax attor-
ney had directed a client to meet with an accountant under his super-
vision. The question was whether communications made to the
accountant were protected by the attorney-client privilege; Judge
Friendly concluded that they were. He noted that, "in contrast to the
Tudor times when the privilege was first recognized, the complexities
98 This may not always have been the prevailing view. See 5 CHARLES FREDERIC
CHAMBERLAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 3693 (1911) joint
client communications not privileged because confidentiality lacking).
99 See 5 id. § 3693.
100 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2301 (stating that when an agent's or clerk's
help is "indispensable to the attorney" and it is necessary to share client communica-
tions with them, such communication does not lose its privileged status).
101 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
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of modern existence prevent attorneys from effectively handling cli-
ents' affairs without the help of others .... ,"102 Since the assistance of
agents was "indispensable" to the attorney's work and the communica-
tions of the client were "often necessarily committed to them by the
attorney or by the client himself," the privilege must include all the
persons who act as the attorney's agents.' 03 Judge Friendly's conclu-
sion is also in harmony with the rationales of the attorney-client privi-
lege. The privilege exists to encourage clients to confide in, and forge
relationships with, their attorneys; the privilege would be a meaning-
less one if the client's communication is in a form unintelligible to the
attorney, either because it is in a foreign language or in the form of
arcane "accounting concepts." After all, "[a] ccounting concepts are a
foreign language to some lawyers in almost all cases, and to almost all
lawyers in some cases. "104
And we come now to the 'Joint defense" scenario: client Cl
makes disclosures in confidence to attorney Al; Al seeks to share
those confidences with lawyer A2, whose client, C2, shares interests
with Cl. Can Al reveal client confidences to A2 in return for a recip-
rocal disclosure of client confidences? The short answer and simple
logic of the attorney-client privilege suggests not. The ability to trade
confidences with another lawyer, or another client, does not en-
courage or enable the client to confide in her attorney, nor does it
measurably promote the relationship between the client and the attor-
ney, and those are the asserted purposes of the attorney-client
privilege.10 5
To be sure, the reciprocal disclosures enable both lawyers to pro-
vide their clients with more effective legal representation than would
be possible without the disclosures. In this broad sense, the disclo-
sures may be said to resemble the lawyer's disclosure of complicated
business data to an accountant. But if the touchstone is simply
whether a disclosure of client confidences facilitates legal representa-
tion, one could not plausibly limit such disclosures to lawyers. It is
easy to imagine circumstances in which a client will feel more comfort-
able, and be more forthcoming, if he consults with an attorney in the
presence of a parent or a close friend, but courts have regularly held
102 Id at 921 (citation omitted).
103 Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2301).
104 Id. at 922.
105 See WoLuPxiw, supra note 1, § 6.4.9 ("Rarely in coparty situations will the pres-
ence of the third party be at all necessary to facilitate communication between lawyer
and client.").
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that such communications are not privileged. 106 An attorney is free,
of course, to interview a parent of a client, but if the lawyer discloses
client confidences in the course of the interview-even to gauge the
parent's assessment of the testimony-the privilege is waived.
It is thus important to keep in mind a salient point about the
attorney-client privilege: not everything that improves legal represen-
tation is covered by the attorney-client privilege. Facilitating legal
representation in every possible way is not the touchstone of the privi-
lege; the touchstone is insuring the secrecy of a client's disclosures to
the client's lawyer. Society allows the client and attorney to preserve the
secrecy of their communications because without it, it is assumed, a
client would not be able to make a full and frank disclosure to his
attorney. The sharing of client confidences with a translator or an
accountant (or a paralegal or a secretary) is consistent with the attor-
ney-client privilege and the confidentiality requirement because shar-
ing with such persons furthers the client's ability to communicate
meaningfully with his attorney; sharing of client confidences with an-
other attorney does not accord with the attorney-client privilege be-
cause it in no sense furthers a client's ability to confide in his attorney.
How, then, could the joint defense privilege have arisen?
D. The Growth of the Joint Defense Privilege
We turn to the origins and evolution of the joint defense privi-
lege.' 0 7 Where new evidentiary privileges are urged, the Supreme
Court has traditionally cautioned that they be carved out narrowly and
developed slowly.108 The history of the joint defense privilege shows
that, in this area, courts have not been mindful of this note of caution.
After just a handful of cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries permitting, in narrowly defined circumstances, the sharing
of privileged information, courts in the second half of the twentieth
106 See United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
presence of a third party at the defendant's meeting with defense attorney precluded
the defendant from asserting the attorney-client privilege to prevent the attorney
from testifying). Similarly, if an attorney, to better understand what a client had said,
had consulted the client's friend and disclosed the substance of the communication,
the privilege would be thereby waived.
107 I call it an "evolution," but not in the classical sense of a slow, gradual change
over time; it has, rather, constituted an evolution in the modem understanding of a
"punctuated equilibri [um]," in which a period of virtual standstill (or equilibrium) is
punctuated by an episode of rapid development. See Steven Jay Gould & Niles El-
dredge, Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered, 3 PALEoBI-
OLOGy 115, 115 (1977).
108 See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).
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century expanded the joint defense privilege with little thought about
its rationale or costs.
As shown below, a flawed understanding of the attorney-client
privilege has propelled the expansion of the joint defense privilege.
Courts eventually came to assume that any communication to or from
a lawyer that enhanced the lawyer's ability to represent his client was
protected by the attorney-client privilege; they disregarded the nar-
row, more accurate rationale for the attorney- client privilege, which is
to foster factual disclosures from a client to a lawyer. The flawed un-
derstanding of the attorney-client privilege has resulted in the joint
defense privilege ballooning out beyond its initial, rather modest ori-
gins-helping parties who faced a common litigation opponent work
together on a common defense at trial.
1. Origins
Although the first American case seen as adopting the joint de-
fense privilege was decided shortly after the Civil War,'0 9 other courts
were reluctant to embrace it for many decades thereafter. That first
case purported to be based on the attorney-client privilege, and in
fact did not claim that a new privilege had been created. However, its
understanding of the attorney-client privilege was too radical a depar-
ture from traditional principles for other courts to quickly follow suit.
It disregarded the purpose of the attorney-client privilege and the
very real potential for conflicts of interest among criminal defendants.
But pressure from the legal profession won in the end, and courts
began to ratify the new understanding of the privilege by the 1960s.
One limitation that the early cases shared was the apparent require-
ment that clients had to be parties to actual litigation to enter into
joint defense arrangements. Eventually, even this limitation was swept
109 Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871); see Bartel, supra
note 17, at 886 ("In Chahoon v. Commonwealth an American court first recognized the
joint defense privilege. .. ."); Patricia Welles, A Survey of Attorne -Client Privilege in Joint
Defense, 35 U. MII L. REV. 321, 324 (1981) ("Since Chahoon v. Commonwealth in 1871,
United States courts have recognized the attorney-client privilege in a joint de-
fense."); Rushing, supra note 15, at 1277 (identifying Chahoon as the "genesis" of the
joint defense privilege); Note, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege on Inter-Attorney Ex-
change of Information, 63 YAL L.J. 1030, 1032-33 (1954) (concluding that, as of 1954,
only two American cases had relied upon ajoint defense privilege, Chahoon, 62 Va. at
822, and Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942)); Michael Davidson, The Joint
Defense Doctrine: Getting Your Story Straight in the Mother of All Minefields, ARMw LAw., June
1997, at 18 ("[The joint defense privilege] first appeared in published case law in
1871." (citing Chahoon, 62 Va. at 822)); Robert G. Morvillo, Joint Defense Agreements,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 3, 1991, at 3 ("The first case to explicitly recognize the privilege was
Chahoon v. Commonwealth .... ").
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away, as notions of the attorney-client privilege became ever more
distended.
The case often cited as demonstrating the privilege's hoary ori-
gins, the 1871 Virginia decision Chahoon v. Commonwealth, shows how
an imprecise understanding of the attorney- client privilege creates a
doctrinal muddle that can actually harm defendants. As the final
shots of the Civil War were being fired, a wealthy foreigner named
Solomon Haunstein, who had settled in Virginia, passed away. His
real estate holdings spread throughout the Richmond area, and in the
chaotic aftermath of the Civil War a carpetbagger named George
Chahoon and a local attorney named Jonathan Sands conspired to
defraud the Haunstein estate. They forged a promissory note against
the estate and instituted a civil suit to recover on it.11 ° At some point,
Chahoon and Sands persuaded the executor of Haunstein's estate,
Richard S. Saxnay, to join the conspiracy. Although Saxnay originally
recognized the note to be a forgery and vowed to fight it, once having
joined the conspiracy he acquiesced in a default judgment against the
Haunstein estate."11
The three were jointly indicted. Apparently recognizing a poten-
tial conflict of interest, the three conspirators retained separate coun-
sel. And apparently also recognizing a commonality of interest, the
three collaborated at a pre-trial joint strategy meeting. The meeting
was attended by the three co-defendants, together with Sands's coun-
sel, Gregory, and Saxnay's counsel, Lyon1 12. (Chahoon's own counsel
did not attend the meeting.) The court apparently severed the trials.
110 Chahoon, 62 Va. at 835.
111 The conspiracy was undone by an employee of Saxnay, named Cole, who testi-
fied that his employer had originally told him that the note was a forgery but later
(presumably after he had entered the conspiracy) claimed that it was genuine. The
description by the Virginia Supreme Court of these events in a related case, involving
Chahoon's coconspirator Sands, is wonderfully vivid:
It tends strongly to show, that in the short interval of time between the two
conversations with the witness, Cole, an extraordinary change had been
wrought in the mind of... Saxnay; that he had deserted his impregnable
camp and gone over to that of the enemy, and joined him in the assault they
were about to make upon that estate which it was his sworn duty to defend.
In what way this mysterious change was brought about, by whose agency, and
what were the terms of capitulation, we do not know and probably never will.
We only how the curator acted afterwards, and in concert with whom, and
with what result of action, all of which tends strongly to show that between
the two conversations with Cole, Saxnay became one of the conspirators to
defraud the estate of Haunstein and convert it all to their own use.
Sands v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 871, 897-98 (1872).
112 Chahoon, 62 Va. at 835.
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At Chahoon's trial, the prosecutor called Saxnay. Saxnay testified
that, at the strategy meeting, Chahoon stated that he would deny at
trial that he had received the money from the fraudulent note.
Chahoon sought to rebut this testimony at trial by calling Saxnay's
counsel, Lyon. The Virginia Supreme Court, by a vote of two to one,
affirmed the trial court's decision to deny Chahoon the testimony of
this witness."13
The court reasoned as follows. Given that they were under joint
indictment for conspiracy, "it was natural and reasonable, if not neces-
sary, that these parties... should meet together in consultation with
their counsel, communicate to the latter all that might be deemed
proper for them to know, and make all necessary arrangements for
the defence [sic]. 'u"14 The court observed that the three co-defend-
ants "might have employed the same counsel, or they might have em-
ployed different counsel as they did. But whether they did the one
thing or the other, the effect is the same, as to their right of communi-
cation to each and all of the counsel .... 1115 The court concluded:
"the counsel of each was in effect the counsel of all, though, for pur-
poses of convenience, he was employed and paid by his respective cli-
ent."1" 6 It followed that
[t]hey had a right, all the accused and their counsel, to consult to-
gether about the case and the defence, [sic] and it follows as a nec-
essary consequence, that all the information, derived by any of the
counsel from such consultation, is privileged, and the privilege be-
longs to each and all of the clients, and cannot be released without
the consent of all of them.117
The Chahoon court's conversion of each defendant's counsel into
counsel for everyone ("the counsel of each was in effect the counsel
for all") is a distortion of the attorney-client relationship and thus the
attorney-client privilege. The defendants involved in the defrauding
of the Haunstein estate had retained separate counsel for a reason:
they were aware that there were potential conflicts among them. Be-
cause they chose to retain separate counsel, each had the ability to
consult with his own lawyer in confidence. As shown in the discussion
of the attorney-client privilege above, ensuring that a client has an
opportunity to confide in his own lawyer is the point of the privilege.
Despite the court's argument that it was "natural and reasonable" for
113 M at 845.
114 Id at 839.
115 Id. at 841.
116 Id at 842.
117 Id.
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them all to consult with each other, this joint consultation did not
further the purposes of the attorney-client privilege as traditionally
understood.
Under the classic rules of the "confidentiality requirement,"
speaking with a third party-even co-defendants or their lawyers-
would waive the attorney-client privilege. Nor should the expecta-
tions of the co-defendants matter: it is, or should be, irrelevant that
the conspirators thought they could communicate with each other
cloaked in the attorney-client privilege. (Such expectations are, after
all, shaped in part by judicial decisions, and through the nineteenth
century no American case had thrown into question the "confidential-
ity requirement.") All defendants were represented by counsel, who
should have been aware of the risk of waiving the privilege in any con-
versation in which the confidentiality was not strictly preserved. As
the Chahoon court notes, it may have been possible for all the co-de-
fendants to retain the same counsel, but the fact is that they did not.
The court glossed over the likely reason for separate counsel-the po-
tential conflicts of interest among the defendants-far too quickly in
allowing this expansion of the attorney-client privilege.
In the decades that followed Chahoon, the issue of privilege in
joint defense cases arose on several occasions, and courts repeatedly
declined to find a joint defense privilege applicable to the facts of a
given case. The Seventh Circuit's 1924 decision Smale v. United
States' 8 is illustrative, particularly that case's probing inquiry into
whether ajoint defense truly existed.119 As in Smale, courts in the first
half of the twentieth century typically proved willing to look closely to
see how closely aligned the "common interests" were among the liti-
gants before accepting the parties' representations that they shared
interests when inter-client and inter-attorneys communications were
made. 20
118 3 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1924).
119 The facts of Smale were similar to those of Chahoon. Smale and Carroll were
indicted for obstruction of justice. Id. at 101. While in jail, immediately after their
arrest, the two sent for their attorneys. Id. After Caroll's attorney, Igoe, arrived, but
before Smale's lawyer arrived, the three met. At trial, Igoe testified as to Smale's
statements at that meeting. IdM The court allowed this testimony because "Igoe never
was employed by Smale, and there is nothing to indicate that Smale ever intended to
employ Igoe, or that Igoe led Smale to believe he would serve any defendant other
than Carroll." Id. at 102.
120 For example, in State v. Hodgdon, 94 A. 301 (Vt. 1915), three co-defendants
were indicted for burglary. Noting that there was no evidence of a "common de-
fense," the trial court permitted one of the co-defendant's counsel to cross-examine
Hodgdon as to a conversation between the cross-examining counsel on the one hand
an Hodgdon and his counsel on the other. Id. at 302; see also Radio Corp. of Am. v.
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Indeed, in the first half of the twentieth century, invocation of
the privilege was affirmed only once,' 21 in the 1942 Minnesota case
Schmitt v. Emey. 122 Although that case extended the concept to in-
clude civil litigation, the Schmitt court limited the sharing to a small
amount of information that was directly relevant to joint interests.123
And, as in Chahoon, the Schmitt court only allowed the privilege after
both defendants were confronting pending to the many cases that
have followed in their train, for the courts there recognized the shar-
ing of privileged materials only among parties who faced a trial to-
gether as co-defendants. This restriction would seem, not only at least
at first glance but even after more searching scrutiny, to have a certain
plausibility to it. At the trial stage, it can be more clearly determined
whether there is a robust common interest among defendants; posi-
tions on issues will likely have crystallized to a significant degree by
this point, and adverse positions will have been uncovered.
The judicial reluctance to extend the attorney-client privilege
naturally had an effect on defense practice, and lawyers were not shy
about voicing their concerns, particularly as a lucrative practice in de-
fending antitrust actions was developing. Canvassing the views of law-
yers primarily in large NewYork firms, a 1954 Yale Law Journal student
note observed that "fear of waiving" the attorney-client privilege often
resulted in lawyers deciding to withhold information from others in
common legal interest.1 24 These lawyers believed the privilege would
be especially useful to them in defending antitrust actions. The
dearth of precedent afforded courts "great latitude in interpreting the
'joint defense' priniciple,"' 25 the student note observed. The note
Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440 (E.D. Ill. 1955) (rejecting claim ofjoint defense privi-
lege); Rediker v. Warfield 11 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (same).
121 See Note, supra note 109, at 1032-33.
122 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942).
123 See id. at 417. That case involved co-defendants sharing notes of a lawyer's
interview of a defendant so that they could join together in writing a brief attempting
to exclude the interviewing lawyer's testimony. Id. at 415. After finding that lawyer's
interview was covered by the attorney-client privilege, the court added that the fur-
nishing of the copy of the notes to allow briefing did not waive the privilege. Id. at
416.
The purpose of furnishing counsel a copy was not to disclose its contents. It
was furnished solely to accommodate them and thereby to enable them to
make their effort and aid more effective in the common cause of excluding
the statement. The copy was furnished solely for that limited purpose.
I. at 417. The Schmitt court thus narrowly restricted the scope of the joint defense
privilege.
124 See Note, supra note 109, at 1030 n.2.
125 Id at 1033.
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questioned the underlying rationale of the privilege. The author also,
not sufficiently attentive to professional pressure, doubted the privi-
lege's prospects for expansion. Because of the "weakness of its policy
rationale," the note predicted that the joint defense privilege would
not grow significantly.1 26 "Enthusiasm for the 'fox hunt' philosophy
of litigation is waning, and the tactical advantage in an exchange of
information among independently hired attorneys might be deemed
of insufficient social importance to justify an extension of the
privilege."1 27
The Yale note has not proven prescient. The student writer un-
derestimated the continuing efforts of the bar, especially the elite bar,
in persuading courts to expand the privilege. Lawyers continued to
press for a "tactical advantage" and proved difficult to resist. Despite
the perceived "weakness of its policy rationale," American courts, at
counsel's urging, have not only embraced the joint defense privilege
but have done so enthusiastically. They have interpreted its coverage
far beyond anything originally conceived in Chahoon and Schmitt.
2. Evolution
The impetus for this expansion was an extremely broad view of
the attorney-client privilege. As courts began to look favorably on the
joint defense privilege in the 1960s and '70s, they abandoned the idea
that the goal of the attorney-client privilege was to promote full and
frank disclosures from a client to an attorney. Instead, they adopted
the view that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege was the
sweeping one of generally making representation of clients "more ef-
fective" or of "facilitating representation." As a result of this broad
view of the attorney-client privilege, courts cast aside earlier limita-
tions, such as requiring people entering into joint defense agreements
to be actual parties to litigation.
The Ninth Circuit in 1964 was the first federal court to embrace
the joint defense privilege, and in so doing it dramatically expanded
its scope, based on a broad view of the attorney-client privilege. In
Continental Oil Co. v. United States,128 the court abandoned what had
appeared to be a requirement that litigation have formally com-
menced before the sharing of privileged information would be per-
mitted. Not surprisingly, given the interest of the elite bar described
in the 1954 note, the case involved an antitrust investigation. 129 In
126 Id. at 1033-34.
127 Id. at 1034.
128 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964).
129 Id. at 348.
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Continental Oil, employees at two companies were called to testify
before a grand jury. Both before and after their grand jury appear-
ances, lawyers at the two companies questioned the client/witnesses
and prepared interview memoranda, which they then shared with one
another. °30 Subpoenas were issued for these memoranda, and the
companies moved to quash.' 31 The government raised the argument
that the Chahoon and Schmitt cases were distinguishable because the
exchange of information in Continental Oil occurred before litigation,
criminal or civil, had commenced (that is, before an indictment or
complaint had been filed).132 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argu-
ment, relying on the attorney-client privilege: "We think that this at-
tempt to distinguish those cases is not valid here. All of the reasons
for the creation of the attorney-client privilege are as operative here
as if the privilege had been claimed after an indictment had been
returned."'33 Crediting the defendants' argument that the lawyers'
exchange of memoranda was intended "to make their representation
of their clients.., more effective," the Ninth Circuit declined to infer
a waiver of the privilege despite the absence of any pending
litigation.134
The Continental Oil court, following Chahoon, rejected sub silentio
the narrow, traditional purpose of the attorney-client privilege, which
is to promote full and frank disclosures from a client to an attorney.
Viewed in this manner, the attorney-client privilege would not extend
to communications between lawyers, even though such communica-
tions might facilitate a lawyer's ability to render advice to a client.
The understanding of the attorney-client privilege reflected in Conti-
nental Oil lacks a meaningfully limiting principle. If any communica-
tions that promote "effective ... representation" are protected by the
privilege, there is no plausible argument why sharing should be lim-
ited to inter-lawyer communications; surely a lawyer might render
more effective advice if he were also able to share client confidences
with the client's friends, parent, employers, etc.
Furthermore, the removal of a temporal limitation-that the priv-
ilege apply only when litigation is actually pending and not simply
anticipated-had the potential to vastly expand the scope of the privi-
lege and to include parties whose interests share little in common.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit swiftly extended Continental Oil in Hunydee
130 Id
131 Id. at 349.
132 Id. at 349-50.
133 Id. at 350.
134 Id at 348-49.
1487
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
v. United States135 to cover parties before indictment whose interests
were far from perfectly aligned. Again, in doing so the court relied on
the attorney-client privilege.
In Hunydee, a husband and wife, under investigation for tax
fraud, retained separate counsel. At a pre-indictment meeting ivith
their respective attorneys, Mrs. Hunydee's lawyer stated that he had
advised his client to cooperate with the government. 136 Mr. Hunydee
and his attorney then conferred for fifteen or twenty minutes, after
which he stated to the assembled foursome that he would "plead
guilty and take the blame."137 The plea did not go as planned, and
Mr. Hunydee was tried. At Mr. Hunydee's trial, the prosecution called
Mrs. Hunydee and her attorney to testify to this statement at the meet-
ing.' 38 Although the trial court permitted the testimony, the Ninth
Circuit reversed.13 9 The Hunydee court found that the attorney-client
privilege had not been waived, despite the fact that the purpose of the
pre-indictment meeting was emphatically not to mount a joint defense
but to encourage Mr. Hunydee to plead out and thereby relieve Mrs.
Hunydee of any criminal exposure. 140 The Hunydee court cited Conti-
nental Oil for the proposition that the attorney- client privilege extends
to exchange of information between counsel when the communica-
tions "concern common issues and are intended to facilitate represen-
tation in possible subsequent proceedings." 141 Neither ajoint defense
nor pending litigation was necessary any longer. 142 And, as in Conti-
nental Oil, the Hunydee court based its decision on a strikingly broad
rationale for the attorney-client privilege, to cover any communica-
tions intended to "facilitate representation."'143
Whether the joint defense privilege extended, in the criminal
context, to pre-indictment meetings among attorneys and clients was
litigated for at least another decade. In the case of In re Grand Juy
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 16, 1974,144 a New York district
court acknowledged that "the guidance of precedent in this precise
area is rather unexpectedly spare," but relying on Hunydee, Continental
Oil, and Chahoon, the court applied the joint defense privilege in the
135 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965).
136 Id at 184.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 185.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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pre-indictment setting. The court confronted the fact that clients in
common interest today may find themselves in an adversarial position
tomorrow, but it nonetheless embraced thejoint defense privilege as a
correlative of the attorney-client privilege itself. 45
The joint defense privilege has quickly moved farther and farther
into uncharted terrain, based on an expansive view of the attorney-
client privilege. Courts have continued to chisel at the requirement
that parties invoking the joint defense privilege have closely aligned
interests, allowing the privilege to cover more and more situations,
even where participants had only nebulous interests in common. In
United States v. Zolin,146 again in the Ninth Circuit, a party under inves-
tigation by a federal grand jury shared documents with third parties
who were not directly under investigation. The court nonetheless
concluded that the disclosure did not result in a waiver of the privi-
lege: "Even where the non-party who is privy to the attorney-client
communications has never been sued on the matter of common inter-
est and faces no immediate liability, it can still be found to have a
common interest with the party seeking to protect the communica-
tions."' 47 The target of the investigation (Ron Hubbard, the founder
of the Church of Scientology) faced criminal liability as a result of
possible violations of the tax laws; the third parties faced no legal ex-
posure at the time, but were members of the church and therefore
had, in the court's view, "'a common interest' in sorting out the re-
spective affairs of the church and Mr. Hubbard."' 48 Thus, a common
housekeeping interest, together with the possibility of future litigation
together, was deemed sufficient to invoke the joint defense privilege.
The often tenuous nature of the common interest linking parties
in a joint defense agreement is thrown into bolder relief in Chan v.
City of Chicago.'49 There, the court recognized a joint defense agree-
ment that had been entered into by defendants and a third party,
even though the civil suit was over two years old and the plaintiff had
145 Id& at 389. The court wrote
The [attorney-client] privilege is ... born of the law's own complexity. The
layman's course through litigation must at least be evened by the assurance
that he may, without penalty, invest his confidence and confidences in a
professional counselor. That assurance is no less important or appropriate
where a cooperative program ofjoint defense is helpful or, afortiori, neces-
sary to form and inform the representation of clients whose attorneys are
separately retained.
Id. at 388 (citing United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961)).
146 809 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987).
147 Id at 1417 (emphasis added).
148 Id.
149 162 F.R.D. 344 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
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given no indication that he intended to name the third party as a de-
fendant. 50 The court did suggest that "there must be some realistic
basis for believing that someone will become ajoint defendant before
a joint defense privilege can arise,"' 51 although some commentators
have rejected such a restriction: "Only if there is no common interest
and the interests of the parties are totally antagonistic will the privi-
lege be denied." 152
The rapid development of the joint defense privilege over the
course of a few decades contrasts with the slow and careful develop-
ment of the attorney-client privilege over centuries. Previously, courts
addressing the attorney-client privilege took at least some account of
the truth-defeating functions of the privilege and weighed those costs
against any possible benefits. But in the area of the joint defense priv-
ilege, some courts treat the phrase "attorney-client privilege" as a
mind-numbing mantra, and dazed by its power, they have authorized
all manner of exchanges, irrespective of how aligned or incongruent
the clients' interests may be or to what extent the privilege may ham-
per discovery of the truth.
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE JOINT DEFENSE PRIVILEGE
The joint defense privilege is characterized today by a core cer-
tainty as to the existence of a privilege of some sort and a con-
founding uncertainty as to the precise details. As I show in this Part,
threading through all of the doctrines that now cluster around the
newly minted privilege is a misguided and imprecise analogy to the
150 Id. at 346.
151 Id.
152 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 70, § 503(b) [06], at 503-100 to 503-101.
Although this view has been overwhelmingly rejected, see, e.g., United States v.
Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996); Loustalet v. Refco, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 243,
248 (C.D. Cal. 1993), one court has adopted the Weinstein and Berger approach and
in so doing set the high water mark to date of the joint defense privilege. VisualScene,
Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), in which a Florida
state court recognized a joint defense privilege between parties on opposite sides of a
civil suit, dramatically illustrates the sweep of the privilege in some jurisdictions today.
Id. at 442. The plaintiff VSI, a distributor of sunglasses to drugstores, sued Pilkington,
a glass supplier, and Metro, a glass processor. Id at 439. VSI and Metro argued that
the glass supplied by Pilkington was defective, although VSI also contended that
Metro had acted negligently in processing the glass. Id VSI and Metro exchanged
privileged materials to further their joint argument that Pilkington had acted negli-
gently. Id at 439-40. The court concluded, "To extend the common interest privi-
lege to parties aligned on opposite sides of the litigation for another purpose is not
inconsistent with any policy underlying the attorney-client privilege and merely facili-
tates representation of the sharing parties by their respective counsel." Id. at 441-42.
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attorney-client privilege. This imprecision at the origins of the joint
defense privilege has resulted not simply in academic uncertainty
about the privilege's nature and limits, but also in a growing number
of litigated cases.
Part III.A quickly catalogs the basic uncertainties that surround
the joint defense privilege, from the questions over the proper name
to the legal tests that have emerged in the courts and legislatures.
Parts III.B through III.E sketch the uncertain contours of the privi-
lege, parsing the explicit language and implicit concepts in the three-
pronged test that has evolved in the federal courts. The joint defense
privilege is revealed to be a doctrinal hodgepodge. Courts have failed
to clarify what communications are protected by the joint defense
privilege, 53 and they have divided as to how closely aligned the inter-
ests of parties must be in order to invoke the privilege.154 There are,
in addition, persisting questions as to the enforceability of joint de-
fense agreements' 55 and as to the ethical duties owed by attorneys in
joint defense arrangements to clients other than their own.' 56 As I
discuss in Part III.F, these, and myriad other, uncertainties have
prompted demands for greater "certainty" in the application of the
joint defense privilege and even for the development of a wholly inde-
pendent privilege.
A. The Uncertainties of the Basic Tests
The question marks that characterize the joint defense privilege
begin with its name. Although the phrase 'Joint defense privilege" is
the historical front-runner since its birth in 1975,157 it has recently
met with competitors. In particular, "'common interest' doctrine" 58
seems to be gaining ground, followed by a legion of minor candidates,
struggling against the odds to attain respectability. The candidates in-
clude: "'common interest' privilege,"' 59 "common interest rule," 60
"common defense doctrine,"' 6' 'joint interest privilege,"' 62 'Joint
153 See infra Part III.B.
154 See infra Part III.C.
155 See infra Part III.D.
156 See infra Part III.E.
157 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1975, 406 F. Supp.
381, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
158 In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
159 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 119 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1997).
160 United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989).
161 Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 174 F.R.D. 609, 634 (M.D. Pa.
1997).
162 In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
1491
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
prosecution privilege,"'163 'joint interest doctrine,"'164 "common pur-
pose theory,"' 65 and "pooled information exception."'166 Sniffing in
disgust at the judicial morass of "mangled concepts," Wright and
Miller argue that the proper name is "allied lawyer doctrine,"'16 7 and
at least one court thought that had a nice ring to it.168
Indeed, if "[t]he first step to wisdom is calling a thing by its right
name," 169 whoever coined the phrase 'joint defense privilege" may
have never reached step two. Is it a "privilege" in its own right 170 or
simply an exception to the confidentiality requirement of the attor-
ney-client privilege? 17 1 And "defense": does it apply only to defend-
ants? What about parties anticipating litigation but not currently
confronting it? And finally, 'joint": can any parties with common le-
gal (or simply commercial) interests avail themselves of the privilege?
Is 'joint" akin to "common," in the sense that parties joined together
in a class action, for example, must evince a commonality of inter-
est?' 72 The questions multiply, as does the suspicion that 'joint de-
fense privilege" may fail to capture the complexity of the concept it
purports to label.
All fifty states have embraced the joint defense privilege in some
form. In roughly half the states, the privilege has been legislatively
codified. Some legislatures 173 have adopted privilege rules drawn
from the evidentiary rules proposed by the Supreme Court in 1971,
163 In re Imperial Corp. of Am., 174 F.R.D. 475, 478 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
164 A-Mark Auction, Inc. v. Am. Numismatic Ass'n, No. 3-99-MC-0014P, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15192, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 1999).
165 Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 685 F.2d 857, 862 (3d Cir. 1982).
166 Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
167 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5493 (Supp. 2001) ("Federal courts continue to confuse the allied law-
yer doctrine, which applies when parties with separate lawyers consult together, and
the joint client doctrine, which applies when two clients share the same lawyer, by
using the phrase 'joint defense privilege' to mangle the . . . concepts."); id. § 5493
n.91 (citing cases that "mangle the ... concepts").
168 Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 213 B.R. 433, 435 n.1
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
169 Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 302 (9th Cir. 1996).
170 This conclusion is reached, for example, in Bartel, supra note 17.
171 See Davidson, supra note 109, at 21 ("The joint defense doctrine acts as an
exception to the general rule that disclosure of confidential attorney-client communi-
cations to a third party waives the privilege . . ").
172 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 827-28
(1999).
173 These states are Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ore-
gon, and Wisconsin.
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but ultimately not adopted by the U.S. Congress,174 which included a
provision permitting parties to share information without waiver of
the attorney-client privilege.175 For example, the Alaska statute pro-
vides that
[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing the confidential communications
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of the profes-
sional legal services to the client ... by the client or the client's
lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common
interest. 176
Other legislatures have adopted an evidentiary privilege modeled on
the more stringent Uniform Rule of Evidence 502 (b), which requires
that litigation be actually pending for the privilege to apply.1 7 7 In the
remaining states, courts have exercised their power to make common
law and have, over the years, developed a joint defense privilege. 178
Whether the privilege has been created legislatively or by the courts, it
remains vague and difficult to define in nearly every jurisdiction.
Federal courts have stumbled forward in the creation of a privi-
lege without any legislative guidance. The test now regularly applied
in federal court, albeit with varying results from jurisdiction to juris-
diction, provides as follows: to invoke the joint defense privilege, a
174 By not adopting the evidentiary rules, Congress intended "to leave privilege
questions to the courts rather than attempt to codify them." United States v. Weber
Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 804 n.25 (1984).
175 Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates (1971), in 51
F.R.D. 315, 361-62 (1971) (regarding Rule 503(b) (3)).
176 ALAsKA R. EvID. 503(b).
177 These states are Arkansas, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Vermont. Texas's code is illustrative; it
provides that the joint defense privilege protects
[c]onfidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the ren-
dition of professional legal services ... by the client or a representative of
the client, or the client's lawyer or a representative of the lawyer, to a lawyer
or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending ac-
tion and concerning a matter of common interest therein.
TEx. R. EvID. 503(b) (1) (C); see also Ryals v. Canales, 767 S.W.2d 226, 229-30 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989) (rejecting joint defense privilege because there was no pending
action at time of sharing). States that have adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence
require pending litigation. See Boston Auction Co. v. W. Farm Credit Bank, 925 F.
Supp. 1478, 1482-83 (D. Haw. 1996) (applying Hawaii evidence law and rejecting
joint defense privilege where there was no "pending action").
178 The New York bar has recently recommended that the legislature amend the
code of evidence to recognize the joint defense privilege. See NEW YoRK BAR REcoM-
MENDATION, supra note 17.
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party must show that "(1) the communications were made in the
course of a joint defense effort, (2) the statements were designed to
further the effort, and (3) the privilege has not been waived."1 79
Placed side by side with Judge Wyzanski's famous ten-part test for eval-
uating the existence of an attorney-client privilege,180 or Wigmore's
almost equally detailed definition,181 the current federal standard for
the joint defense privilege is lacking in rigor and instantly generates
more questions than it settles. Nor should this be surprising, given
that the attorney-client privilege evolved over centuries, calibrated to
address the competing demands of society-for every person's evi-
dence-and the individual-for effective legal representation, but the
joint defense privilege emerged suddenly and developed with little at-
tention to first principles or the costs of the privilege.
B. Communications
Communications made in the course of a joint defense effort.'8 2 The
ambiguities embedded in the current definition of the joint defense
privilege begins with communications. The classic definitions of the at-
torney-client privilege18 3 concretely specify what communications are
179 Haines v. Ligget Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94 (3d Cir. 1992); see, e.g., In re
Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718-19 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Bay State Ambu-
lance & Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1989). I focus below on the
federal standard because most sophisticated criminal investigations are ordinarily un-
dertaken at the federal level.
180 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.
Mass. 1950).
(1) [T]he asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of
the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this com-
munication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence
of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and
not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege
has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id.
181 8 WIGMoRE, supra note 64, § 2292.
(1) [W] here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that pur-
pose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance perma-
nently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8)
except the protection be waived.
IL
182 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
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protected by the privilege: factual disclosures from a client to an attor-
ney made to solicit legal advice.' 8 4 By contrast, precisely what "com-
munications" fall within the ambit of the joint defense privilege has
been open to interpretation and evolution. The earliest federal case
to adopt the privilege (Continental Oil) involved communications
among lawyers whose clients shared a legal interest;8 5 the next case
(Hunydee) expanded the privilege to communications among lawyers
and clients when the latter shared common interests.'
8 6
This, however, does not capture the breadth of the doctrine as it
has evolved, for communications between two clients directly are now
cloaked in the joint defense privilege, providing that one of their law-
yers (or even, in some jurisdictions, one of the agents of one of the
lawyers) '8 7 is present when the conversation occurs. Courts have gen-
erally balked at regarding communications between clients directly,
which are conducted outside the presence of an attorney or his agent,
as cloaked in the privilege.' 88 At least one court has, however, re-
cently abandoned even this requirement, drawing upon developments
in the law of the attorney-client privilege.' 89 The full range of com-
munications potentially sheltered by the joint defense privilege is
thus, at this time, indeterminate.
C. Joint Defense Effort
Yet more problematic is the phrase 'joint defense effort." How
joined, or identical, must the interests of persons be if they endeavor
184 See United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358 (limiting the attorney-client
privilege to "communication [s] relat[ing] to a fact of which the attorney was
informed").
185 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964); see also supra text accompanying notes 128-35.
186 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965); see also supra text accompanying notes 135-43.
187 See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) (ruling that state-
ments made by a co-defendant to an investigator acting for defendant's counsel were
protected from disclosure by the co-defendant's attorney-client privilege). In
McPartlin, two co-defendants (McPartlin and Ingraham) jointly planned to discredit a
governmentwitness. Id. at 1335. In the course of these preparations, McPartlin made
incriminating statements to an investigator employed by Ingraham's attorney. Id. At
trial, Ingraham sought to introduce into evidence statements made by McPartlin to
the investigator. Id. The court sustained McPartlin's objection that the statements
were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id.
188 See United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Schachar v.
Am. Acad. of Opthalmology [sic], Inc., 106 F.R.D. 187, 191-92 (N.D. Ill. 1985); see also
John Labatt LTD v. Molson Breweries, 898 F. Supp. 471, 476-77 (E.D. Mich. 1995)
(holding that communications are privileged only if the party receiving the informa-
tion is a "conduit" to the other party's attorney).
189 IBJ Whitehall Bank & Trust v. Cory & Assocs., Inc., No. 97 C5827, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12440, at *20 (E.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 1999).
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to embark on a joint defense? Can any two or more persons claim a
common interest and, in this way, avail themselves of the joint defense
privilege? The history of the joint defense privilege reflects the dilu-
tion of a requirement that parties invoking the joint defense privilege
have the sort of discrete and vigorous common interest that emerges
when parties face a common litigation adversary. As we shall see, this
dilution leads to the problem of the innocent witness being drawn
into cooperation arrangements with the guilty.
Whereas in Chahoon, the joint defense was mounted by co-de-
fendants-that is, persons jointly facing a prosecutor-subsequent
cases have permitted a claim of a joint defense privilege before an
indictment has been filed. Courts have failed to explain why, how-
ever, a criminal investigation necessarily generates a common interest,
let alone a common legal interest. Illustrative is the Hunydee case,
where the Ninth Circuit leapt to the conclusion that a husband and
wife under investigation for tax fraud thereby-that is, as a conse-
quence of the investigation-had a common interest. Another view,
bolstered by the fact that the two had retained separate counsel, is
that the investigation did not align the spouses' interests but divided
them, rendering the application of the joint defense privilege
inappropriate.
If two business partners are being investigated for tax fraud, one
may raise as a defense that he was unaware of the records submitted
by the other. Because the denial of the willfulness required for tax
fraud may depend on one partner's shifting the blame to the other,190
the "innocent" partner has an interest in aligning himself with the
prosecutor. The "innocent" partner may nonetheless prefer to iden-
tify himself with his guilty partner, possibly out of friendship or a con-
cern that a tax fraud indictment would injure his commercial
enterprise. But courts have overwhelmingly rejected, at least in the
civil context, the extension of the joint defense privilege to those who
share emotional or commercial, as opposed to legal, interests: unless
parties face pending, or reasonably anticipated, litigation together,
they cannot avail themselves of the joint defense privilege.1 91 But in
190 See United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11 (1976); United States v. Bishop,
412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973) (holding that "willfully" requires no more than an inten-
tioned violation of a known legal duty).
191 Concededly, the distinction between a commercial interest and a legal interest
may not be wholly clear. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on N.Y. Marine &
Gen. Ins. Co., M 8-85 MHD, 1997 WL 599399, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1997) ("Al-
though the distinction between a common legal, as opposed to a commercial, interest
is somewhat murky, a common legal interest has been defined as one in which the
parties have been, or may potentially become, co-parties to a litigation.... or have a
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the context of a criminal investigation, courts have abandoned any
inquiry into the nature of the common interest. 192
In the typical white-collar investigation, the number of persons
called to testify before a grand jury may run into the dozens, and,
unlike the two business partners discussed above, they typically hold,
or have held, unequal roles in their organization. Most of these per-
sons face little or no criminal exposure. These are the bookkeepers,
the secretaries, the paralegals, who are questioned as to what they saw,
or were told, or were ordered by their superiors to do. The prosecu-
tor has no grounds for suspicion that they have committed any crimes,
but he needs their testimony to determine if others have. The joint
defense privilege purportedly enhances a lawyer's ability to render le-
gal advice, but in the case of such a peripheral witness, it is unclear
how the witness benefits (in the form of enhanced legal advice), for to
begin with he faces no legal exposure.
Complicating the situation further is the fact that the witness's
lawyer may have been provided by the subject's or target's lawyer. The
witness's lawyer may be grateful for the referral (and hoping for more
work) and may seek to repay the favor by encouraging his client to
craft a story that does not incriminate the target of the investigation
(who is often the witness's employer)1 93 Often, low-level employees
in a criminal enterprise face some criminal exposure, but the prosecu-
'coordinated legal strategy.'") (citations omitted). But courts have looked to whether
the parties claiming the joint defense privilege are together confronting pending or
anticipated litigation. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 89-3 & 89-4, 734 F. Supp. 1207,
1212 (E.D. Va. 1990) ("Movant invites the Court to extend the joint defense privilege
to include entities who are not parties to the litigation, but who merely have a pecuni-
ary interest in it. The Court declines this invitation."), affd in part and vacated in part,
902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990).
Whether an action is ongoing or contemplated, whether the jointly inter-
ested persons are defendants or plaintiffs, and whether the litigation or po-
tential litigation is civil or criminal, the rationale for the joint defense rule
remains unchanged: persons who share a common interest in litigation
should be able to communicate with their respective attorneys and with each
other to more effectively prosecute or defend their claims. The district
court's ruling, apparently based on the notion that the joint defense privi-
lege is limited to codefendants, was in error.
Id.
192 See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming
district court's finding that parties " 'had a common interest' in sorting out the respec-
tive affairs of the Church and Mr. Hubbard" and noting that all those present at the
meeting were church employees).
193 Some observers have drawn attention, rightly or wrongly, to the ordeal en-
dured by White House steward Bayani Nelvis during the Independent Counsel's inves-
tigation of President Clinton. Rosin, supra note 59, at 11.
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tor is more interested in pursuing their higher-ups. The prosecutor
may be prepared to grant the employee a favorable deal in return for
testimony against his employer or superiors.1 94 The witness's lawyer
may nonetheless emphasize the benefits of "hanging together" with all
the others ensnared in the investigation (including, of course, the su-
perior, who may have the most to lose) or in crafting a "unified story"
to tell prosecutors. Whether this really works to the employee's advan-
tage in organized crime and white-collar investigations is an insuffi-
ciently studied question.1 95
There is, however, reason for doubt. For example, in response to
"Operation Uncover" in the late 1980s, a federal probe into the mis-
Take the case of Joseph Small, the relatively obscure attorney representing
Bayani Nelvis, the White House steward. Small seems just a little too
tethered to the White House. After an erroneous report appeared saying
Nelvis had told both the Secret Service and the grand jury that he had seen
the president and Monica alone together, Small issued a statement calling it
"absolutely false." But the statement came from the White House, not from
Small's law firm. This aroused Starr's suspicions, prompting him to recall
Nelvis before the grand jury for more grilling.
Id.; Judy Keen & Kevin Johnson, Clinton's Lawyer Lays Groundwork Via Defense Pacts,
USA TODAY MAG., Aug. 14, 1998, at 1A.
[President Clinton's lawyer David] Kendall also has a cooperation agree-
ment with Joseph Small, the lawyer for White House steward Bayani Nelvis,
who is not in any apparent legal peril. [Law professorJonathon] Turley says
this might constitute an inappropriate use ofjoint defense agreements and
may put pressure on Nelvis to give testimony favorable to Clinton. "Ajoint
defense agreement places enormous pressure on these White House em-
ployees to conform to the president's account and the collective defense,"
he says. "It can create an extremely coercive environment for low-level
employees."
Id. Also worthy of consideration is the saga of Lisa Ann Jones, a low-level employee at
Drexel Burnham, whose lawyer represented Drexel as well in the larger probe. Jones
was ultimately charged with, and convicted of, perjury. See Richard H. Underwood,
Perjury! The Charges and the Defenses, 36 DuQ. L. REV. 715, 761-64 (1998).
194 Prosecutors, for example, enjoy essentially unreviewable discretion in charging
decisions, see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987), and in decisions to rec-
ommend downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2001).
195 Cf ALAN DERSHOWrTZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 398-99 (1982).
The bosses have an interest in assuring that their own lawyers-lawyers they
are paying-are representing the mules. The last thing the boss wants is for
an independent lawyer-or worse, a lawyer friendly to the prosecutors-to
encourage the mules to buy their freedom in exchange for turning in the
boss .... [A] smart boss will generally try to retain the best possible lawyers
for his mules. But he will try to get lawyers who will urge the mules to "fight
rather than switch" allegiances.
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use of classified documents by major defense contractors, Raytheon
Co. secured counsel for one of its employees, John Kiely.196 It then
entered into a joint defense agreement with Kiely, pursuant to which
documents were exchanged and a collaborative defense mounted to
the investigation. 97 Apparently lulled by Raytheon's soothing
promises, Kiely and his attorney declined to cooperate with the prose-
cutors.198 After Raytheon struck a deal with prosecutors, they predict-
ably directed their fire at the $60,000 per year middle manager, who
was convicted by a jury of conspiring to defraud the government by
illegally using classified documents. 199 As Kiely learned, the fact that
two parties both face criminal exposure does not mean that their in-
terests are necessarily aligned. Courts and other commentators, how-
ever, persist in glossing over this reality. The assumption that any two
or more persons who are being questioned, or who are under investi-
gation, somehow share a common legal interest is simply not necessa-
rily the case.
D. Agreement
Statements were designed to further the joint defense effort.200 Even par-
ties that actually share a common legal interest may not have em-
barked on a joint defense. If two persons are being questioned by a
grand jury, there may then be, under the current view, the requisite
common interest to justify the creation of the joint defense privilege,
but unless the two have actually agreed to "further" ajoint defense, any
materials shared will not be covered by the joint defense privilege.
For the joint defense privilege to exist, then, courts have insisted that
there be an explicit "agreement" manifesting that a 'Joint defense ef-
fort" has been undertaken. 20' This requirement has led to further
confusion, however, because it marks a significant divergence from
the attorney-client privilege.
'The attorney-client privilege can exist even if an attorney and
prospective client never agree that the attorney will undertake the
representation. The privilege is inferred by law when a person con-
196 See Kiely v. Raytheon Co., 914 F. Supp. 708, 710 (D. Mass. 1996).
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 Id- at 711; Zitner, supra note 4, at 65.
200 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
201 See United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 295, 295 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding no
joint defense agreement because defendant did not prove that the communications at
issue were made "during the course of ajoint defense agreement"); SIG Swiss Indus.
v. Fres-Co Sys., USA, Inc., No. 91-0699, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3576, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 17, 1993).
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suits with an attorney, or one reasonably believed to be an attorney,
with a view towards obtaining legal services. 202 Courts have extended
the protection of the attorney-client privilege to disclosures made by a
person in the mistaken, although subjectively reasonable, belief that
an attorney-client relationship could develop. 203 By contrast, courts
have rejected such arguments in the context of the joint defense privi-
lege, concluding that "one party's mistaken belief about the existence
of a joint defense does not, and cannot, give rise to a joint defense
privilege."20 4
Illustrative is United States v. Weissman,205 where the Second Cir-
cuit declined to infer ajoint defense agreement even where there was
considerable evidence to support the defendant's claim that he be-
lieved such an agreement existed.20 6 In Weissman, a company chief
financial officer (CFO) and the company itself were under investiga-
tion by a congressional committee. Perceiving themselves to have
common interests, they and their lawyers shared information for sev-
eral weeks. 20 7 Eventually, documents were uncovered indicating that
the CFO (Weissman) faced personal criminal liability.20 8 At a meeting
on June 16, 1993, attended by Weissman, his lawyers, and the com-
pany's lawyers, the CFO made disclosures that were damaging to him-
self.2 0 9 At a meeting the following day, Weissman made similar
disclosures.2 1 0 After the company decided to cooperate with prosecu-
tors, its lawyers turned over notes taken at both meetings.2 11 The
notes from the June 17 meeting included a reference to a joint de-
fense agreement, and prosecutors sealed off the notes and made no
use of them. 212 However, seeing no references to a joint defense
202 McCoRmicK, supra note 70, at § 88 ("Communications in the course of prelimi-
nary discussions with a view to employing the lawyer are privileged though the em-
ployment is in the upshot not accepted."). In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), for example, the court rejected the view that the
attorney-client relationship "'arises only when the parties have given their consent,
either express or implied.'" Id. at 1316 (citation omitted).
203 Thus, for example, a disclosure to someone mistaken for a lawyer may be pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege. See United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517,
522-23 (D. Del. 1981).
204 Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. at 297 n.1 (citing In Re Bevill, Bressler & Schulman Asset
Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986)).
205 195 F.3d 96, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1999).
206. Id.
207 See id. at 98.
208 Id
209 Id.
210 See id. at 98-99.
211 Id. at 99.
212 Id.
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agreement in the June 16 notes, the prosecutors relied upon them in
developing information against the CFO.2 13
Weissman moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the use
of the June 16 notes was improper, and the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's denial of the motion.21 4 The court of appeals rea-
soned that "prior to Weissman'sJune 16th revelations, Empire had no
reason to know of his wrongdoing .... Some form ofjoint strategy is
necessary to establish a Uoint defense agreement], rather than merely
the impression of one side as in this case."215 The court implicitly
accepted the conclusion that once Empire was alerted to Weissman's
personal liability, the company was free to enter into a joint defense
agreement with him. What prevented the formation of ajoint defense
effort on or prior to June 16 was not the absence of a joint interest in
concealing Weissman's wrongdoing but the absence of a knowing
agreement between Empire and Weissman that extended to the con-
cealment of Weissman's personal wrongdoing.
The unanswered (and, indeed, unasked) question is why such an
agreement-in effect, a "meeting of the minds" between two persons
to conceal the wrongdoing of one of them-should be given judicial
effect in the first place. In most circumstances, an agreement to con-
ceal evidence is disfavored.21 6 Two persons can, of course, contract
not to volunteer information to a third, but such an agreement is gen-
erally not enforceable in ajudicial proceeding.21 7 As Wigrnore notes,
213 See id.
214 Id. at 98. The district court canvassed the case law and concluded that the
Ninth Circuit was on "one end of the spectrum" in holding that "the joint defense
privilege arises out of and protects any general-purpose meeting in which codefend-
ants discuss matters of common interest." United States v. Weissman, No. 5194 CR
760 CSH, 1996 WL 737042, at *7-*8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 1996). Other circuits, the
district court found, "required evidence of common defense strategy or activity be-
tween the parties before extending to them the protections of joint defense privi-
lege." Id. at *8. The district court correctly predicted that "the Second Circuit, unlike
the Ninth Circuit, is unwilling to infer a joint defense agreement from the simple
circumstance of a general purpose meeting." Id. at *9.
215 Weissman, 195 F.3d at 99-100 (citations omitted).
216 See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. 425, 427 (Ct. App.
1989) (stating that "a bargain to suppress evidence is disfavored for obvious reason").
217 For example, in Williamson v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. Rptr. 744 (Ct. App. 1977),
vacated on other grounds, 21 Cal. 3d 829 (1978), the plaintiff brought a personal injury
suit against Firestone, a tire manufacturer, and Big Four, a manufacturer of tire-
changing equipment. Id. at 745. An expert retained by Big Four prepared a report
that concluded that Firestone was at fault. Williamson v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d.
829, 832 (1978). Big Four and Firestone came to an agreement that Big Four would
agree to withdraw the expert's report and thereby conceal it from the plaintiff, and in
return Firestone would agree to indemnify Big Four. Id- The California appellate
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"The judicial search for truth could not endure to be obstructed by a
voluntary pledge of secrecy .... ,,218 And the Supreme Court has spe-
cifically recognized that criminal matters pose an especially compel-
ling need for relevant evidence: the "longstanding principle that 'the
public.., has a right to every [person's] evidence' . .. is particularly
applicable to grand jury proceedings. '" 219 Thus, the law of the joint
defense privilege, which requires an agreement to conceal evidence
for the privilege to exist, conflicts with the ordinarily predominant
principle that agreements to conceal evidence from a litigation adver-
sary, let alone a grand jury, are void.
Courts have, in fact, occasionally balked at enforcing joint de-
fense agreements. In Kiely v. Raytheon, discussed earlier,220 Kiely sued
Raytheon for breaching an agreement, which allegedly included a
provision requiring each party to notify the other if it intended to
cooperate with prosecutors. The district court rejected Kiely's claim,
finding that
[a]n agreement by Kiely and Raytheon not to talk to the govern-
ment without the other's consent would have given either a poten-
tial veto over the other's furnishing relevant, truthful information to
investigators of criminal activity. Such a veto would obviously inter-
fere with the investigation and might even in some circumstances
amount to a criminal obstruction of justice. 22 1
As drafted today, joint defense agreements typically require parties to
notify other participants of any intent to withdraw, and, more impor-
tantly, agreements often impose significant penalties on any withdraw-
court concluded that the Big Four-Firestone agreement was unenforceable. William-
son, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 746. According to one judge in the majority, permitting parties
to enter into agreements to deny information to others would "encourag[e] attorneys
for separate defendants to enter into calculated, collusive and conspiratorial under-
standings to impede, impair and defeat the legitimate efforts of a plaintiff to obtain
discovery of relevant and needed material." Id. at 751 (Jefferson, J., concurring).
218 8 WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2290; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
682 n.21 (1972) (finding that "the mere fact that a communication was made in ex-
press confidence, or in the implied confidence of a confidential relation, does not
create a privilege").
219 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 339
(1950) (citations omitted)). The Court has also indicated that several privileges do
not apply in criminal proceedings, although they may apply in civil proceedings. Id.
at 685-701; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 n.19 (1974); cf. 26 U.S.C.
§ 7525 (Supp. V 1999) (providing for limited accountant privilege in "noncriminal
proceedings" in federal courts); MCCORMICK, supra note 70, § 104 (noting that some
states deny physician-patient privilege "in criminal cases generally, or in felony cases,
or in cases of homicide").
220 See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
221 Kiely v. Raytheon Co., 914 F. Supp. 708, 714 (D. Mass. 1996).
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ing parties.2 22 Because such penalties may constitute, in the words of
the Kiely court, "a substantial impediment" to the grand jury investiga-
ion,223 for they deter cooperation with prosecutors, courts in the fu-
ture may prove unwilling to enforce joint defense agreements.
E. Waiver and Ethical Issues
The privilege has not been waived.2 24 The third prong of the test
developed by the federal courts for the joint defense privilege tracks
the final requirement of the attorney-client privilege.225 The applica-
tion of the non-waiver requirement has, however, produced inconclu-
sive litigation and doctrinal uncertainty in the context of the joint
defense privilege. As will be explored below, the waiver question is
connected with ethical issues for defense attorneys who are parties to
joint defense agreements.
With respect to the attorney-client privilege, the client is deemed
the holder of the privilege, and he can, intentionally or inadvertently,
waive the privilege himself if he discloses materials to a third party.226
222 For example, joint defense agreements often provide that any party that with-
draws from the agreement waives the right to preserve the confidentiality of any
shared communications. See ModelJoint Defense Agreement of Law Firm X, at para.
8 (on file with author). The Model states that,
[i] n the event that an Attorney or Client withdraws from this Agreement...
such Attorney or Client thereby waives: (a) any attorney-client privilege or
work product with respect to communications made to the remaining Attor-
neys or Clients to this Agreement, (b) any claims of confidentiality concern-
ing information provided to the Attorneys and Clients pursuant to this
Agreement ....
Id. And, in addition, withdrawal from a joint defense agreement often results in a
target of an investigation discontinuing the payment of a witness's legal fees.
223 See Kiely, 914 F. Supp. at 714.
224 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
225 See 8 WiGMoRE, supra note 64, § 2292 (stating that the attorney-client privilege
exists except when the client waives the protection).
226 See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding the privilege
was not preserved when the document was produced regardless of whether the pro-
duction was inadvertent, reasoning "if a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must
treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications like jewels-if not crown
jewels"); 8 WGmORE, supra note 64, § 2325.
All involuntary disclosures, in particular, through the loss or theft of docu-
ments from the attorney's possession, are not protected by the privilege, on
the principle that, since the law has granted secrecy so far as its own process
goes, it leaves to the client and attorney to take measures of caution suffi-
cient to prevent being overheard by third persons. The risk of insufficient
precautions is upon the client.
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The client can also waive the privilege indirectly if he authorizes his
attorney to disclose privileged information. Unless the client con-
sents, however, the attorney has a duty to protect the confidence of
any client communications in order to preserve the privilege. 227 The
issue is complicated in the context of the joint defense privilege prin-
cipally because it is unclear who the holder of the privilege is and
who, therefore, can either "waive" the privilege or authorize its waiver.
When one client withdraws from the joint defense agreement and
agrees to cooperate with the prosecutor in return for a favorable deal,
courts have regularly held that the withdrawing client, acting on his,
own, cannot waive the privilege. "[U] nder the common interest privi-
lege," courts routinely state, "waiver of the privilege requires consent
of all parties who share the privilege." 228 Under the current view of
the joint defense privilege, then, only if all the clients who entered
into a joint defense agreement consent to the waiver of the privilege
can either they or their lawyers disclose joint defense materials to a
third party.
Explaining this result has sent courts twisting into doctrinal con-
tortions. One doctrinal route was suggested by the Chahoon court,
which held that in ajoint defense arrangement, "the counsel of each
was in effect the counsel of all," 229 language parroted by subsequent
courts.23 0 A joint defense arrangement, under this view, transforms
and expands the attorney-client relationship. When a client enters
into a joint defense agreement, he may "in effect" count all lawyers
representing the parties to the agreement as his own lawyers, and he
can seal their lips as to any disclosures just as he can seal the lips of his
own lawyer. A client can thus prevent an attorney retained by any
party to ajoint defense agreement from waiving the privilege with re-
spect to joint defense communications, and unless all of the clients
agree to a waiver, the joint defense privilege continues in effect.
227 See In re Claus Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[T]he [attorney-
client] privilege belongs solely to the client and may only be waived by him. An attor-
ney may not waive the privilege without his client's consent."). Compare United States
v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that lawyer's disclosure to a prosecu-
tor constituted waiver because he was acting with client's consent), with Schnell v.
Schnall, 550 F. Supp. 650, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that the lawyer's testimony
before the SEC did not constitute waiver because there was no indication that the
client had authorized disclosures).
228 See, e.g., In re Imperial Corp. of Am., 179 F.R.D. 286, 289 (S.D. Cal. 1998); see
also, e.g.,John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A, 913 F.2d 544, 556 (8th Cir. 1990).
229 Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 842 (1871).
230 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F.
Supp. 381, 388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
[VOL, 77:51504
2002] A NEW APPROACH TO JOINT DEFENSE AGREEMENTS
The solution suggested by the Chahoon court generates difficul-
ties. Consider the ramifications for legal ethics rules, when a party to
ajoint defense agreement defects and agrees to take the stand against
his former co-conspirator. In cross-examination, can the defendant's
attorney confront the defector with admissions he made in the course
of joint defense consultations? If, as suggested by the Chahoon court,
the defendant's attorney was "in effect" the defector's attorney as well
at that time,231 the answer suggested by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct would seem to be that he may not. Rule 1.6 prohibits an at-
torney from "reveal[ing] information" imparted by a client; this would
seem to be implicated if the defendant's attorney was "in effect" the
defector's attorney when the admissions were made.23 2 And this, in
turn, would trigger the application of Rules 1.7233 and 1.9.234 The
former prohibits an attorney from representing a client where such
representation would be "materially limited by the lawyer's responsi-
bilities to another client,"235 and the latter prohibits a lawyer from
representing a client with "materially adverse interests" to that of a
former client, who the attorney represented "in a substantially related
matter."23 6 Taken together, the Model Rules suggest that the attor-
ney's ability to represent the defendant would be compromised and
limited by his duties to the defector (viewed "in effect" as his erstwhile
client) and that withdrawal and even disqualification would be appro-
priate. This was, in fact, the conclusion reached by an ABA opinion
letter exploring the issue in the civil context.2 37 And in the criminal
231 Cliahoon, 62 Va. at 842.
232 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents
after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation .... ").
233 See id. R. 1.7(b) ("A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client
or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests .. ").
234 See id. R. 1.9(a) (1980) ("A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation. .. ."); see also
Seave, supra note 18, at 15 ("The word 'client' in Rule 1.9(a) has been broadly con-
strued to include an individual who is not a client but to whom an attorney has a
'fiduciary obligation.'") (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580
F.2d 1311, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1978)).
235 See supra note 233.
236 See supra note 234.
237 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395 (1995)
(discussing the obligations of a lawyer who formerly represented a client in connec-
tion with ajoint defense consortium). The author of the opinion letter took the view
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context, the United States Supreme Court has further held that the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective counsel authorizes trial
courts to disqualify defense counsel unable, due to ethical constraints,
to provide their client with conflict-free representation. 238
Courts struggled with the ethical issues raised by joint defense
arrangements in the final years of the previous Bush administration,
when federal prosecutors fired off disqualification motions in a trio of
high-profile criminal cases. 239 The impetus may have been comments
by the head of the Department ofJustice's criminal fraud division that
disqualification motions were appropriate when a participant in a
joint defense agreement defected and became a cooperating wit-
ness. 240 Although the courts in all three cases permitted the defense
attorneys to continue their representations, despite the fact that they
had been privy to information shared by individuals who were now
cooperating, and possibly testifying, witnesses, the reasoning em-
ployed was troubling to the defense bar.241 In one case, the court, in
that an attorney who received information shared pursuant to a joint defense agree-
ment is under an obligation (imposed by Rule 1.6) not to disclose the materials, and
an obligation (imposed by Rule 1.9) not to represent a person whose interests are
adverse to a member of ajoint defense group. Id. The author further concludes that
Rule 1.7 would foreclose the representation of a client which would likely be limited
by the requirements imposed by Rules 1.6 and 1.9. Id.
238 See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (finding that courts can
disqualify defense counsel to ensure "that criminal trials are conducted within the
ethical standards of the profession"); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c) (authorizing
courts to disqualify counsel where there is "good cause" to believe conflict of interest
exists).
239 See United States v. Bicoastal Corp., No. 92-CR-261, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21445, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1992) (allowing the defendants to keep their counsel
under a government motion for an inquiry into potential conflicts of interest); United
States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 30,
1992); United States v. Anderson, 790 F. Supp. 231, 232 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
240 White-Collar Prosecutors Probe Joint Defense Agreements, THE DOJ ALERT, July 1991,
at 3 ("[Urgenson] noted.., that there may be grounds to disqualify defense attorneys
if the defendants' interest diverge and their attorneys use information obtained
through joint defense agreement to cross-examine various witnesses.").
241 See Matthew D. Forsgren, Note, The Outer Edge of the Envelope: Disqualification of
White Collar Criminal Defense Attorneys Under the Joint Defense Doctrine, 78 MINN. L. REV.
1219, 1241 n.121 (1994).
The government might have lost the battle (i.e., disqualification of a particu-
lar group of attorneys) in these cases, but under no circumstances did the
government lose the war (i.e., the proposition that a court may disqualify
criminal defense attorneys under the joint defense doctrine). On the con-
trary, in each case the court applied traditional disqualification analysis, al-
though joint defense disqualification presents more complex considerations
than disqualification for successive or multiple representation.
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concluding that disqualification was unwarranted, relied heavily on
the fact that little information had been shared during joint defense
discussions.242 In the two other cases, the courts emphasized the fact
that the former members of the joint defense agreement had not
joined the prosecutor's motion to disqualify, strongly hinting that had
the former members done so, the courts would have decided the cases
differently.243 But all three cases took for granted that an attorney-
client relationship was formed between each of the clients of a joint
defense agreement and each of the attorneys and that therefore the
ethical rules involving nondisclosure of confidential information and
avoidance of conflicted representations were applicable. In the event
that substantial information had been shared or the defector had
moved to disqualify an attorney in a joint defense agreement, the
courts signaled that they would have been receptive to disqualification
motions.
The decisions "caused great concern and uncertainty in the
white-collar defense community"244 and sent the defense bar scram-
bling to refashion joint defense agreements to address the ethical is-
sues raised in these three cases.245  One solution-intended to
Id. (internal cross-references omitted).
242 See Bicoastal 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21445, at *7.
243 For example, McDade involved the investigation and prosecution of Congress-
man Joseph McDade. McDade, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *2. McDade and a
former aide, Raymond Wittig, retained separate counsel in the course of an investiga-
tion into whether the Congressman received illegal gratuities. Id. at *2-*3. McDade,
Wittig, and their lawyers, however, shared information under in ajoint defense agree-
ment for over two years until Wittig decided to plead out. Id. at *3. Prosecutors then
moved to disqualify McDade's lawyers. Although the district courtjudge "confess [ed]
to being not altogether comfortable with the situation," id. at *6, in light of the "dis-
turbing ethical tensions," id. at *1, he denied the motion to disqualify. Id. at *2. The
court found it significant that Wittig, although requesting that McDade's lawyer pre-
serve the confidentiality of his prior communications, did not join the prosecutor's
motion to disqualify. Id. at *11; see also Anderson, 790 F. Supp. at 232 (assuming that
joint defense agreement raised potential conflict of issues, and noting that the defen-
dant had made an informed and knowing waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel).
244 Ronald J. Nessim, Conflicts and Confidences-Does Conflict of Interest Kill the Joint
Defense Privilege? The Defense Viewpoint, CRIM. Jusr., Spring 1992, at 8; see also Robert S.
Bennett, Foreword to Eighth Survey of White Collar Crime, 30 Am. CPiM. L. REv. 441,
450-51 (1993) (arguing that prosecutorial motions to disqualify joint defense attor-
neys make up "an increasingly aggressive effort ... to tip the balance in the adver-
sarial system in their own favor").
245 The New York bar was particularly candid in expressing its concerns. Its Com-
mittee on Professional Responsibility wrote that:
The problem with viewing the joint defense doctrine as an extension of
the attorney-client privilege is that this analysis might suggest that the joint
defense doctrine hinges on the existence of an attorney-client relationship
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circumvent the ethical problems that seem to be part and parcel of a
broadly conceived attorney-client relationship extending to all clients
in a joint defense arrangement-was simply to rewrite joint defense
agreements. Attorneys added recital provisions to the effect that no
attorney-client relationship was formed among the various signatories
to ajoint defense agreement and their attorneys. 246 And specifically to
deal with the ethical conflict of interest rules, attorneys amended joint
defense agreements to provide that any defector waived (1) the right
to preclude the use of admissions he made during joint defense dis-
cussions and (2) the right to seek the disqualification of the attorneys
who were privy to those admissions.247
between each attorney in the joint defense and each participant. This view
... would import the notion that an attorney owed the identical fiduciary
duty to every participant ....
Recognizing this concern, many courts and commentators consider the
joint defense doctrine to be separate and apart from the attorney-client
privilege.
Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Ethical Implications
ofJoint Defense Common Interest Agreements, in 51 REc. OF THE ASs'N OF THE BAR OF THE
Cin oF NEW YORK 115, 118 (1996).
246 Sample joint defense agreements are included in Steven Alan Reiss & Laraine
Pacheco, The Essential Elements of a Joint Defense Agreement, 8 White-Collar Crime Rep.
(Andrews Publ'g) No. 2, at 1 (Feb. 1994).
247 The New York bar recommends inserting the following provision:
Nothing contained [in this agreement] shall be deemed to create an
attorney-client relationship between any attorney and anyone other than the
client of that attorney ... and no attorney who has entered into this Agree-
ment shall be disqualified from examining or cross-examining any joint de-
fense participant who testifies at any proceeding, whether under a grant of
immunity or otherwise, because of such an attorney's participation in this
agreement, and it is herein represented that each party to this agreement
has specifically advised his or her client of this clause.
Comm. on Prof I Responsibility, supra note 245, in 51 REc. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR
OF THE CrrY OF NEw YORK 115, 121 (1996). Two model joint defense agreements
recently obtained from Washington, D.C. firms indeed contain language to that ef-
fect. See Model Joint Defense Agreement from Law Firm Y, para. 11 (on file with
author), which states,
Each counsel and client further agree that if any Client who is or has at any
time been a party to this Common Interest Agreement testifies in any investi-
gation, litigation, or proceeding, Counsel for any other parties to this Agree-
ment shall not be precluded from utilizing in the examination of such
testifying person- any or all information independently obtained or derived
from confidential communications made, or information provided, pursu-
ant to this Agreement, including communications made or information pro-
vided by the testifying person or his or her Counsel.
Model Joint Defense Agreement from Law Firm X, supra note 222, at para. 8, says,
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Such provisions have not, however, eliminated the problem. In
many cases parties cooperate and embark upon a joint defense with-
out entering into any formal, written agreement. (Although courts
have required parties invoking the joint defense privilege to demon-
strate an agreement, they have not required that the agreement be in
writing.248 ) In at least two recent cases involving oral joint defense
agreements, United States v. Henke249 and Gilson v. State,250 courts have
held that an attorney-client relationship existed between one client
and another client's attorney, when information had been shared pur-
suant to a joint defense agreement: In Henke, the trial court refused
to permit an attorney to withdraw on the eve of trial, despite the attor-
ney's claim that his ability to represent his client was limited by his
prior "representation" of others who had been involved in ajoint de-
fense but who had subsequently cooperated with the prosecution.251
The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the attorney owed ethical
duties to all clients in ajoint defense. 252 In Gilson, which culminated
in the imposition of the death penalty, the trial court refused to per-
mit a defendant to call as a witness his original attorney, who had
been privy to communications by a joint defendant.25 3 The state ap-
pellate court affirmed, concluding that the defendant's lawyer owed
ethical duties to the other defendant.254 In a recent civil case, how-
In the event that an Attorney or Client withdraws from this Agreement ....
[n]othing herein shall be deemed to prevent the remaining Attorneys from
continuing their representation of the remaining Clients upon the with-
drawal of any other Attorney or Client, including the right of the remaining
Attorneys to examine any withdrawing Attorney or Client at any hearing,
trial or proceeding.
248 See Scheininger & Aragon, supra note 19, at 11.
249 222 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 2000).
250 8 P.3d 883 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
251 Henke, 222 F.3d at 637-38.
252 See id at 638, 643. The Ninth Circuit reasoned
[a] joint defense agreement establishes an implied attorney-client relation-
ship with the co-defendant.... This privilege can also create a disqualifying
conflict where information gained in confidence by an attorney becomes an
issue, as it did in this case.
Id at 637 (citation omitted).
253 Gilson, 8 P.3d at 908.
254 Id. The facts of Gilson were as folloWs: two defendants, Gilson and Coffman,
having been charged with murder, retained separate counsel and entered into ajoint
defense agreement. Id. After communications were shared among the two and their
lawyers pursuant to ajoint defense agreement, Coffman pled out and agreed to testify
at Gilson's trial. Id. Gilson's trial counsel, Deborah Maddox, filed a motion to with-
draw "based upon a conflict of interest she would face if placed in the position of
attacking Coffman's credibility as a witness if she testified in Appellant's [i.e., Gil-
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ever, a district court concluded, at odds with the Gilson and Henke
courts, that ajoint defense agreement did not give rise to an implied
attorney-client relationship.255 So the law in the area remains
uncertain.
Even where joint defense agreements contain provisions disclaim-
ing the formation of an attorney-client relationship with another cli-
ent's attorney and relinquishing any right to seek disqualification of
those attorneys, fundamental questions remain. First and foremost
are the recital provisions disclaiming the formation of an attorney-
client relationship. Simply put, if no attorney-client relationship is
formed among the various witnesses/clients and the attorneys, what is
the basis for the claimed confidentiality of the shared communica-
tions? Some commentators have suggested that an attorney would
owe fiduciary duties to a witness who shared information pursuant to a
joint defense agreement.2 56 Even if true, the significance of such a
relationship is opaque: whatever duties a fiduciary owes another, he
ordinarily cannot, simply on the basis of that fiduciary relationship,
refuse to provide evidence in ajudicial proceeding. The recital provi-
sions may rescue the joint defense privilege from the ethical issues
son's] trial." Id. The state filed a similar motion to disqualify Maddox, and the trial
court concurred, granting the motion to withdraw. Id. At Gilson's trial, after
Coffman had testified, Gilson called Maddox to the stand, but the court prohibited
the offered testimony. Id. In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of criminal
appeals wrote, "Appellant [Gilson] assumes, without conceding, that Coffman prop-
erly invoked her attorney-client privilege with Ms. Maddox. However, he argues that
any privilege was waived when Coffman took the stand to testify .... " Id- at 909. The
court's superficial treatment of the argument is a case study in the mangling of the
attorney-client privilege and joint defense privilege. Instead of coming to terms with
the fact that Maddox was not Coffman's lawyer to begin with and that it is therefore
mysterious how Coffman could "invoke[ ] her attorney-client privilege with Ms. Mad-
dox," the court simply recited the mantra that the attorney-client privilege is the old-
est of the common law privileges, as if that point was either disputed or relevant. See
id. And, with respect to the waiver issue, the court concluded that Coffman took no
affirmative act justifying a waiver because she was compelled to testify and did not do
so "voluntarily." Id. Hence, in Gilson as in Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21
Gratt.) 722 (1871), a co-defendant testified as to ajoint communication and the de-
fendant was foreclosed from calling an attorney privy to the communication to chal-
lenge the testimony. Summing up, then, the court in Gilson concluded that
Coffman's right to invoke her attorney-client privilege as to communications to Mad-
dox (grounded in a non-existent attorney-client relationship) trumped Gilson's right
to compulsory process (grounded, of course, in the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution). Gilson, 8 P.3d at 909-10 (rejecting due process argument be-
cause Gilson had cross examined Coffman).
255 Essex Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 993 F. Supp. 241, 253
(D.N.J. 1998) (reversing a magistrate's disqualification order).
256 See Bartel, supra note 17, at 918-24; Rushing, supra note 15, at 1278-81.
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that arise from an attorney-client relationship, but the cost seems to
be rendering the privilege itself groundless.
Provisions waiving objections by a defector to the use of informa-
tion he shared during joint defense discussions are equally problem-
atic. The attorney-client privilege exists only where disclosures are
made both in confidence and with the intent that they remain confi-
dential.2 57 Most joint defense agreements nowadays, however, pro-
vide that communications remain confidential subject to a condition
subsequent: in the event that one member defects, he waives any ob-
jection to the public use of information that he shared (although he
himself is supposedly still bound to preserve the confidentiality of in-
formation shared with him). The contingent confidentiality that char-
acterizes joint defense agreements is inconsistent with the attorney-
client privilege and renders problematic any claims that a joint de-
fense privilege somehow arises from the attorney-client privilege.
258
Similarly, provisions waiving a right to disqualify other counsel in
a joint defense arrangement are problematic and likely unenforce-
able.259 If, on the one hand, no attorney-client relationship is formed
among the various witnesses/clients and the attorneys in a joint de-
fense agreement (as claimed by the recital provision), then it is diffi-
cult to understand the basis of the asserted confidentiality. If, on the
other hand, an attorney-client relationship is formed, then it is un-
clear how an attorney can opt out of the ethical conflict of interest
rules that govern any such relationship.260 In the criminal context,
courts have rigorously enforced conflict-of-interest rules. The Su-
preme Court held in Wheat v. United States261 that the judicial system
has an independent interest in ensuring that criminal defendants
have conflict-free counsel.262 It is, therefore, unlikely that a court
would regard as binding a party's decision to waive his or her right to
257 See supra Part II.B.
258 Even a proponent of the joint defense privilege acknowledges this difficulty.
See Bartel, supra note 17, at 911 n.203.
259 No court has yet ruled on the issue, although other provisions ofjoint defense
agreements have already been ruled unenforceable. See Kiely v. Raytheon Co., 914 F.
Supp. 708 (D. Mass. 1996).
260 See Seave, supra note 18, at 17.
261 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
262 I& at 153.
When a trial court finds an actual conflict of interest which impairs the abil-
ity of a criminal defendant's chosen counsel to conform with the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility, the court should not be required to tolerate
an inadequate representation of a defendant.
Id.; see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (discussing a court's power to
ensure that proceedings are fair and not tainted by conflict of interest).
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seek disqualification, for the court could pursue disqualification sua
sponte. 263
F. An Independent Privilege?
After a few decades of experience, the joint defense privilege is
still, at its core, uncertain, for there is no consensus as to the nature of
the relationship that exists between attorneys and clients who are en-
gaged in a joint defense. And this uncertainty has generated, among
other controversies, insoluble ethical dilemmas. A solution bubbling
up in the academic literature is to craft an altogether new privilege,
one that borrows haphazardly from the attorney-client privilege, the
work product doctrine, and fiduciary law principles. 264 Although the
proposal to craft an independent privilege has yet to be embraced in
the courts,265 it has been promoted as a solution to the doctrinal and
ethical problems that arise from "conceptualizing" the joint defense
privilege as simply an extension of the attorney-client privilege.
The multiplicity of viewpoints on the ethical and various other
issues that surround thejoint defense privilege has prompted a chorus
of protests from the bar, with complaints that uncertainty about the
contours of the privilege have "chilled" the formation ofjoint defense
groups. 2 6 6 Nonetheless, many attorneys report that the privilege, al-
beit in its current confused and almost incoherent form, is nonethe-
less effective in defending targets of a criminal investigation.
Consider the following observation by Lanny Breuer, a prominent
Washington, D.C., defense lawyer, and a veteran of President Clin-
ton's White House Counsel's Office: "Prosecutors these days have it
tough. With the ever-increasing sophistication of the white collar de-
fense bar, prosecutors in multidefendant investigations often face a
unified wall of resistance from the witnesses and targets of their in-
263 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c) (authorizing court to disqualify counsel where "good
cause" to believe conflict of interest exists).
264 See Bartel, supra note 17, at 918-24.
265 See United States v. Agnello, 135 F. Supp. 2d 380, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("The
joint defense privilege 'is not an independent basis for privilege but an exception to
the general rule that the attorney-client privilege is waived when privileged informa-
tion is disclosed to a third party."') (quoting Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Stratton
Oakmont, Inc., 213 B.R. 433, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
266 Bartel, supra note 17, at 872; see also Amy Foote, Note, Joint Defense Agreements in
Criminal Prosecutions: Tactical and Ethical Implications, 12 GEO. J. LErAL ETHiCS 377, 387
(1999) (noting the "chilling effect" of the McDade, Bicoastal and Anderson decisions);
GregoryJ. Kopta, Comment, Applying the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Privi-
leges to Allied Party Exchange of Information in California, 36 UCLA L. REv. 151, 153
(1988) ("Continuing uncertainty exacts a high price. Fear of waiver in general is very
expensive to both the participants and the legal system itself.").
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quiries."2 67 This is so, Breuer and his coauthor Michael Imbroscio ex-
plain, because "[w]orking under a shield of privilege in
multidefendant cases-sometimes called the joint defense' or 'com-
mon interest' privilege-skilled defense lawyers are able to share in-
formation and coordinate defense strategy among those facing a
prosecutor's scrutiny."268 Prosecutors "are often frustrated by the ef-
fectiveness of the arrangement," but "there is nothing prosecutors can
do to object."269 The claim recently received some confirmation in
congressional testimony by a leading federal prosecutor. Charles La-
Bella, the former U.S. attorney from San Diego tapped to head up an
investigation into campaign finance violations during the 1996 presi-
dential campaign, testified as to the difficulties he confronted during
the investigation, focusing on joint defense agreements:
The reality in the District of Columbia, as I've come to know it, is
that there are joint defense agreements, and these joint defense
agreements are as thick as closing binders. They're probably two,
three inches thick. Everyone has a lawyer. Everyone does a shuffle
in a white collar case. Everyone forgets their name when you start
to question them. Everyone, when you put a memorandum in front
of them says, I see my signature, I see the memorandum, but I don't
remember writing it; I don't remember what it says; and I can't tell
you why I wrote it. I've been doing white collar cases virtually all my
career. This is the shuffle that you get. It's not the president or the
vice president I'm talking about, but every witness that you come up
against in a white collar case. These are very difficult cases to
make.270
The simple response to LaBella might be that white-collar cases,
like all criminal cases, should be difficult cases to make. Our system is
designed to place substantial obstacles in the way of the police and
prosecution, so highly do we as a society value our constitutional
rights and so vigilantly do we guard against overreaching by the state.
But such a response, however much it may resonate rhetorically, is
surely question-begging. We do not put up obstacles to the police and
prosecution simply for the sake of putting up obstacles. The serious
question is whether joint defense agreements promote or undermine
socially desirable goals.
267 Lanny A. Breuer & Michael X. Imbroscio, An Unreasonable Condition: Targets
Seeking Leniency Are Increasingly Asked To Withdraw from Joint Defense Agreements, LEGAL
Tmms, Sept. 20, 1999, at S27.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Independent Counsel Hearing, supra note 14 (questions omitted).
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Whether the joint defense privilege is advanced as an extension
of the attorney-client privilege or as an independent privilege alto-
gether, it is plainly a departure from the traditional privilege rules.
Before embracing the novel privilege, courts need to gain a fuller pic-
ture of both the costs and benefits it poses to society.271 Contrary to
what some assume, 272 it is hardly self-evident that society, on balance,
benefits from the judicial recognition of the joint defense privilege.
Especially in the context of a criminal investigation, there may be seri-
ous doubts as to why from society's perspective the sharing of information
among clients (and attorneys) with common interests is beneficial.
IV. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE JOrNT DEFENSE PRIVILEGE
Many of the justifications supplied to support the joint defense
privilege are linked to the rationales for the attorney- client privilege
itself. The results are, I argue in this Part, an unimpressive edifice
upon which to support a novel evidentiary privilege. The joint de-
fense privilege is said to be essential to foster disclosures among attor-
neys and clients with common interests (in much the same way that
the attorney- client privilege is said to be essential to foster communi-
cations between a client and an attorney). As I argue in Part IV.A,
however, a great deal of sharing would occur even in the absence of
the joint defense privilege. To assess the merits of the joint defense
privilege, one would need to attain greater clarity in defining precisely
what sort of inter-party communications are likely facilitated by the
joint defense privilege, and whether society benefits when such com-
munications are encouraged. I then question claims that the joint de-
fense privilege in fact promotes socially valued ends, such as the
search for truth (Part IV.B), a fair adversary system (Part IV.C), and
the "efficiency" of the litigation process (Part IV.D).
A. Sharing Without the Joint Defense Privilege
Let us begin by accepting the assumption that an unrestricted
flow of information among clients and lawyers, where the clients share
common interests, benefits society. We would still need to inquire
what portion of that information flow, and concomitant alleged social
benefits, are properly attributed to the joint defense privilege. Al-
271 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2285 (arguing that new evidentiary privileges
should be created only where the injury to a socially valued relationship is "greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation").
272 See, e.g., Rushing, supra note 15, at 1274 ("The joint-defense privilege fulfills
the social goal of encouraging interparty communications by preserving their
confidentiality.").
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though the joint defense privilege is often indiscriminately credited
for the entirety of such an information flow,2 73 this premise is faulty.
Would parties that share a common interest-for example, in frustrat-
ing a criminal investigation or prosecution-pool information even if
there were no joint defense agreement? The answer is plainly yes. In
this respect, one must, as a threshold matter, distinguish between in-
formation protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product
doctrine on the one hand and altogether unprivileged information on
the other. With respect to the latter, information may well be shared
irrespective of whether a joint defense agreement exists.
For example, a prosecutor tells the attorney for witness X that she
doubts the truthfulness of witness Y on a certain point. Will X's attor-
ney relay that information to Y's attorney? He may, if either X's inter-
ests are aligned with Y's interests or if he hopes to earn the
professional gratitude of Y's attorney. Whether X and Y have entered
into ajoint defense agreement is not directly implicated: the commu-
nication from the prosecutor to X's attorney is not privileged, so the
communication from X's attorney to Ys attorney would not be privi-
leged either, regardless of whether ajoint defense agreement existed.
It is perhaps the case that clients and attorneys who have entered into
ajoint defense agreement forge closer interests than otherwise identi-
cally situated clients and attorneys who have not entered into a joint
defense agreement. Thus, the likelihood of the sharing of such infor-
mation may increase on the margin once ajoint defense agreement is
in place; this, however, is a far more modest claim on behalf of the
joint defense agreement than those regularly made.
Now consider the information sharing that may occur if X re-
ceives a subpoena for certain documents. X's attorney considers shar-
ing a draft motion to quash with Y's attorney to solicit his advice.
Although the draft motion is not protected by the attorney-client priv-
ilege, 274 it is covered by the work product doctrine, which creates a
273 See Bartel, supra note 17, at 871 ("Communications in pursuit of ajoint defense
will not occur... [without] the joint defense privilege .... .").
274 Recall that the attorney-client privilege exists only to shield factual disclosures
from the client to the attorney; it does not protect legal memoranda, for example,
except to the extent that they embody or reflect such factual disclosures. Moreover,
even if the draft motion to quash includes factual disclosures from the client to the
attorney, it still might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege if the disclo-
sures were made with the intent that they become part of a public document, such as
a legal filing. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356-58 (4th Cir.
1984) (finding that information supplied to a lawyer with intent that it become part of
a prospectus is not protected by attorney-client privilege).
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zone of privacy within which lawyers can prepare for litigation.275 Un-
like the attorney-client privilege, the work product protection is not
waived by disclosure to a nonadversarial third party.276 Accordingly,
X's attorney could preserve the work product protection despite shar-
ing the draft motion with Y's attorney. Again, then, the sharing may
occur irrespective of the existence or nonexistence of a joint defense
agreement. To be sure, the work product doctrine provides only a
qualified protection, which can be overcome by a showing of substan-
tial need, unlike the "absolute" protection of a true evidentiary privi-
lege. 277 And without the joint defense privilege, X's attorney runs the
275 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). Hickman was partially
codified in the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. SeeFED. R. CIv.
P. 26(b) (3).
276 See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1976)
("We ... are of the opinion that broad concepts of subject matter waiver analogous to
those applicable to claims of attorney-client privilege are inappropriate when applied
to Rule 26(b)(3)."); In re F.A. Potts & Co., 30 B.R. 708, 711-12 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983)
(finding that disclosure of a letter to an "unrelated third party" did not constitute a
waiver of the work product protection).
277 In fact, the attorney-client privilege is not nearly as absolute as is often as-
sumed. "[P]redictability in the application of the privilege .. .is largely lacking in
many areas," see McCORMICK, supra note 70, § 87, and "the privilege does not have the
reach many lawyers believe it has." EPSTEIN, supra note 96, at 453. It does not apply to
client communications seeking business or political or personal advice, see McCoR-
MICK, supra note 70, § 88, is overridden when client and attorney become embroiled
in a dispute, see EPSTEIN, supra note 96, at 278-82, and, of course, does not cover
communications made in furtherance of a client's crime or fraud. See United States v.
Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989). Furthermore, the attorney-client privilege, like
all common-law privileges recognized by Federal Rule of Evidence 501, is an ex post
rule of admissibility in federal court proceedings, not an ex ante guarantee of confi-
dentiality. The scope of the evidentiary privileges can vary among the fifty states
(each governed by its own statutory and common law) and the federal courts (gov-
erned by Rule 501). A communication is not privileged in all fora merely because it is
privileged in one forum. Accordingly, a federal common-law privilege cannot guaran-
tee confidentiality in all proceedings at all times. But cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be cer-
tain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all."). Is the attorney-client privilege worthless because it is neither abso-
lute nor wholly predictable? Surely not. A sophisticated client may judge the risks
associated with a disclosure to an attorney as less than the expected benefits (en-
hanced legal services). In much the same way, an attorney may judge the risks associ-
ated with a disclosure to another attorney as less than the expected benefits. The
existence of a joint defense privilege or a joint defense agreement simply shifts the
risk-benefit analysis. The risk of disclosure to a prosecutor may decrease if there is a
joint defense agreement, but that risk will never be zero. The basic Machiavellian
insight that the risks associated with a conspiracy increase as the number of persons
"in the know" grows cannot be defeated by the creation of a parchment privilege.
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risk that, should Y later decide to cooperate with prosecutors, he will
give this information to prosecutors. But how much of a danger is
that? X's attorney may well conclude that, even without the joint de-
fense privilege, the harm that would come from disclosure of a draft
motion (relatively small) discounted by the likelihood that it will ever
be shared with prosecutors (relatively slight) is less than the immedi-
ate and concrete benefits that can come from input from another law-
yer on a draft motion.2 7 8
The sharing of client confidences ordinarily poses far greater
risks. X discloses inculpatory facts to his attorney; the attorney consid-
ers sharing the information with Y and Y's attorney in the hope that
they can collectively craft a story that places those facts in a less dam-
aging light. Without ajoint defense agreement in place, X's attorney
is unlikely to share the damaging information. Sharing of confiden-
tial communications would waive the attorney-client privilege, and the
sharing permitted under the work product protection does not ex-
tend to client confidences. 279 Thus, if X's attorney disclosed his cli-
ent's confidential communication to Y and Ys attorney, it could be
argued that the attorney-client privilege had been waived. At a mini-
mum, without ajoint defense agreement, he would be unable to seal
the lips of Y and Ys attorney should they cooperate with the prosecu-
tor. Because the client's disclosure may be highly compromising, his
attorney will thus be reluctant to share the information with anyone
else in the absence of a joint defense agreement.
One should add, however, that even if the parties have entered
into a joint defense agreement, there would necessarily be significant
risks in any disclosure of highly damaging information to another per-
son. X's attorney may disclose such evidence to Y and Ys attorney if
they can assist him in crafting an exculpatory story, but even if the
sharing is conducted under the cover of a joint defense agreement,
there would be attendant risks. Should Y decide to cooperate with the
prosecutor, he will in theory be foreclosed from disclosing the infor-
mation supplied by X, but enforcement of the joint defense agree-
ment is hardly certain. If the risks associated with a disclosure are
great (because the information is extremely damaging), even a rela-
tively high degree of confidence in the preservation of its confidential-
ity might still discourage the attorney from sharing the information.
278 The analysis would be similar for an attorney's notes of an interview with a
third-party witness. The notes are covered by the work product doctrine, which pro-
tection would be preserved in the event the notes were shared with a non-adversarial
third party.
279 See Bartel, supra note 17, at 916 (noting that "[s]haring of dient-lawyer com-
munications is not permitted by the strict application of the work product doctrine").
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The existence of a joint defense agreement may increase the attor-
ney's confidence, but that confidence can never be complete, and the
associated risks can never be zero.2 80
Thus, one should not overstate the significance of the joint de-
fense privilege. A vast amount of information (unprivileged informa-
tion, legal memos, notes from interviews of third parties) may be
shared with or without the privilege. Joint defense agreements may
promote the sharing of such information as parties, having bound
themselves together by a joint defense agreement, see their fortunes
as more intimately intertwined. But the principal effect of the joint
defense privilege is to promote the sharing of a specific type of infor-
mation: client confidences. The joint defense privilege bridges the
gap left by the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege
and reduces, although by no means eliminates, the potentially grave
risks associated with the sharing of client confidences.
B. The Search for Truth: Coordinating Stories
Although the costs of the attorney-client privilege, in denying ac-
cess to all of the evidence, have long been recognized, recent scholar-
ship has drawn attention to the truth-promoting aspects of the
privilege. When clients are encouraged to make full factual disclo-
sures to their attorneys, it is argued, attorneys are better able to trans-
mit complete and accurate information (especially information
pertaining to "contingent claims") to the factfinder.281 Proponents of
the joint defense privilege have similarly argued that the sharing of
factual and legal information among clients (and attorneys) with com-
mon interests at a minimum does not frustrate the search for truth
and may in fact foster it. Information is not withheld from the prose-
cutor as a consequence of the joint defense privilege, it is said; the
joint defense privilege simply permits the sharing of information
among parties in common interest.28 2 And by allowing defense attor-
280 I am indebted for this point to a candid defense lawyer, who remarked to me
that if he finds a document that is extremely damaging to his client but which had not
been subpoenaed, "I wouldn't show it to my dog, let alone another lawyer. I don't
care if I had a joint defense agreement."
281 SeeAllen et al., supra note 72, at 364-69 (arguing that the attorney-client privi-
lege allows attorneys to explore "contingent claims" and thereby enhances their abil-
ity to convey truthful information to the factfinder).
282 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.15 (2d ed.
1999) ("The litigation process is generally not deprived of evidence [by the joint de-
fense privilege] that would otherwise be available because the collaborative communi-
cations are unlikely to be made in absence of the privilege."); Daniel J. Capra, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in Common Representations, TRIAL LAW Q., Summer 1989, at 20,
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neys more effectively to represent their clients through the develop-
ment of unified theories not riddled with inconsistencies, the truth is
likelier to emerge from a more robust adversarial system.283 Further-
more, it is argued, absent t1~ejoint defense privilege, a defense attor-
ney may be unaware of what other witnesses have already testified and
will thus be unable to confront a client with information at odds with
a false story that a client is planning to tell.284 One supporter of the
novel privilege concludes that "[d] eterring the formation of joint de-
fense groups ... undermines the search for truth."285
In the context of a criminal investigation, this claim may be over-
stated. The goal of any criminal investigation is to accurately deter-
mine whether a crime has been committed and, if so, to sort the guilty
from the innocent. To accomplish these goals, a prosecutor fre-
quently depends on securing the truthful testimony of an "insider. '286
If little or no information flows among the various insiders and a pris-
oner's dilemma is created, the insiders may be pressured to cut a deal
21 ("A uniform rule extending the privilege to all communications made in the inter-
est of common representation would be consistent with the policies of the privilege,
without imposing an unnecessary cost upon the search for truth."); Perito et al., supra
note 21, at 40 ("Defendants are only barred from disclosing information learned dur-
ing the course of the joint defense, and absent ajoint defense agreement, they would
be unlikely even to have gained such knowledge.").
283 Scheininger & Aragon, supra note 19, at 13 ("Ajoint defense agreement facili-
tates coordinated defense strategy."); Forsgren, supra note 241, at 1232 ("When de-
fendants share factual information, they can better present a "'coherent and plausible
defense, rather than one riddled with immaterial inconsistencies.'" (quoting Perito et
al., supra note 21, at 40)).
284 Cf Bartel, supra note 17, at 880 ("Thejoint defense agreement does not signifi-
cantly enhance the opportunities to engage in concerted secret criminal activity. To
the contrary, having lawyers injected into the group through joint defense arrange-
ments should stifle further criminal activity ... ").
285 Id. at 873.
286 See Genego, supra note 45, at 791-92 (1988) ("Since many white collar and
drug offenses are committed in private, among groups of willing participants, the
government often relies on confidential informants to gather information." (footnote
omitted)); PeterJ. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Col-
lar Crime: How Far Will thw Courts Allow Prosecutors To Go?, 54 U. PrIr. L. REv. 405, 449
(1993) ("Often the best witness is the defendant herself, if she made incriminating
statements to investigators or co-conspirators . . . ."); John C. Jeffries Jr. & John
Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HAs-
TINGS LJ. 1095, 1104 (1995) ("Generally speaking, successful prosecution of organ-
ized crime leaders requires the use of accomplice testimony."); EarlJ. Silbert, Defense
Counsel in tie Grandfury-The Answer to the White Collar Criminal's Prayers, 15 AM. CaM.
L. REv. 293, 293 (1978) (noting that criminal investigations are "wholly dependent on
the ability to compel the production of documents and the testimony of witnesses,
particularly those with inside knowledge").
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with the prosecutor and provide testimony.287 If information flows
freely, however, deals may be struck among the insiders to deny mutu-
ally incriminating information to the prosecutor. More precisely,
deals will be struck among the insiders' lawyers, who will usually have
had preexisting business relationships and who may be dependent
upon each other for future business referrals. Absent the joint de-
fense privilege, the market for information as to conspiratorial acts is
best characterized as a monopsony, with the only potential buyer be-
ing the prosecutor.288 Once the joint defense privilege is born, insid-
ers may prefer to barter information with one another, and they may
then be in a position to 'join together like musk oxen to show com-
mon horns to the government."28 9
Even where the joint defense privilege does not facilitate outright
"stonewalling," it enhances an attorney's ability to "prepare" a witness,
which may in turn decrease the likelihood that the truth will emerge
in a criminal investigation. An attorney fully apprized of that to which
other witnesses of an investigation have testified, or plan to testify, is
in a far better position to advise a client before he appears before the
grand jury. Any attorney who has prepared a client for a deposition
or a grand jury appearance is aware of the ease with which testimony
and even recollections can be shaped and even created.290 Clients, as
well as friendly witnesses, for the most part want to be helpful when
287 Professor Akhil Amar, for example, has written in favor of excluding defense
lawyers from the grand jury: "It is in fact quite useful for society to have at least one
nonviolent but secret interrogation place, so that individual members of organized
conspiracies can be brought in one by one, and their partners in crime will never
know for sure whether they ratted or stood mute." AHIL REED AmAR, THE CONST-I-
TION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 218 n.171 (1997). He explains that "[t]he secrecy of
the grand jury room is in effect the wall between prisoners that creates a classic 'pris-
oner's dilemma' to confess the truth." Id.
288 See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 118 (1997).
289 See The Effect of State Ethics Rules on Federal Law Enforcement Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on CriminalJustice Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 50
(1999) (statement of John Smietanka, former Principal Associate Deputy General).
For example, although federal prosecutors in Washington, D.C. originally sought
prison sentences ranging from thirty-five years to life imprisonment for the so-called
"P Street" crew, they ended up settling for pleas bargains for as little as three and a
half years. One defense lawyer explained that an iron-clad joint defense agreement
allowed the defendants to secure such a favorable deal from prosecutors: "[The joint
defense agreement] made it more difficult for the government to divide and conquer.
We had a unified team they couldn't penetrate." Eva M. Rodriguez, Prosecution Trades
Shaky Drug Case for Pleas, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 18, 1993, at 2 (statement of Henry Asbill).
290 On the malleability of memory, see John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68
TEX. L. REv. 277, 328 n.277 (1989), and Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coach-
ing, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 1, 10 n.34 (1995).
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meeting with an attorney, and one needs to do very little to nudge
them in a preferred direction. A statement of the relevant law, a
description of the theory of the case, a confident, approving reference
to some favorable facts learned from other witnesses or documents,
and a client who previously had dim or ambiguous recollections will
come to have an absolutely "honest" memory. An attorney can subtly,
or not so subtly, coach a client to bend testimony to conform to a story
widely agreed upon by those under investigation.291
An attorney's ability to coach a client is, however, in large part a
function of how much information the attorney has prior to meeting
with the client. If a grand jury is investigating several individuals for
price-fixing and the prosecutor has focused attention on a certain bus-
iness meeting, there are limits, not only ethically, but also tactically, to
any witness preparation session, as long as each witness is ignorant of
the other's testimony. To illustrate this point, I have adapted a hypo-
thetical witness preparation session described by Professor Wydick.292
Assume that prosecutors are probing a certain business meeting; they
want to know if Ms. E and Mr. F. discussed three topics-X, Y, and Z.
Professor Wydick suggests that an attorney for Mr. F. can coach her
client in the following manner:
Q) At the meeting, did Ms. E say X?
A) No, I am quite certain she didn't.
Q) Did she say Y at the meeting?
A) Again, I am quite certain that she did not.
Q) At the meeting, did Ms. E say Z?
A) Well, you know, as to Z, yes, I think she may very well have said
Z.
Q) O.K. now, I need to make sure that I understand correctly what
you are telling me. You are absolutely certain that E did not
say X, is that right?
291 In United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986), for example, an attor-
ney sought to fashion a unified story by delivering the following speech to three
witnesses:
The purpose of this meeting tonight is so we can help each other remember
exactly what happened, how it happened, when it happened and all the mi-
nor details.... I was talking with [a fourth witness, not present at the meet-
ing] . . . but according to his version of the facts, it's quite different from
what I have so far understood them to be. So, I would center on my facts on
what you, three of you, say they are and somehow try to either fit all the
other facts around these, or if they don't fit, then I have to watch out, you
know, there's something else, somebody saying something else.
id. at 1431 n.2. This speech only came to light because one of the witnesses surrepti-
tiously tape recorded the meeting.
292 Wydick, supra note 290, at 32-34.
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A) Yes, that's fight.
Q) And you are absolutely certain that E did not say Y, is that
fight?
A) Yes, that's fight.
Q) And as to Z, you say "I think," but you aren't certain? Am I
correct in believing that you simply do not know one way or
the other as to Z?
A) Yea, I guess that's fight.
Q) So you remember for certain that she did not say X, and you
remember for certain that she did not say Y, but you do not
remember one way or the other about Z, is that fight?
A) Right. 29 3
The attorney's questioning induces Mr. F to deny what he had
originally come close to admitting-that topic Z was discussed at the
meeting. Professor Wydick suggests that in the above scenario the at-
torney may have violated the rules of professional ethics that prohibit
the elicitation of false testimony,294 but he acknowledges the difficul-
ties in enforcing such rules. He therefore counsels attorneys to be
more attentive to the distorting effects of leading questions, as dis-
cussed in the work of linguists and moral philosophers, and he ap-
peals to attorneys' "informed conscience."29 5
A better check on overaggressive witness preparation is likely the
attorney's own self-interest or at least her interest in advancing the
interests of her client. For example, although witness preparation ses-
sions typically conclude with a bout of "role-playing," lawyers are often
advised that elaborate mock-questioning can backfire and result in
testimony that appears "canned."296 Likewise, an attorney's interest in
advancing her client's interest may discourage her from implanting
testimony where she is ignorant of the testimony provided by others'
293 Id. at 33.
294 Id. at 34 ("It is unethical."). See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b)
(1983) (asserting that a lawyer shall not "counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely");
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (6) (1980) (stating that a lawyer
shall not "[p]articipate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or
it is obvious that it is false").
295 Wydick, supra note 290, at 52.
296 SeeJames W. McElhaney, Horse-Shedding the Witness, TRIAL, Oct. 1987, at 80, 83
("It is better for there to be a little awkward spontaneity than the impression that
everything is canned."); see a/SOJOHN 0. SONTENG ET AL., THE TRIALBOOK 214 (student
ed. 1984) (advising that witnesses should "avoid the rehearsed look"); Carol T. Rie-
ger, M. Dombroff" Dombroff on Unfair Tactics, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1430, 1439 (1985) (book
review) (arguing that legal "gamesmanship" can result in bad advice). A famous ex-
ample of apparently scripted testimony that backfired occurred in the Triangle Shirt-
waist fire case in New York. See Daniel J. Kornstein, A Tragic Fire-A Great Cross-
Examination, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 28, 1986, at 2.
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witnesses. In the scenario described above, it would be not simply un-
ethical but tactically unwise to exhort a client to deny that topic Z was
discussed when others who attended the meeting may testify to the
contrary. Where the lawyer remains unsure of the testimony of
others, she has an incentive to ascertain what really happened so as to
provide better counsel to her client.
The notion that the truth is more likely to emerge when attorney
and client are kept, at least in part, uninformed, conflicts with the
prevailing wisdom of the legal profession. 297 When, for example, Oli-
ver North was questioned by the Senate, his attorney, Brendan Sulli-
van, Jr., complained that he and his client had not been provided with
some of the documents upon which North was to be questioned until
only a few days before his appearance before Congress. Sullivan told
Senator Inoye that North "cannot be expected to accurately recall all
of the facts" or to provide "complete and accurate testimony" without
prior consultations with counsel.298 As Professor Applegate notes, the
comment probably came as a surprise to most viewers, who held the
"common belief that an honest witness simply takes an oath and testi-
fies."299 But Professor Applegate seconds Sullivan's remarks, arguing
that "[w] ithout an understanding of the underlying facts, witnesses
may be flustered at trial by statements of other persons or by docu-
ments of which they were unaware. ' 0°
The argument that the jury will accord undue importance to a
witness's confusion on the stand, whatever its merits at trial, has little
force in the context of a criminal investigation. An experienced prose-
cutor would far prefer to have the opportunity to question each wit-
ness without that witness first having been "prepared" and coached by
an attorney as to what others had testified. Such a prosecutor under-
stands that a witness will not perfectly recall events; indeed, a witness's
first recollection of events is apt to change when confronted with doc-
umentary evidence and the testimony of others. A witness may origi-
nally testify that topic Z was not discussed, but confronted with the
297 See Applegate, supra note 290, at 304 ("Lawyers frequently inform witnesses of
facts of which they were previously unaware by telling the witness directly or by com-
paring the testimony of witnesses possessing similar knowledge. There are compel-
ling reasons for informing a witness of other views, and most commentators do not
question the practice.").
298 Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Secret Mili-
tay Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Comm. To Investi-
gate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong. 3-5 (1987) [hereinafter Iran-
Contra Investigation]. The episode is discussed in Applegate, supra note 290, at
283-84.
299 See Applegate, supra note 290, at 283.
300 Id. at 304.
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secretary's minutes or with the testimony of others, the witness may
honestly change his opinion. The prosecutor will, or should, under-
stand that the original testimony was honest and even accurate, in the
sense that it reflected the witness's recollection at that time. Recollec-
tions change as a witness is presented with more evidence; the ques-
tion is whether the truth is more likely to emerge when a witness
originally does not know what others have testified.
It is important to recall, moreover, that the joint defense privi-
lege, as it has evolved, does not even require that attorneys act as in-
termediaries in the swapping of information. Parties working
together in a joint defense agreement can gather in a room and, as
long as one attorney, or even one agent of an attorney, is present, any
exchange will be privileged. Thus, it would be a simple matter for one
witness to address another witness and say, "My recollection is that we
never discussed X, Y, or Z. In fact, all I recall discussing is your son's
wedding," and the entire exchange would be privileged.301 Such a
conversation would clearly frustrate the search for the truth. As the
Supreme Court has noted, "if ... all witnesses remain in the court-
room while the grand jury investigation was going on to ensure that
all testified in a consistent manner, it cannot seriously be doubted that
this practice would hinder the grand jury in its task of uncovering the
truth."3 02
Bentham, as well as the modern critics of the attorney-client privi-
lege,30 -" reminds us that there is at least a question whether society
benefits when all clients, guilty and innocent, receive zealous legal ad-
vice. The limitations reflected in the traditional understanding of the
attorney-client privilege, such as the confidentiality requirement and
the restriction of the privilege to factual communications from a cli-
ent to an attorney, implicitly reflected an awareness that, beyond a
301 Thus, when two witnesses coach each other in the presence of an attorney, the
exchange is privileged, but if the same conversation occurs outside the presence of an
attorney, the exchange is not privileged. And sophisticated clients do give "legal" ad-
vice to one another. For example, FBI surveillance recorded mobster Sammy
Gravano lecturing a young member of the Gambino family:
You're called to the grandjury. You gotta take the fifth. Alright so far? Now
they give you immunity. What do you do?... [T) here is [sic] three things:
common sense, common sense is one part, seventy-five percent of the an-
swers. Another ten or fifteen percent... you gotta dance and bob and
weave. One, I didn't remember, I don't think so, or to the best of my knowl-
edge. Okay? Let's say fifteen percent, so that's seventy-five percent, so we're
up to ninety percent. Ten percent, you out and out lie.
United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Gir. 1995).
302 United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986) (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
303 See supra notes 74-75, 84 and accompanying text.
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certain point, legal advice can become, from society's perspective, too
zealous. There may be a socially optimal level of legal representa-
tion-advice that allows parties to be apprized of their rights, to ex-
plore contingent claims, etc.-but beyond that point, legal advice may
frustrate other goals of thejudicial system, including preeminently the
discovery of the truth.
C. Fairness: Symmetry Between Defense and Prosecution and the Role
of Secrecy
Another argument made on behalf of the attorney-client privi-
lege is that the privilege ensures the even-handed application of the
law.304 Likewise, proponents of the joint defense privilege argue that
it promotes fairness between the prosecution and the defense.30 5 The
prosecutor, it is said, has his own information-gathering device-the
grand jury-which operates in secret,30 6 and simple fairness dictates
that witnesses also be permitted to operate their own secretive
"shadow grand jury."30 7
This argument, which wraps the joint defense privilege in a pat-
ina of reasonableness, is fundamentally flawed. The prosecutor seeks
to gather evidence in secret, to be sure, but the preservation of secrecy
is not the prosecutor's raison d'etre. The prosecutor seeks to gather as
304 Professor Charles Fried, for example, has argued that it would be "immoral" to
constrain citizens from either learning of their rights or from learning from others of
their rights. See Fried, supra note 82, at 586. "Fairness" means that society should
allow individuals to determine what the limits of the law are in relation to oneself, and
this means societal recognition of a privilege that shields communications between a
client and an attorney.
305 See NEW YORK BAR RECOMMENDATION, supra note 17 (arguing that the joint
defense privilege "is rooted in common sense, efficiency and fairness"); Bartel, supra
note 17, at 873 ("A trial becomes a lopsided contest when multiple co-defendants are
discouraged from coordinating their defense and present unnecessarily inconsistent
defenses. Relegating defendants to uncoordinated and inconsistent defenses bestows
an unfair tactical advantage on the prosecution because inconsistent defenses impair
the credibility of the defense as a whole."); Capra, supra note 282, at 20 (asserting that
"pooling of information is often necessary to an effective defense or cause of action");
Foote, supra note 266, at 377 (explaining that "courts have welcomed the emergence
of the joint defense doctrine because sharing information among multiple defend-
ants is critical to effective representation"); Forsgren, supra note 241, at 1232 (stating
that "courts recognize that the joint defense doctrine 'can be necessary for a fair op-
portunity to. defend' in white collar cases" (quoting United States v. McPartlin, 595
F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir. 1979))).
306 Morvillo, supra note 109, at 3 ("Grand jury secrecy is heavily relied upon (by
prosecutors] to prevent subjects or targets of an investigation from learning about the
relevant facts and allegations." (citation omitted)).
307 Jed S. Rakoff, Tlw Drafping ofJoint Defense Agreements, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 9, 1995, at 3.
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much evidence as possible to determine whether a crime has been
committed and, if it has, to present that evidence to a factfinder. Se-
crecy is an instrumental good, for it protects the reputations of those
involved in an investigation, as well as enhances the likelihood of a
successful investigation. 308 If the prosecutor determines that no crime
was committed, then the evidence will never be revealed; if, however,
a crime has been committed, the evidence will be publicized in a trial.
Even prior to trial, if the prosecutor discovers evidence of wrongdo-
ing, he will typically present that evidence to a target and his attorney
in an effort to persuade him to plead guilty or simply to give him an
opportunity to present an innocent explanation. And after an indict-
ment, a prosecutor has a constitutional duty to disclose information to
the defense.30 9 The prosecutor, in short, engages in information-con-
trol practices only to further his true objectives-sorting the guilty
from the innocent and marshalling the evidence against the former.
By contrast, for the defense lawyer, secrecy and information-con-
trol are the paramount goals. During the investigation phase, "the
central theme of the white-collar crime defense function ... [is] to
keep potential evidence out of government reach by controlling ac-
cess to information."310 The defense attorney works to stem the flow
of information to the government from his client and from any third
party witnesses under his client's control;311 information control is
even sought in communications between the client and attorney.3 12 If
the defense attorney succeeds in preventing the prosecutor from
308 The Supreme Court has summarized the reasons for grand jury secrecy, as
required by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as follows:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated;
(2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and
to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning
the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with
the witness who may testify before [the] grand jury and later appear at the
trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclo-
sures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of
crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure
of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of
standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979) (quoting United
States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)).
309 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1999); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963).
310 MANN, supra note 45, at 5.
311 See i& at 124-80.
312 Lawyers often do not seek the full factual picture from their clients so as not to
trigger their ethical responsibilities. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAwYERs
445-51 (6th ed. 2002); MANN, supra note 45, at 103-23.
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learning about incriminating evidence and keeping it secret, then he
will have achieved his goal.3 1 3
In criminal procedure, then, "symmetrical," seemingly even-
handed rules can have asymmetrical consequences. Rules that equally
enhance the ability of the defense and the prosecution to deny infor-
mation to the other can benefit the defense, but gravely impair a crim-
inal investigation. 314
D. Efficiency
Finally, its proponents claim that the joint defense privilege pro-
motes "efficiency." The joint defense privilege is said to allow lawyers,
working in concert, to avoid duplicative efforts, thereby reducing legal
costs. 3 1 5
A response to this argument might begin by sounding a note of
surprise: why are lawyers so eager to decrease legal fees? The attorney-
client privilege plainly benefits lawyers by increasing the amount of le-
gal work relative to the work available to other professions. Account-
ants, investment bankers, and business consultants, who increasingly
compete with lawyers for clients, cannot promise their clients secrecy
in the wide range of circumstances that an attorney can. Thus, a cli-
313 By contrast, with respect to exculpatory evidence, the defense attorney will
have every incentive to disclose such evidence.
314 See William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REv.
1903, 1922 (1993).
315 See Bartel, supra note 17, at 873 ("The presentation of inconsistent defenses
also lengthens a trial's duration, consuming more of a court's time than otherwise
would occur. Deterring joint defense groups causes inefficiency that our criminal
justice system cannot afford .... ."); Joseph J. Ortego & David J.Vendler, Avoiding
Pitfalls of Joint Defense Groups, FED. LAW., June 1998, at 30, 37 ("[The joint defense
privilege] is a necessity, given today's concerns for limiting litigation expenses, avoid-
ing duplication of legal services, and expediting resolution of disputes."); Reiss &
Pacheco, supra note 246, at 2 ("[A] joint defense agreement may result in more effi-
cient and more effective case management. By dividing tasks, counsel can avoid du-
plication of efforts, thereby reducing costs."); Scheininger & Aragon, supra note 19, at
13 ("[A] joint defense agreement lets defendants share resources, thereby reducing
the staggering costs of defending a large case."); Kopta, supra note 266, at 154
("Greater freedom to exchange privileged information could reduce . . . legal
costs .... "); Rushing, supra note 15, at 1280 ("The policy underlying the joint-defense
privilege, then, is to promote the general efficiency of legal representation by giving
parties the tactical advantage of access to information in the possession of others.");
Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Culpable Employees, Attorney Ethics, and the
Joint Defense Doctrine, 58 TEX. L. REV. 809, 839 n.147 (1980) ("Society has an interest in
promoting cooperation among joint defendants to enhance the efficiency of litiga-
tion, a benefit that offsets the cost of any obstruction of truthfinding that the doctrine
might engender.").
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ent seeking secrecy will have no choice but to retain a lawyer, even
though other professionals might be able to offer similar services. 316
Lawyers have, predictably, defended the attorney-client privilege with
vigor, and one would also expect attorneys to lobby against the
privileging of communications between clients and other profession-
als, an expectation borne out by recent ABA opposition to a Congres-
sional proposal to extend a limited evidentiary privilege to
accountants. 317 Why, however, are lawyers so eager for courts and leg-
islatures to develop, expand, and render more certain a privilege the
purported consequence of which is to reduce legal work? Suffice it to
say, we need to probe further.
What such a probe first reveals is that, although the joint defense
privilege is touted for increasing efficiency, litigation arising out of
joint defense agreements has proven to be a growth industry. Joint
defense arrangements have prompted, as already indicated, govern-
ment motions to disqualify defense counsel on conflict of interests
grounds (when one member of ajoint defense agreement defects and
becomes a government witness),318 defense motions to dismiss indict-
ments (when the government secures information from a defector
that was protected by thejoint defense privilege),319 and suits for dam-
ages on the basis of breached joint defense agreements.3 20
Moreover, implicit in the claim that the joint defense privilege
increases efficiency is the idea that there is a finite amount of legal
work to do, and joint defense agreements simply permit attorneys to
divide up the work, to their clients' benefit. But in actual practice
joint defense agreements multiply the amount of work that attorneys
can do, even if there is no separate litigation as a result of the
agreement.
Consider a grand jury investigation involving ten witnesses. First
consider how the investigation might play out in the absence of ajoint
defense agreement. A witness with little knowledge of relevant events
is subpoenaed by the grand jury. The attorney interviews the client
316 See Fischel, supra note 84, at 3-8.
317 See Mark Thompson, A Taxing Matter: Lawyers Are Bracing for Competition from
Accounting Firms, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1998, at 17 (discussing ABA opposition to extension
of accountant's privilege).
318 See United States v. Anderson, 790 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Wash. 1992); United
States v. Bicoastal Corp., No. 92-CR-261, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21445 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.
28, 1992); United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (E.D.
Pa. July 30, 1992).
319 See United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1989).
320 See Kiely v. Raytheon Co., 914 F. Supp. 708 (D. Mass. 1996).
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before the grand jury appearance, accompanies him to the grand jury,
and does a relatively quick debriefing afterwards. There may be some
exchanges with other attorneys involved in the investigation, but in
the absence of a joint defense privilege, attorneys will be reluctant to
swap client confidences. There are limits, therefore, on attorney-
orchestrated strategizing.
Now consider how the investigation plays out with ajoint defense
agreement in place. Before any witness testifies, attorneys discuss
each of their client's stories; meetings and conference calls are con-
ducted, with many of the witnesses and attorneys present, to coordi-
nate a response to the investigation. After each witness testifies before
the grand jury, he is elaborately debriefed by his attorney. The attor-
ney then prepares a memorandum to be shared with other attorneys,
which explores not only the testimony given, but also the prosecutor's
questions, as a reflection of the prosecutor's knowledge and the direc-
tion of his case. Attorneys again conduct meetings and conference
calls, larding their bills with endless hours of "strategy sessions" or the
like. Absent ajoint defense agreement, cooperation among attorneys
may occur anyhow, but it will not be nearly as involved as when ajoint
defense agreement exists.
When proponents of the joint defense privilege argue that the
privilege reduces legal fees by permitting the consolidation and divi-
sion of work, they are looking, as it were, at only one side of the
ledger. The joint defense privilege may, on the one hand, reduce le-
gal fees by promoting a division of labor.3 21 But, on the other hand,
the privilege increases fees by enhancing a lawyer's opportunities to
perform work on his client's behalf. Without the joint defense privi-
lege, an attorney can himself use any information he develops in the
course of a representation to develop legal theories and formulate de-
fenses. AsJudge Easterbook notes, the attorney-client privilege serves
as a "species of property right in information," permitting the attorney
to realize a return on his investment in information.3 22 But that re-
turn is limited by the non-disclosure requirement, for the only poten-
tial buyer of the attorney-generated information is the prosecutor.
Once ajoint defense agreement is in place, however, the information
can be peddled to other persons under investigation and their law-
yers, as well as to the prosecutor. Because there are more potential
buyers for the attorney-generated information, the value of the infor-
321 One should, however, not overstate the efficiencies that should be credited to
the joint defense privilege. It is important to recall that much division of labor could
occur even without the joint defense privilege. See supra Part IV.A.
322 See Easterbrook, supra note 84, at 356-57.
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mation, formerly suppressed when the prosecutor enjoyed monop-
sony power, increases. 323 And as the value of attorney-generated
information increases, so too will the expected investment in legal ser-
vices. In short, the effectiveness of a lawyer's advice to his client has
likely increased as a result of the joint defense agreement, but so too,
in all likelihood, has his billable hours.
Even assuming, contrary to the above conclusion, that the joint
defense privilege works, on balance, to reduce the overall fees
charged by lawyers, the privilege may nonetheless generate externali-
ties that would need to be taken into account. Any fair assessment of
the joint defense privilege and the agreements it fosters must acknowl-
edge that they. increase the obstacles faced by prosecutors in a criminal
investigation. By fostering cooperation among persons under investi-
gation, joint defense agreements decrease the likelihood that any one
insider will cooperate with a prosecutor at the outset of an investiga-
tion. When evidence is not forthcoming from the parties themselves,
prosecutors and law enforcement officers will need to labor to find
other evidence. Such an expenditure of law enforcement resources is
a social cost absent from the calculus of those who tout the efficiency
of joint defense agreements. An alternative prosecutorial strategy in
response to ajoint defense agreement may be to offer generous deals
(principally involving a reduction of punishment) to entice one of the
insiders to testify. Here, again, joint defense agreements create exter-
nalities (shortened incapacitation of offenders, diminished deter-
rence, reduced fines recovered) that undercut claims as to the
"efficiency" of joint defense agreements.
It might be said in response that, especially with respect to certain
business and regulatory offenses, the criminal statutes themselves are
so indeterminate and the maximum statutory penalties so steep that
they "over-deter," for they deter more socially beneficial activities than
socially harmful activities.3 24 To the extent that joint defense agree-
ments force prosecutors to accept deals involving penalties less than
the statutory maximum, society, as well as the individuals under inves-
tigation, benefit, for the penalties then actually assessed are more ap-
propriately gauged to the offense.325
Whatever the merits of this argument, it is important to recognize
how far afield it is from the arguments on behalf of the joint defense
323 See STEARNS, supra note 288, at 118.
324 For example, payments to foreign officials, though criminalized in some cir-
cumstances, may entail zero social costs. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Govern-
ance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1270-71 (1982).
325 See Fischel, supra note 84, at 32; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 84, at 600.
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privilege ordinarily peddled today. To state this view plainly: the privi-
lege is socially beneficial because it increases the cost of investigating
and prosecuting crime; the increased investigation and prosecution
costs mean less effective enforcement, which in turn lowers expected
sanctions; and lower expected sanctions in turn means less compli-
ance with the criminal law, which is said to be desirable precisely be-
cause the criminal law itself is misguided. It is, perhaps, a sufficient
response to note that this argument is patently overbroad: we may
concede that some and even many criminal laws are misguided, but
few would argue that rll of them are. If so, then the better answer is
to reform those flawed laws, not change evidentiary rules and criminal
procedure in a way that hinders the enforcement of all criminal laws.
In sum, from society's standpoint, a "prisoner's dilemma"-which
depends on the impossibility of coordination and therewith the non-
existence of a joint defense privilege-may be more efficient than a
system in which joint defense agreements foster cooperation among
persons under investigation. The prisoner's dilemma increases the
likelihood that plea bargains can be quickly obtained from one in-
sider after another. An efficient criminal investigation is one that ex-
peditiously sorts the guilty from the innocent. Joint defense
agreements, which frustrate such sorting, are unlikely to promote
efficiency.
V. THE JoiNT DEFENSE PRIVILEGE RECONSIDERED
Courts and academics have failed to explain the doctrine of the
joint defense privilege or supply compelling policy justifications for it,
because they have been wedded to the ideas that surround the attor-
ney-client privilege. Having stripped away these misconceptions, this
Part tentatively proposes another justification for the joint defense
privilege in the context of a criminal investigation and in light of that
justification, a more precisely defined privilege.
Part V.A argues that the joint defense privilege is better under-
stood, and justified, as an attempt to alleviate the risk that an innocent
witness in a criminal investigation will be pressured by prosecutors to
falsely inculpate himself. This suggestion is then scrutinized in Part
V.B, especially in light of the possibility thatjoint defense agreements
might have the effect of entangling an innocent witness in a criminal
conspiracy. Ultimately, this Article is skeptical of the benefits of the
joint defense privilege even for the innocent witness, at least when the
privilege is broadly construed. Focusing on the plight of the innocent
witness, confronting the prisoner's dilemma of falsely incriminating
himself or facing steeper penalties, suggests a more narrowly tailored
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privilege. In Part V.C, I argue that the joint defense privilege should
be restricted to those currently under indictment or reasonably ex-
pecting to be indicted.
A. The Innocent Witness
We have already explored the power of the prisoner's dilemma in
eliciting testimony in a criminal investigation. 326 The prisoner's di-
lemma, however unfortunate for those confronting it, is a socially use-
ful tool in pressuring those naturally reluctant to incriminate
themselves and others to provide such testimony. One concern, how-
ever, is the possibility that the prisoner's dilemma may result in un-
truthful testimony, offered in the hope of appeasing the prosecutor.
An especial concern is that an innocent witness, confronted with the
threat of a significant penalty and unable to reach out to others under
investigation, may be pressured to falsely inculpate himself and
others. 327 The joint defense privilege may prove a boon to the guilty
in crafting false alibis, but that cannot be the end of our analysis, for
society benefits when the innocent succeed in defeating the prisoner's
dilemma. Thus, the joint defense privilege, although imposing sub-
stantial costs on society, may still be defensible if it promotes this goal,
even if it creates widespread procedural obstacles in all criminal
investigations.
One immediate way in which in which the joint defense privilege
may benefit the innocent witness is in facilitating her ability to obtain
legal advice. 328 For example, in a large-scale corporate investigation,
the corporation may provide attorneys for its employees, often on the
condition that they enter into ajoint defense agreement with the cor-
326 See supra Part I.A.
327 One should not overstate this possibility. An innocent person, especially one
advised by competent counsel, is usually in a better position than a guilty one to resist
the prosecutor's threats, and thereby to defeat the prisoner's dilemma. The efficacy
of the prisoner's dilemma depends upon a realistic basis for the prosecutor's claims to
possess evidence or information. If the prosecutor tells an innocent witness that he
possesses evidence against her, the claim is likely to be met with some skepticism, for
the innocent witness knows no such (reliable) evidence exists. Such a claim may,
however, be consistent with the facts as known by the guilty witness, who is likely to be
more vulnerable to the prisoner's dilemma as a consequence. See William J. Stuntz,
Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L REV. 761, 798 n. 114 (1989) (arguing
that the prisoner's dilemma is likely to exert greater pressure on innocent witnesses
than guilty ones).
328 See Bartel, supra note 17, at 883 (arguing that joint defense agreements "help
procure legal representation for people who otherwise might lack the financial means
to hire a lawyer").
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poration and freely share information. The joint defense privilege al-
lows such a transaction to occur.329
Moreover, an innocent witness, or a marginally culpable one,
pressured to provide falsely incriminating evidence, would benefit
from the ability to communicate with other witnesses. Such a witness
may lack the resolve, if isolated from other witnesses, to rebut the
charges. In other words, to defeat the prisoner's dilemma, communi-
cation and coordination with other witnesses will often be important.
An innocent witness may be tempted to succumb to the prosecutor's
threats unless he can obtain meaningful assurances from other wit-
nesses that they have not testified and do not intend to testify against
him. Indeed, a joint defense agreement may be more useful to an in-
nocent witness unexpectedly thrust into a criminal investigation than
a guilty one. Those who have embarked on a criminal conspiracy may
have forged meaningful bonds prior to the initiation of an investiga-
tion. Secrecy oaths, commonplace among criminal conspirators
across cultures, may diminish the power of a prosecutor's threats and
enhance the ability of those trapped in the prisoner's dilemma to de-
feat it.330 Thus, although a joint defense agreement may do little to
enhance the ability of organized crime individuals, for example, to
coordinate their response to an investigation, such an agreement may
prove invaluable to the truly innocent.
Finally, the innocent witness may benefit from the joint defense
privilege insofar as it is a bulwark against prosecutorial overreaching
and abuse. Although the topic of prosecutorial abuse has attracted
considerable scholarly attention of late,331 the utility of joint defense
agreements as checks upon prosecutorial overreaching has not been
considered. Where the prosecutor is convinced, rightly or wrongly,
that the target of the investigation is guilty, he may threaten her, when
all else fails, with perjury and obstruction ofjustice charges. A prose-
cutor with a weak case based on a violation of the substantive criminal
329 Nor should one assume that innocence necessarily obviates the need for legal
counsel in a criminal investigation. A prosecutor, unlike an omniscient observer, can-
not "know" that a witness is innocent, especially in the early stages of an investigation.
Other persons involved in the investigation may tell prosecutors, in honest error or to
deflect attention from themselves, that the truly innocent witness was not innocent at
all. A lawyer can assist the wrongly accused both in communicating informally with
the prosecutor to signal his innocence and in preparing the client to respond to the
false accusations.
330 See Richman, supra note 29, at 78 & n.35 (discussing Mafia secrecy oaths).
331 See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IoWA L. REv. 393 (2001); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Miscon-
duct in GrandJury Investigations, 51 S.C. L. REv. 1 (1999); Fred C. Zacharias, The Profes-
sional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001). '
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law may nonetheless have a stronger case that a false statement was
made, perhaps inadvertently, in the course of the investigation. The
joint defense privilege may mitigate this danger. Absent the joint de-
fense privilege, a party may testify before a grand jury with the genu-
ine desire to provide full and complete evidence, but he may
unintentionally omit a vital fact. The prosecutor could then claim
that this omission was willful and develop a criminal case based on it.
For example, a party may testify that he did not attend a certain meet-
ing or that a certain subject was not discussed at the time. This may
well be an honest, unrefreshed recollection. With a joint defense
agreement in place, however, the party may learn that others have
testified that such a meeting occurred before he is called to testify.
Their description of the meeting may jar his memory, allowing him to
give a more accurate account to a grand jury or to a law enforcement
officer. The joint defense privilege may thus protect the innocent by
preventing prosecutors from making baseless accusations and threat-
ening prosecutions on manufactured charges of perjury or obstruc-
tion of justice.
Although the joint defense privilege, viewed as a refuge for the
innocent witness thrust into a criminal investigation, is the best justifi-
cation for the joint defense privilege, it is not wholly convincing. As
an initial matter, it is true that joint defense agreements may enable
persons to obtain legal representation at no cost to themselves-be-
cause their fees are paid by others-but the disinterestedness of the
legal representation they receive may suffer as a result. An innocent
witness may be best advised to disassociate himself from the other per-
sons being questioned and to cooperate with prosecutors. The deci-
sion to cooperate is a "leap into the unknown," and the client, even a
sophisticated client, is likely to rely heavily on the advice of counsel.33 2
If the attorney's personal interest is aligned with that of another law-
yer, there is at least ground for the suspicion that the minor player
may not receive wholly independent and prudent legal advice.
B. The Joint Defense Privilege as a Trigger for Prosecutorial Overreaching
To the extent that a joint defense agreement hinders the prose-
cutor's access to information, it deprives him of the information with
which he can quickly sort the innocent from the guilty. Confronted
with such obstacles, the prosecutor can either fold up the investiga-
tion and decline prosecution or more aggressively seek out the infor-
mation that will advance the investigation (and thereby, perhaps, his
332 See Richman, supra note 29, at 73 (arguing that one should "appreciate the
critical role of defense lawyers in the decision to cooperate").
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career). The fallacy of those who laud the joint defense privilege and
the arrangements it fosters is the assumption that the prosecutor will
always choose the first option. In fact, the prosecutor may aggressively
pursue the case in a manner that makes the innocent witness worse off
than he was before entering into a joint defense agreement.
To be sure, a prosecutor confronts a world in which there are
more crimes to be pursued than there are hours to pursue them, and
declination of a difficult case would allow a prosecutor to develop
other, easier ones. But even if such considerations might incline the
prosecutor to discontinue an investigation, other factors may rouse
him to pursue it even more relentlessly in the face of seemingly insu-
perable obstacles. Federal prosecutors are, in part through self-selec-
tion, among the more aggressive members of the legal profession, and
such character traits are likely only exacerbated by the culture of
prosecutorial offices, where a reputation for declining cases is often
worse than a reputation for losing cases.333
Consider, again, a previously quoted passage in which a promi-
nent defense attorney extolled the virtues of joint defense agree-
ments. Lanny Breuer, former White House Special Counsel for
President Clinton, wrote, "In a world of only black and white, prosecu-
tors frequently view [a joint defense] arrangement as obstructionist
and fundamentally undermining their search for truth. While these feel-
ings are not surprising there is nothing prosecutors can do to object."334
But there are prosecutorial strategies in response to joint defense
agreements. A prosecutor, unable to gather evidence that either sorts
the guilty from the innocent or is sufficient to charge any person with
a substantive offense, may threaten to charge all involved with crimi-
nal conspiracy or its modern incarnation, a RICO violation.33 5 Such a
charge may have the effect of sweeping in the innocent, or only barely
guilty, with the most culpable parties. Then, the minor player will
confront the possibility of sanctions vastly greater than any injury to
society caused by his conduct.3 36 Moreover, one of the many aspects
of RICO that makes it so famously congenial to prosecutors is the lib-
333 On prosecutorial culture generally, see Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's
Duty to Truth, 14 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 318-25 (2001).
334 Breuer & Imbroscio, supra note 267, at S27 (emphasis added).
335 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
336 SeeWAYN- R. LAFAVE &AuSIN W. SCOTt,JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 6.8(a), at 588-89
(2d ed. 1986). As Professor Stunz has noted, moreover, "the extra punishment is not
necessarily justified as a penological matter, nor is the prosecutor likely to want actu-
ally to impose it on low-level figures in the criminal organization. The prosecutor's
interest is not in overpunishment but disclosure." Stuntz, supra note 314, at 1951.
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eral availability of pretrial forfeiture.337 During the Chicago U.S. at-
torney's investigation of the commodities market in the late 1980s,
traders were pressured to testify against their higher-ups during mid-
night visits by law enforcement agents. According to newspaper ac-
counts, traders reported that they were threatened with RICO
charges: "You like your house, you like your car? Your wife likes her
jewels? Well, they're ours now. '338
When information is not forthcoming, another prosecutorial tac-
tic is to subpoena the family members of witnesses who have failed to
provide evidence. Many criticized the Office of the Independent
Counsel's decision to subpoena Monica Lewinsky's mother to the
grand jury,339 but the occasional observer noted that the practice, un-
seemly or not, is utterly commonplace.3 40 Family members are, after
all, often privy to relevant evidence, and, other than spouses, none
can claim a privilege in the federal or state system.3 41 Prosecutors are
unlikely to deny themselves a potentially valuable source of informa-
tion when other sources prove unfruitful.
Another prosecutorial tactic is to ratchet up the pressure, and
potential exposure, of a witness who has not, in the prosecutor's opin-
ion, been altogether candid. I discussed above the utility of a joint
defense agreement in heading off a possible case for perjury. But sim-
337 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (1) (providing for the issuance of pretrial restraining
orders to preserve the availability of tainted assets for postconviction forfeiture, as
described in § 1963(a)).
338 Editorial, The Kinder, Gentler Hog Butcher, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1989, at A14.
RICO charges were also used to coerce testimony during Rudolph Giuliani's investiga-
tion of Wall Street figures. See L. Gordon Crovitz, How the RFCO Monster Mauled Wall
Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1050, 1059 (1990). Giuliani brought a RICO prosecu-
tion rather than a tax fraud case against the relatively small securities house
Princeton/Newport Partners because "RICO could be the rubber hose to bludgeon
Princeton/Newport officials into testifying against bigger fish." Id. Lawyers for
Princeton/Newport alleged, "'The primary purpose [of the RICO prosecution] in
this case is to coerce the testimony of the defendants against principals at Drexel
Burnham Lambert and Goldman Sachs.'" Id. They further claimed that prosecutors
told them-a claim denied by prosecutors-"that 'we have no real interest' in
Princeton/Newport, but that the firm 'can help us with Drexel Burnham and
others.... If you cooperate, fine. If you don't, we are going to roll right over you to
get where we want to go."' Id
339 See Vikram David Amar & Akhil Reed Amar, Justice: 10 Things We Learned From
Star, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1999, at M3; Juliet Eilperin, Gingrich Awaits Starr Report:
Speaker Reassures GOP Colleagues of Political Boon, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1998, at Al; Stuart
Taylor Jr., Must a Parent Testify?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1998, at 33.
340 See Davis, supra note 331, at 427.
341 See In re E.F., 740 A.2d 547, 549 (D.C. 1999) ("To our knowledge, no federal
court of appeals or state highest court has recognized a parent-child privilege, even
limited to confidential communications.").
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ilar dangers are not altogether eliminated. In this respect, the catch-
all "false statement" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, is a notoriously useful
prosecutorial tool, for its encompassing language covers any "false, fic-
titious, or fraudulent statement or representation ... in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch
of the Government of the United States. ' 342 There is no requirement
that the statement actually mislead investigators; the prosecution can
";create" a § 1001 case by asking a witness questions when she already
knows the answers. In the candid words of the Solicitor General in a
recent oral argument before the Supreme Court, the prosecution can
then "escalate completely innocent conduct into a felony. '3 43
Prosecutors have also taken aim at the attorney-client privilege
itself, exciting the especial ire of defense counsel. Prosecutors have
increasingly alleged that attorney-client communications were in fur-
therance of an ongoing crime, and a number of courts have been re-
ceptive, embracing an expansive approach to the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege-3"4 A prosecutor can also
342 Section 1001 provides in full:
[W] hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative,
or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent state-
ment or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or entry; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
343 Transcript of Oral Argument, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998)
(Docket No. 96-1579), Dec. 2. 1997, 1997 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 76, at *32-*33 (state-
ment of Solicitor General Seth Waxman); see also Brogan, 522 U.S. at 416 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) (warning about "overzealous" prosecutors using § 1001); Giles A.
Birch, Comment, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No,
57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1273, 1278 (1990)
[I]f an investigator finds it difficult to prove some elements of a crime, she
can ask questions about other elements to which she already knows the an-
swers. If the suspect lies, she can then use the crime she has prompted as
leverage or can seek prosecution for the lie as a substitute for the crime she
cannot prove.
Id. (citation omitted).
344 As one defense attorney noted, "The Department ofJustice seems to be push-
ing the envelope in trying to get courts to say that you don't need to have communica-
tions as the law has traditionally recognized in furtherance of crime or fraud, but
simply something that is related to a potential crime or fraud." Interview with Jan
Handzlik, Kirkland & Ellis and Vincent J. Marella, Bird, Marella, Boxer & Walpert, Los
Angeles, California, CORP. CRIME REP., Feb. 8, 1999, at 12, 14-15 (statement of Ian
Handzlik).
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pressure corporate managers to waive the corporate attorney-client
privilege or face indictment and stiffer penalties.345 Prosecutors have
lately been more vigorous in demanding information about the
source of legal fees, rejecting claims that such information is privi-
leged.3 46 And prosecutors have required participants in joint defense
agreements to sever their ties with the other joint defense members as
a condition of government cooperation.347 In short, the suggestion
that prosecutors are powerless in response to joint defense agree-
ments is woefully off the mark. Indeed, if Breuer's and Imbroscio's
claim was accurate, how could one explain the title of a recent ABA
Criminal Justice Section meeting: "Assault on the Privilege: Protecting
and Defending the Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product, and Joint
Defense Agreements in Criminal Investigations"? 348
There has been an outpouring of recent academic articles com-
plaining about such prosecutorial "assaults" and gesturing rather
broadly to an alleged rise in prosecutorial abuse.349 I would suggest
that one explanation for prosecutorial "overreaching" in the conduct
of investigations is that "the ever increasing sophistication of the white
collar defense bar,"350 and the proliferation of information-control
practices, such as the joint defense privilege, have spurred prosecutors
to more intrusive means of extracting information. This, in turn, may
drive defense counsel to be ever more active in their own efforts to
frustrate the prosecutor.
My suggestion has a counterpart in the academic literature. Pro-
fessor Stuntz has written recently about legislative responses to judi-
345 Robert Morvillo, a defense lawyer in New York City, has written,
The office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York routinely coerces corporate waivers of the privilege by informing corpo-
rate managers that their failure to waive the privilege will be evaluated in
determining whether the corporation has been sufficiently cooperative to
avoid indictment and/or a severe guidelines sentence.
Robert G. Morvillo, TheDecline of the Attorne-Client Privilege, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 1997, at 3
(citation omitted).
346 See, e.g., In reGrandJury Subpoena, 204 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2000) ("'IT]he
identity of the client, the amount of the fee, the identification of payment by case file
name, and the general purpose of the work performed are usually not protected from
disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.'" (quoting Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174
F.3d 394, 402 (4th Cir. 1999))).
347 See Breuer & Imbroscio, supra note 267, at S27.
348 Meeting of the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association (Feb.
7, 1999).
349 See supra note 331.
350 See Breuer & Imbroscio, supra note 267, at S27.
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cially created procedural protections for criminal defendants. 351
Stuntz argues that legislatures have emasculated many judicial protec-
tions by underfunding criminal defense counsel, increasing sentences
for numerous offenses, and vastly expanding substantive criminal lia-
bility.3 52 Stuntz argues, in other words, thatjudicially created criminal
procedure rules are (partly) driving an ill-advised expansion of the
substantive law, which in turn makes courts more protective of the
rights of suspects, and continuing on in a vicious cycle.
My claim is that another cycle may be occurring. As courts prove
more receptive to expansions of the attorney-client privilege, defense
counsel have exploited those advantages and proven more effective in
stymieing the prosecutors' access to information. But this, in turn,
has driven prosecutors to become more aggressive in their efforts to
obtain information. Not only legislatures, but prosecutors as well, can
respond to enhancements in criminal procedural protections. Thus,
although joint defense agreements are promoted as a check upon
prosecutorial abuse, they may have precisely the opposite effect. Joint
defense agreements, which prevent the expeditious acquisition of in-
formation, may galvanize a prosecutor to pursue ever more intrusive
techniques.
C. Rethinking the Contours of the Joint Defense Privilege: A New Model
for Its Justification and Scope
The most compelling argument for recognizing the formation of
joint defense agreements in criminal investigations is to protect inno-
cent witnesses being pressured by prosecutors to come forward with
evidence that falsely incriminates themselves or others. Society bene-
fits when the innocent succeed in defeating the prisoner's dilemma,
and to the extent that the joint defense privilege assists the innocent
witness in so doing, it may be justified on this basis. With that argu-
ment in mind, but against the backdrop of the significant costs of the
joint defense privilege when guilty parties avail themselves of the privi-
lege and when prosecutors ratchet up penalties in response to joint
defense agreements, we can sketch the appropriate contours of the
privilege. As with any evidentiary privilege, the joint defense privilege
should "'be strictly construed"'3 53 to achieve its objective-that is, to
protect the innocent person pressured to falsely incriminate himself.
351 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE LJ. 1 (1997).
352 Id. at 55-59.
353 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (quoting Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). The Supreme Court has stated that a privilege applies
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An appropriate entry to the question of the privilege's proper
scope is to consider when an innocent person is likely to face such
pressure. Someone who has been indicted and charged with a crimi-
nal offense is plainly in such a predicament. A prosecutor is likely to
condition a favorable plea bargain or sentencing reduction motion on
the defendant's willingness to falsely concede his own guilt and often
to provide testimony, of possibly doubtful veracity, against others. Es-
pecially after a prosecutor has indicted several people together, ajoint
defense agreement (and its concomitant information sharing) may
strengthen the determination of innocent defendants to resist the
pressure of the pending charges. Thus, where criminal litigation has
actually commenced, the joint defense privilege would, under this ar-
gument, be defensible.
More difficult questions arise prior to indictment in the context
of an ongoing criminal inyestigation. Most persons called to testify
before a grand jury, especially ones represented by counsel, have
some idea of where they fit in an investigation and what their expo-
sure is, if any, before entering the grand jury. A defense lawyer ordi-
narily requests that a prosecutor, before a grand jury appearance,
identify his client's "status," which can range from a target, to a sub-
ject, to a mere witness. 35 4 The United States Attorneys' Manual 355
(U.S.A.M.) defines a "target" as "a person as to whom the prosecutor
or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to the
commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is
a putative defendant,"356 and the U.S.A.M. defines a "subject" as "a
person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investiga-
tion." 5 7 "Witness" is the catch-all category for all other persons called
to testify.35 8 The definitions are somewhat imprecise, 359 and some-
only where it is "necessary to achieve its purpose," Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 403 (1976), and "promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need
for probative evidence." Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51.
354 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORIEys' MANuAL §§ 9-11.150 to
9-11.154 (Supp. 1992) [hereinafter UNITED STATES ArroRNEYs' MANUAL].
355 Although the U.S.A.M. does not confer any rights, see United States v. Lorenzo,
995 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993), it is regularly consulted by prosecutors in grand
jury practice.
356 UNITED STATES ATroRNEs' MANUAL, supra note 354, § 9-11.151.
357 Id.
358 Id. "Witness" can be used in the generic sense of anyone called to testify
before a grand jury, or it can be used in the more specific sense of someone with no
criminal exposure, that is, in contradistinction to a subject or target.
359 Indeed, interpretations vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and even from
prosecutor to prosecutor. For some prosecutors a target is someone virtually certain
to be indicted; others, adopting a more expansive interpretation of the U.S.A.M., ap-
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one's status can change over time.3 60
Nonetheless, the decisive point for our purposes is that a person
called to testify before the grand jury who is told that he is merely a
witness (in contradistinction to a target or subject) is under virtually
no pressure, at least from the prosecutor, to provide falsely incriminat-
ing testimony. Such a status carries no implied threat, and, as a conse-
quence, the party in no way confronts a prisoner's dilemma (i.e.,
provide false testimony against oneself or face steeper penalties). By
contrast, a party informed by the prosecutor that he is the "target" of
the investigation is impliedly being threatened and would be reasona-
bly fearful of indictment. Such a party is confronting a prisoner's di-
lemma and, even if he is innocent, may succumb to the pressure of
falsely incriminating himself to ward off indictment. The designation
of "subject" is the most indeterminate of the three, for the prosecutor
is signaling his concerns that the person might have committed a
crime but that there is insufficient evidence to know one way or other.
Ordinarily, the designation of "subject" is interpreted not as a threat
but as an acknowledgement of the prosecutor's ignorance.36'
The implications of this analysis are as follows. Only persons cur-
rently under indictment or reasonably anticipating the possibility of
indictment-that is, those identified by prosecutors as targets-
should be permitted to avail themselves of the joint defense privilege.
"Witnesses" in an investigation, facing no criminal exposure and
under no implied threat of possible indictment, have little need for
such a privilege because they are under virtually no pressure to falsely
incriminate themselves or others. Although those designated "sub-
jects" may not have the same degree of confidence, they are also not
in a prisoner's dilemma because the status of subject carries no im-
plied threat of impending indictment.
Where persons with relevant evidence, but facing no criminal ex-
posure, enter into joint defense agreements with the targets of the
investigation, the result is likely truth-defeating. The targets can then
shape their stories, or gauge their strategy, more fully informed about
the progress of the investigation. The truth is more likely to emerge
in a criminal investigation in which targets are isolated, as much as
ply the term to those linked to substantial evidence of guilt, but as to whom there is
still a question whether indictment will be pursued.
360 As more evidence emerges, one initially deemed a "witness" may later be
judged a subject or even a target: the bookkeeper once thought to be in the wrong
place at the wrong time may in fact be a knowing accomplice.
361 Reflecting this fact, the U.S.A.M. counsels prosecutors to notify targets of their
status but makes no similar suggestion for those who are subjects. See UNITED STATES
A-rroRNEs' MANuAL, supra note 354, § 9-11.151.
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possible, from others called to testify and thereby prevented from co-
ordinating strategy or fabricating alibis with non-targets. 362
Limiting the scope of the joint defense privilege may also protect
the witness with no criminal exposure. Although joint defense agree-
ments are celebrated for increasing the flow of information, it is often
unclear how such an information flow benefits an innocent person
testifying before the grand jury. He, after all, usually gains little from
learning what others have testified. And, in fact, a joint defense ar-
rangement poses significant risks to such a person, who may be drawn
into a criminal conspiracy in which he played little or no part. His
lawyer, perhaps paid by the target's lawyer, may encourage the witness
to shade his story in a way that benefits the target but which may
arouse the prosecutor's suspicions. Indeed, joint defense arrange-
ments often prove to be extremely coercive environments for minor
witnesses, for they are pressured to protect the targets of the
investigation.363
Following this new model, courts should resist the conclusion
that all persons questioned in a criminal investigation share a com-
mon interest and can, as a consequence, be permitted to enter into a
joint defense agreement. Where a witness has no criminal exposure
and has no reasonable expectation of being indicted together with the
targets of an investigation, he (and his lawyer) have no proper basis
for entering into ajoint defense agreement with others under investi-
gation. Only actual defendants and targets of an investigation, under
this approach, would typically be permitted to avail themselves of the
joint defense privilege.3 64
Limiting thejoint defense privilege to those who are either under
indictment or who face the reasonable possibility of indictment, it may
be objected, gives rise to line-drawing problems. How can one know,
it may be asked, in the midst of a criminal investigation, whether one
reasonably faces a risk of indictment? The objection, although worthy
of serious consideration, is not decisive. As an initial matter, there are
already thorny line-drawing problems surrounding the joint defense
362 See supra Part IV.B.
363 See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
364 It is already the case that targets of an investigation have protections that non-
targets do not. U.S. attorneys are encouraged to afford targets "an opportunity to
testify ... before the grand jury" before indictment, see UNITED STATES ATroRNEYS'
MANuAL, supra note 354, § 9-11.153, and are discouraged from subpoenaing a target,
absent special reasons. See id, § 9-11.151; see also id § 7-1.200 ("The Antitrust Division,
of course, follows the Department's general practice of informing individuals, under
certain circumstances, that they are targets of an investigation and advising them of
the opportunity to appear voluntarily before the grand jury.").
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privilege in the criminal context; as Part III argued, courts have incon-
clusively struggled to define the contours and scope of the joint de-
fense privilege.
More importantly, the rule proposed here dovetails with the rule
that already exists in civil litigation: only those with a "realistic basis"
for believing that they may be joint defendants (or plaintiffs) are per-
mitted to avail themselves of the privilege.365 Courts have erroneously
adopted the view that all persons questioned in a criminal investiga-
tion have a "realistic basis" for believing that they may end up asjoint
defendants. There is no empirical or logical support for this view; it
simply reflects an abdication of the courts' proper role in limiting an
evidentiary privilege, particularly one as novel as the joint defense
privilege, to the category of cases in which it is most justified.
The rationale for thejoint defense privilege proposed here-pro-
tecting the innocent person pressured to inculpate himself or
others-suggests a narrowing of the scope of the privilege in the con-
text of a criminal investigation. To accomplish this result, however,
no change is required in the basic tests already adopted by courts and
legislatures in recognizing the joint defense privilege. Rather, courts
need to adopt the same rule-a "realistic basis" of status as co-liti-
gants-in the same criminal context that already prevails in the civil
context. In the absence of a common legal interest, as occurs when
two or more parties face pending or reasonably anticipated litigation
together, the joint defense privilege should not be recognized.
CONCLUSION
Most commentators have treated resistance to the emergence
and expansion of the joint defense privilege as antiquarian and mis-
guided. This Article's goal is to force practitioners and academics to
confront a panoply of questions that surround the novel privilege,
questions that render its continual expansion of doubtful social utility.
As the title of the Article suggests, thejoint defense privilege may be a
refuge for the innocent, but it is also often a privilege to conspire:
courts need to make an effort to cabin the application of the privilege
to limit its costs.
The Article has aimed to strip away a number of misconceptions.
First is the assumption that the joint defense privilege is a necessary
corollary of the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege
is premised on the (still controversial) claim that society is better off
when clients are afforded a zone of privacy in consultations with their
365 Ghan v. City of Chicago, 162 F.R.D. 344, 346 (N.D. II. 1995).
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attorneys; such attorney-client privacy benefits society as a whole, it is
argued, because clients can make a full disclosure of factual informa-
tion to a person trained in the law. Such a rationale does not support
the sharing of confidential information with persons outside the im-
mediate attorney- client circle.
A second misconception is that any enhancement of the services
lawyers are able to render their clients is socially advantageous. Al-
though the attorney- client privilege is not costless, for it may result in
the withholding of relevant evidence from an adversary or factfinder,
it is said to be, on balance, socially desirable for a number of reasons:
fully informed, lawyers can apprize clients of their rights, assist clients
in efforts to conform their conduct to the law, and allow clients to
explore claims or defenses of which they were hitherto unaware. The
privilege is, however, circumscribed in scope and riddled with excep-
tions. These limitations, such as the confidentiality requirement, re-
strict the services an attorney can render a client to those deemed to
be, on balance, in society's interest.
A third misconception is that the "flow of information" that re-
sults from the joint defense privilege-principally, the sharing of cli-
ent confidences-necessarily benefits society at large. It is often in
society's interest to frustrate efforts among citizens to pursue coopera-
tive strategies. Especially in the context of criminal investigations,
joint defense agreements entail significant, although often unrecog-
nized, externalities. Like other procedural obstacles to criminal inves-
tigations, the joint defense privilege has a diluting effect on expected
criminal sanctions.
The strongest argument for recognizing the formation of joint
defense agreements in criminal investigations is to protect innocent
witnesses. To be more precise, it is to protect innocent persons who
are being pressured by a prosecutor to come forward with false evi-
dence that incriminates themselves or others. Society benefits when
the innocent succeed in defeating such a prisoner's dilemma. With
that argument in mind, but against the backdrop of the significant
costs of the joint defense privilege, this Article proposes to limit the
privilege to those currently facing indictment or who reasonably ex-
pect to be indicted.
More broadly, the Article highlights a neglected component of
the dynamic unleashed when courts extend certain kinds of procedu-
ral protections to criminal defendants. That legislatures may, regret-
tably, respond to judicially created rights by changing the substantive
law has recently been recognized. I suggest that prosecutors can, and
almost certainly will, respond as well. Confronted with obstacles such
as joint defense agreements, prosecutors can be expected to resort to
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a variety of tactics to extract information, tactics which, although per-
mitted by the courts, have been tarred as prosecutorial overreaching.
As defense attorneys play a more active role in packaging the informa-
tion that reaches prosecutors or staunching the flow of information
altogether, one should not be surprised to find prosecutors taking a
more active role in seeking to gather information.
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